


ADA050686

ONE FILE COPY



①
P.S.
② 27 Jul 77
③ 287 p.

D D C
RECEIVED
APR 2 1978
14507050
F

110 325

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

23 SEP 1977

ERRATA SHEET

p. iii, line 16 should read "Middle States Association of Schools and Colleges"

p. 4, insert ; on line 28 between "for" and "ethic"

p. 42, line 2, "agendas" should read "agenda"

p. 90, line 40, should read "of relative . . ."



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

DAPE-ZBW

27 July 1977

General Bernard W. Rogers
Chief of Staff
United States Army
Washington, DC 20310

Dear General Rogers,

Attached is the report of the West Point Study Group charged by you to examine all aspects of the United States Military Academy. The undersigned are in agreement with the findings and recommendations contained therein and recommend early attention be given to them.

The enthusiastic assistance accorded the Study Group by civilian and governmental institutions was of great value. The respect, deep concern, and great affection for the Military Academy evidenced throughout the country was not only heartwarming but inspired our work. We have been heartened by the dedication and quality of the cadets, faculty, and staff of the Military Academy and by the basic strengths of the institution. We note that West Point is changing and has changed even as we conducted our inquiry. We are encouraged by the initiative already taken to address many of the problems discussed in this report.

Deeply aware of the responsibility that you placed on us, we respectfully submit this report.

Sincerely yours,

Sincerely yours,

HILLMAN DICKINSON JACK V. MACKMULL JACK N. MERRITT
Major General, USA Major General, USA Brigadier General, USA
Chairman, Academic Chairman, Environment Chairman, Military
Committee Committee Professional Development
Committee



DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Letter of Transmittal	1
Preface	iii
Chapter I Introduction	1
Chapter II Recommendations	9
Chapter III The Environment	33
Chapter IV Governance	35
Chapter V Academic Program	60
Chapter VI Military Professional Development Program	96
Chapter VII Intercollegiate Athletics	125
Chapter VIII Extracurricular Activities	133
Chapter IX Honor Code and System	136
Appendices	
A Borman Report Recommendations, Army Response, Study Group Recommendations	143
B Committee Members and Consultants	152
C Research Log	162
D Board and Committee Structure	164
E Admissions	173
F Institutional Functioning Inventory	177

ACCESSION for				
NTIS	White Section <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
DDC	Buff Section <input type="checkbox"/>			
UNANNOUNCED <input type="checkbox"/>				
JUSTIFICATION <i>Par</i>				
BY _____				
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES				
DIS	FOR SPECIAL			
<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>				

PREFACE

In the aftermath of the cheating incident of 1976, the Chief of Staff of the Army felt the need for a broad, searching examination of the entire U.S. Military Academy and saw in the climate of healthy self-examination the opportunity to make such changes as might be found necessary. Thus, in early January, he directed the formation of the West Point Study Group and charged it to study, not simply those aspects pertaining to Honor, as in the case of the Borman Commission, but with a thorough review of all aspects of the Academy. The Study Group drew its members and consultants from the active Army, Department of Army civilians, Federal Service employees and leaders of the academic and business community. Military members represented a spectrum of military branches, experience, educational disciplines and varied service at the Academy. Some had no previous relationship with West Point. Consultant recommendations were solicited from many sources: the National Academy of Sciences, the National Institute of Education, the Middle States Association of Schools Colleges, the Department of Defense including all three services, the Library of Congress and other appropriate civilian organizations. A detailed list of committee members appears at Appendix B. The Study Group operated under the general auspices of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and consisted of three committees--Academic, Environment and Military Professional Development--each under the guidance of a general officer.

Over the next 7 months, the members of the Committee probed relevant aspects of the Academy employing a variety of techniques. To develop a data base, the Study Group conducted numerous interviews, made many visits, administered questionnaires and studied a wide field of available literature. The Group consulted with members of the Army staff, the Superintendent, Dean and Commandant of the Academy and over 300 members of the Academy staff and faculty, as well as the superintendents, deans, commandants and faculty of the other U.S. service academies and the Canadian, British, German and French academies. The Group also interviewed nearly 600 cadets and several cadets and midshipmen from the Air Force and Naval academies. Over 40 general officers, active and retired, were contacted to determine what those who had achieved professional success might suggest to improve the Academy and its graduates. Still other interviews included leaders of the academic community.

The Study Group made fact-finding visits to numerous locations including all U.S. and five foreign service academies. The Group also visited 16 private or state colleges or universities. Visits to active Army educational institutions included the US Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, and seven Training and Doctrine Command Schools. Study Group members visited nine Army divisions. Questionnaires were administered to nearly a thousand newly-commissioned lieutenants and over 700 of their commanders and subordinates. Question-

naire responses from Academy personnel included over 1600 cadets and nearly 400 staff and faculty. The Study Group also elicited letter responses from current corps and division commanders, major command chiefs of staff, commandants of combat and combat support arm schools and separate brigade and regimental commanders.

Research efforts embraced a wide variety of material to include accreditation reports of both the United States Military and Naval Academies. The Group reviewed previous studies of the various academics such as the reports of the Folsom Committee, the Keppel Board, the White Committee and the General Accounting Office. Equally useful were the annual class questionnaires and surveys of graduates. The Group also studied a number of commercially published works.

The Study Group defined objectives and measures of success, generated discussion, evaluated alternatives and recommended actions and topics for further study. Military Academy personnel participated and assisted the work in many ways, as did many other Department of Army organizations. The Study Group particularly appreciates the willing help and advice received from individuals throughout the country. Former military men were generous in their aid. Busy educators enthusiastically provided invaluable help and perspective. The affection and concern for the Military Academy throughout the country have been inspiring to all who have participated.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPT

A. Introduction

Responding to guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Army, the West Point Study Group examined the United States Military Academy and found it basically a sound institution. This report summarizes the ways in which the Group believes this institution can be made even better. The Electrical Engineering 304 cheating incident in the Spring of 1976, the Report of the Special Commission on the U.S. Military Academy (the Borman Report) in December 1976, and our review indicate that the Academy has fallen victim to a number of problems which in complex and subtle ways have compounded. The Study Group believes that these problems can be solved by prompt and vigorous action to carry out the recommendations of the Borman Commission, the West Point Special Actions Group, and this report. The following report is inevitably problem oriented. It makes no attempt to chronicle the many excellent aspects of West Point, and there are aspects of every part of the Academy which inspire admiration.

The problems assume a variety of specific forms, but certain generalizations are possible. First, the Study Group notes a slackening of the pursuit of excellence. It appears everywhere in cadet life but is most troubling in the academic program. Many cadets, of course, vigorously work for academic achievement. A significant number, however, do not. Some even attempt to discourage other cadets from seeking academic distinction, using methods which range from casual disparaging remarks to conscious manipulation of peer evaluations. There are similar denigrations of military training, athletic prowess and of adherence to the highest ethical and professional values. One may assert correctly that such attitudes are abundant in every undergraduate institution. We believe, however, that the National Military Academy bears a special responsibility for excellence.

Second, the Study Group observes a concomitant decline in the standards demanded of cadets by the Academy, perhaps in part because of concern for attrition. Marginal scholastic performances do not preclude graduation. Even the frequency of success on the playing fields has declined. There is a pervasive need to set and enforce standards in all aspects of the cadet experience.

A third general problem identified by the Study Group is an apparent lack of accepted common objectives for the whole institution, an uncertainty of purpose which repeated recitation of the mission statement cannot disguise. There is a disturbing lack of comprehensive supervision and long-range planning. There are too frequent examples of unclear assignment of responsibility and authority. Senior officials seem overly occupied with minor administrative matters. The Superin-

tendent's span of control is excessive, and the brevity of his tour conflicts with the need for continuity in that position. The Dean and the senior faculty—all tenured and steeped in knowledge of the Academy—are teamed with transient counterparts in the Department of Tactics. At the junior officer level, the faculty comes from the upper quartile academically, while the tactical officers are overwhelmingly from the lower half. There are doubts and conflicts about the role of tactical officers, the place of women in the Army, and priorities in the education and training of cadets—to name but three contentious issues. Cleavages exist between faculty and non-faculty, academic and military, senior and junior, tenured and non-tenured, male and female, officer and cadet. Rather than joining in pursuit of a common goal, the various elements follow their separate aims, lacking in true communication, uninformed of each other's interests, each believing his own programs should be afforded first priority, often competing for cadet time.

Not surprisingly, cadets frequently find themselves whipsawed among conflicting requirements that show little toleration for other demands. Multiple tasks rigidly scheduled so fragment each day that cadets seldom enjoy the satisfaction of concentration on a single activity, whether academic, military, athletic, or recreational. The large number of courses required for graduation and the few options for electives result in scattered academic attention and limited opportunity for study in depth. The need to improve management of cadet time is heightened by the existence of cadet chain of command duties (sometimes unnecessary or unimportant), the rigors of physical education and sports schedules, and a large number of attractive extracurricular, recreational, and cultural activities.

The Study Group found that a relatively humorless atmosphere seems to prevail. True, West Point is a serious place engaged in a serious purpose. It has always been so but did not always lack the lightheartedness and zest that characterize most groups of young people who are presumably following a freely chosen path. A certain grimness marks many of the cadets, an outlook which may blind them to many of life's humorous aspects and rob them of much of the enjoyment of their four-year experience.

Fourth, the Academy is not institutionally sensitive to evidence of the need for change nor is it organized to be decisive in making changes. Problems are identified falteringly and solved hesitantly. Most tradition-laden institutions change slowly, and this characteristic can and has been a strength. West Point must not scrap fundamental principles and mimic every fad. Indeed West Point has avoided much of the trauma and turmoil experienced by other institutions of higher education and

has retained features to which the best colleges are now returning. For this we compliment the Academy. But a healthy institution also confidently identifies its own weaknesses and aggressively moves to correct them. The Study Group sees a number of areas at the Academy which call for such attention. There should be a review of all pedagogy in both the educational and training programs; poor courses should be improved or eliminated; a major effort to improve cadet writing should begin; quality standards for graduation should be established. Measures should be taken to reverse the intellectual inbreeding of the faculty and staff and to increase their participation in the educational mainstream of the country. The pervasive negative effects of the General Order of Merit, the Leadership Evaluation System, and the Disciplinary System should be recognized and curbed. The contemporary leadership style of the Army at large should replace the autocratic style which too often is seen at the Academy and which impairs the effectiveness of young graduates in their initial tours. Admission standards, especially the demanding physical fitness requirements for women, should be reviewed. The Academy should address the problems of the intercollegiate athletic program; the need for clear direction, for support from all quarters, for improved facilities.

Finally, the Study Group wishes to reaffirm the importance of the Honor Code to the central purpose of the Academy and to stress the need for all aspects of Academy life to be organized and conducted to support the Honor Code and the highest ideals of the military profession. Recent reforms in the Honor System seem efficacious but should be re-evaluated in the near future. What should never be forgotten is that honor taken for granted is honor lost. The Electrical Engineering 304 episode underscores that hard lesson. The development of personal and professional integrity is a process of continuing education and renewal for all cadets and all officers. The Academy should be a wellspring of this process for the Army.

The Study Group concludes this introduction by offering as our first recommendation the adoption of the following Concept of the U.S. Military Academy. This statement is the Study Group's effort to explain what the Academy should do to accomplish its mission and to remedy the lack of accepted common objectives. Chapter II contains the specific recommendations judged necessary by the Study Group to solve the current problems of the Academy. Chapters III - IX present the findings which emerged from the Study Group's investigations, along with detailed explanations of the resulting recommendations. The Study Group submits its report with confidence in the fundamental strength of the Academy and with a desire to ensure its full health and vitality.

B. Concept for the U.S. Military Academy (proposed for adoption and written in a tense appropriate for that purpose).

The mission of the United States Military Academy is to educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate shall have the character, leadership, intellectual foundation and other attributes essential to progressive and continuing development through a career of exemplary service to the nation as an officer of the regular Army.

The educational and training programs of the Military Academy should inspire cadets to dedicate themselves to careers of selfless service to the country as professional military officers. This goal requires cadets to adopt without reservation the ideals inherent in the motto Duty, Honor, and Country. All aspects of the Academy must support and reinforce this objective.

In accomplishing its mission, West Point leads young men and women through the transition from civilian to officer. The time for each phase of this transition--from civilian to cadet and from cadet to officer--resists precise definition and varies among individuals. Thus, each stage raises questions about cadet progress. Such questions might address the time at which cadets develop a mature concept of honor or duty and when they are prepared for the responsibilities of leadership. These issues prompt continuing debate and constant efforts to improve the five integrated programs that coalesce to form the West Point environment: Academic, Character Development, Military Professional, Athletic, and Extracurricular Activities.

1. Academic Program. The Academic program constitutes a fundamental building block of the four-year experience. It provides the intellectual bases for future education and training, both academic and professional; for the formulation of a personal ethic for the development of character; and for effective decisionmaking. During the academic year, this program has the highest priority.

The academic program provides a high quality education in a challenging military environment, preparing cadets mentally for the rigors of a career of service, in peace or war. The program lays a foundation for developing the judgment and ethics required of professional Army officers. It develops an appreciation of society and the role of the military in it; it fosters an interest in world issues. The learning process enhances the ability to sort information and develop associations among the variety of ideas and facts and then to apply these to defining and solving problems, both practical and theoretical. Equally important objectives are: developing self-confidence; learning to allocate time and resources judiciously; learning to make reasoned judgments; and learning to write and speak with clarity and precision.

A desire for academic excellence is a central theme of the academic program. High achievement reinforces intellectual interests develops habits of continuous self-criticism and improvement and permits a full realization of potential.

Although specialization in the accepted sense is not a primary goal of the academic program, cadets receive exposure to the basic intellectual disciplines that would support post-baccalaureate education and later specialization.

Cadets are introduced to the theoretical and applied sciences and engineering, the social and behavioral sciences, language, and the humanities. This required grouping of courses is designed to establish a foundation in the mathematical and experimental methods of the physical sciences and their application to science and engineering; an understanding of the concepts, methods of analysis, historical and quantitative techniques of the social sciences; an appreciation of the important scholarly, literary, ethical, cultural, religious, and other institutional foundations of society; and an understanding of human behavior. Building upon this general education, cadets select concentrations in at least one field or discipline to develop the confidence that comes from fuller knowledge and to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. Unifying themes in the disciplines are sought so that cadets may experience the power and recognize the consequences of the integration of learning.

The academic program emphasizes understanding and use of general principles rather than the memorizing of detailed techniques of solution. Cadets must be capable of stating a problem, selecting an appropriate approach to solving it, producing a solution, and interpreting it to others.

Cadets must have time to reflect, to synthesize, and to gain the confidence that comes from true understanding. This requirement means that adequate time for study, free from distraction, must be available during the academic year. Administrative procedures must be closely and continuously monitored to detect those encroaching on cadet study time.

Learning constitutes the most important undertaking of the academic year. Cadets must sense staff and faculty interest in them and dedication to their development, but simultaneously they must recognize their personal responsibility to meet prescribed standards. A reasonable choice of electives and a constant awareness of the relevance of the material studied to future work at the Academy and to a career in the Army will enhance motivation for study. Broad and general in nature, the academic program meshes with a calling, the demands of which are equally broad.

2. Character Development Program. The character development program assists cadets in constructing a personal moral code that will sustain them through a career of Army service. This program has its theoretical roots in the academic program. Academic preparation in the philosophical development of moral precepts builds a framework for the reasoned development of moral percepts. Ethical implications of each discipline require constant emphasis. Additionally, voluntary religious activities enhance spiritual development and heighten awareness of moral issues. Furthermore, each member of the staff and faculty should act as a model for cadets by demonstrating personal responsibility and integrity of the highest order. The cadet Honor Code and System challenge the cadets and furnish the opportunity for introspection and moral growth at West Point and during their whole military career.

The Honor Code forms the cornerstone of the ethical structure of cadet life. Although the Honor Code is not a comprehensive prescription for ethical behavior, it contains a set of irreducible standards common to all honorable people--refusal to lie, cheat, or steal. Additionally, the Honor Code includes the tenent of self-enforcement. The Honor System applies the Honor Code to cadet life, demanding that the cadets practice daily the precepts of the Code.

A high standard of personal honor remains a basic expectation of men and women in the profession of arms. As novice officers, cadets must quickly recognize that moral rectitude is a prerequisite for those entrusted with the quardianship of a self-governing society. Cadets should be nothing less than completely honest in dealings with subordinates and superiors who depend daily on the correctness of their actions. Newton Baker has reminded all that "the inexact or untruthful soldier trifles with the lives of his fellow men and with the honor of his government." The Honor Code and System should provide cadets a basis for continuing ethical development both as cadets and as officers.

3. Military Professional Development Program. The Military Professional Development program makes West Point unique. Throughout the four-year experience, the cadet gains an intellectual appreciation of the profession of arms unavailable elsewhere. During the four-year program, the cadets receive an appropriate balance of theory and practice in the school of the soldier. This balance appropriately reflects the total purpose of the Academy. Three objectives guide the military professional development program. The first aim is to have cadets understand classical and contemporary concepts of warfare. Second, cadets must develop individual military skills and be able to apply them in leadership situations and responsible staff and technical assignments. Finally, cadets study the techniques of command and gain an appreciation of the principles of leadership. During the academic year, the Military Professional Development program gives the cadet unique intellectual depth in the military profession through courses in Military Systems,

Modern Warfare, Decisionmaking, Battlefield Simulation and the like. This instruction complements the more traditional courses in Psychology, Leadership, Military Law, Military Art (History), and related electives.

During the summer training period, cadets learn to apply military skills in extended leadership laboratories in a variety of settings. These exercises challenge cadets in such diverse areas as supervising and training subordinate cadets, holding positions with the U.S. Army in the field, and participating in special activities.

The sum of these summer experiences combines with the classroom contributions to produce graduates well prepared to enter post-graduate military training and subsequently to assume the duties and responsibilities of a commissioned officer.

4. Athletic Program. The fourth element of the West Point experience is the athletic program. This program reinforces the other three by providing the opportunity for personal growth in a physically vigorous, competitive environment. In addition, it provides recreational release from a crowded, demanding daily schedule, while emphasizing the development of the individual strength and endurance required in the field Army. The program gives a strenuous introduction to individual combative skills and stresses the importance of maintaining high levels of physical fitness. The advanced program teaches sports which cadets can pursue in later years and encourages them to excel in at least one. While focusing on individual development, the program also provides a foundation for structuring physical fitness programs for Army units.

Intramural and intercollegiate athletics further reinforce the pursuit of excellence that is fundamental to all aspects of the Academy. But they also develop teamwork and leadership skills. Vigorous competition occurs, but athletic victory is never an end in itself. Intramural competition should be sufficiently intense to generate interest but not to the degree that cadets impair their studies. The intercollegiate and intramural programs, club sports, and the physical education program must be integrated to emphasize the continuing professional and character development of the cadet.

5. Extracurricular Activities. Extracurricular activities represent the final dimension of the West Point experience. Extracurricular activities encompass religious activities, recreational sports clubs, community programs, cultural activities, military skill programs, and academic clubs. These programs emphasize the development of the cadet's intellectual, physical, and professional skills in an environment conducive to personal growth, and simple enjoyment. Recreational sports clubs emphasize life-long activities such as sailing and skiing. Community assistance programs, such as scouting or youth team coaching,

reinforce a commitment to service. Programs related to military skills such as orienteering contribute to professional development. Cultural activities permit cadets to expand their awareness of art, music, and the theater and to experience personal achievement in these areas. Finally the academic extracurricular programs provide for expanded interaction with other cadets outside the classroom and for the exchange of ideas with students at other universities. The entire extracurricular program expands the range of cadet contacts and opens the Academy to a wide range of attitudes, ideas, and pastimes.

Thus the major Academy programs foster continuing intellectual, character, and professional development. They do so in an environment that emphasizes subordination of self to the interests of the Nation. The Academy seeks to develop an inquiring, enlightened military leader. These words summarize what the Academy must do to fulfill its mission.

CHAPTER II

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations fall into three categories: one contains recommendations without qualification and two are conditional. The two conditional groups are "Experiment with," indicating a recommendation for trial with a small group of students for a limited time and "Consider," pertaining to areas where a problem clearly exists but supporting data are insufficient to permit a firm recommendation. For purposes of clarity, the underlining has been continued in the text of the recommendations. Page numbers in parentheses indicate location of discussion in the body of the report. This format has been adopted to facilitate use by the Academy in identifying recommendations of the Study Group.

Internal Governance

1. Ensure that the Superintendent serves in office a term of four to eight years and that he has demonstrated competence as an academic. A longer term will provide stability and continuity of policy and contribute to academic excellence. (p. 39)
2. Change the function of the Academic Board from implementing policy to providing policy advice on academic matters to the Superintendent, except in discharging duties prescribed by statute. Include Director of the Office of Physical Education, the Director of the Office of Military Instruction, and the Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. (pp. 36-39, 40)
3. Establish an Academy Policy Board with the mission of providing advice to the Superintendent on all policy matters having general significance for the Academy. (pp. 39-41)
4. Alter the structure of boards and committees as shown on page 53 to reflect the missions of the Academic Board and the Policy Board. Delegate to responsible officials and committees policy implementation authority insofar as practicable. (pp. 39-41)
5. Reduce the personal involvement of heads of academic departments in governance activities, particularly by curtailing their participation on boards and committees. This measure will permit them to concentrate their efforts on their departments, their teaching, and their disciplines--in short, on academic excellence. When a head of department is elected to serve on the Policy Board, consider replacing him on the Academic Board with another tenured faculty member of his department. (pp. 38, 78)

6. Increase participation by other tenured and non-tenured staff and faculty in the governance of the Academy. This action will lead to a wider range of talent and viewpoints in governance and to a deeper commitment to the vitality of the institution on the part of those groups. (p. 38)

7. Strengthen the roles of the Superintendent, the Dean, and the Commandant in the governance structure. Certain committees should report directly to the Dean and the Commandant rather than to boards or other committees. Executive functions formerly performed by committees should be done by the Dean and the Commandant within policy guidelines set forth by the Superintendent on advice of the various boards. (pp. 43-45)

8. Establish the Office of Policy, Plans and Analysis with responsibility for institutional research to include data collection and analysis; long-range planning; assisting the Superintendent in setting the agendas of the Policy and Academic Boards, the Board of Visitors, and the USMA Advisory Committee; and coordinating the scheduling of all significant activities at the Academy. The Director should be a colonel whose tour should be 4-5 years and who will also serve as Secretary of the Policy Board. (pp. 41-43)

9. Develop a data bank and a research and evaluation program on possible and probable candidates, appointees, cadets and graduates. This information will permit measurement of attitudes and performance at selected benchmarks. (p. 42)

10. Establish a Faculty Council consisting of all tenured faculty and staff members, and two non-tenured faculty members from each academic department representing their non-tenured colleagues. The Dean should serve as its chairman; the Council should meet with the Superintendent in order to facilitate communications between the Superintendent and the faculty. (p. 43)

11. Expand the membership and tenure of the Superintendent's Honor Review Committee. The Committee reports to the Superintendent but should also transmit its reports to the Policy Board for consideration and comment. (p. 43)

12. Establish a Committee on Professional Development and a Committee on Cadet Life as standing committees of the Policy Board to ensure continuing review of all aspects of the educational training and extracurricular programs of the Academy. (p. 165)

13. Establish temporarily the position of Deputy Superintendent, a fourth general officer position. During the early years following this report it is expected that the Superintendent, Dean and Commandant will be devoting much of their attention and energies to the careful examination of the Academy's programs. The addition of a

Deputy Superintendent during that period will allow the Superintendent to focus his efforts on those areas requiring his personal attention and reduce his personal span of control within the governance structure. (pp. 48-50)

14. Reorganize the Academy's staff structure in accordance with existing Army regulations thereby reducing the Superintendent's span of control. Establish an Office of the Deputy Post Commander and organize a directorate staff to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities. (pp. 48-52)

15. Establish the Director of Automation and Training Support as single manager for all Academy automation and instructional technology resources and procurement actions to improve the interface with Department of the Army Staff in those areas and to facilitate improvements. (p. 43, 51)

16. Establish both an Academy Computer Advisory Committee and an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) User's Group. Also, formalize an ADP Master Plan to include evaluation and provision of necessary support to the USMA Preparatory School. (pp. 43-44)

17. Expand the computerized Cadet Information System and improve computer support to cadets and administrators.

18. Restructure the existing Department of Tactics redesignating it as the Office of the Commandant. Redesignate the Office of Physical Education and the Office of Military Instruction as the Department of Physical Education and the Department of Military Instruction. (p. 51)

19. Establish the Department of Military Development (within the Office of the Commandant) under the new position of Brigade Tactical Officer to reduce the Commandant's span of control. (p. 51)

20. Redesignate the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership as the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, an academic department under the supervision of the Dean. Transfer such staff service functions as personal counseling, Cadet Troop Leader Training, and Leadership Evaluation System to other departments of the Office of the Commandant. (pp. 40, 51-52)

21. Establish the Office of the Director of Cadet Activities with responsibility for the existing Cadet Activities Office and selected Cadet Treasurer functions now under the control of the Superintendent's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The Director should have tenure and, in the near term, report to the Deputy Superintendent. (p. 51)

Admissions (pp. 44-45, 173-176)

22. Undertake a more aggressive recruitment program.
 - a. Improve the information provided to members of Congress.
 - b. Develop a program for early acceptance of outstanding applicants.
23. Change admissions procedures to limit the cases decided by the Academic Board to those which are major deviations from admissions policy.
24. Restrict athlete recruitment to candidates with demonstrated ability or potential for outstanding contribution in a sport, along with ability to perform satisfactorily in the academic and military training programs.
25. Permit class quotas to remain unfilled should insufficient numbers of fully qualified applicants be found in the candidate pool.
26. Change the title of the Director of Admissions and Registrar to the Director for Admissions.

External Governance

27. Establish the USMA Advisory Committee to meet two to four times each year to advise and assist the Superintendent. Members should be nominated by the Superintendent, approved by the Chief of Staff and appointed by the Secretary of the Army. Consecutive appointments not to exceed six years should be managed so that not more than one-third expire each two years.

A chairman and about 12 members should be selected all of whom have distinguished civilian or military backgrounds. There should be no ex-officio members. Provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App 1) apply. The panel should have a Secretariat stationed at West Point.

The committee should advise the Superintendent at least annually and reports should be forwarded to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and the Board of Visitors. (pp. 46-48)

28. Establish ad hoc Visiting Committees under the aegis of the Advisory Committee to assess departments and other agencies. (p. 47)

Shaping Cadet Academic Attitudes

29. Reduce graduation requirements to approximately 40 academic courses. (pp. 65, 66-68, 71-75)
30. Restructure the curriculum to allow sufficient specialization to take advantage of individual cadet interests and aptitudes. (pp. 70, 73)
31. Eliminate all orders of merit which establish relative ranking of cadets from first to last. (pp. 65, 90)
32. Eliminate the normative grading system for physical fitness tests and physical education; establish minimum standards. (pp. 63-64, see also Item 126)
33. Improve the interdepartmental coordination of scheduling for examinations and papers. (p. 65)
34. Ensure involvement of the Superintendent, Dean, Commandant and other senior members of the staff and faculty in academic activities such as counseling, faculty seminars, cadet seminars, lectures or classes in order to maintain contact with and demonstrate interest in scholastic pursuits. (pp. 77-79)
35. Consider initiating a faculty/tactical officer interchange with some officers serving two years as instructors and two as tactical officers. (See also Tactical Department, Item 115). (pp. 81-82, 98-100)
36. Include in the orientation of new staff and faculty information on the importance of mutual support among all components of USMA stressing the harmonious relationship required to achieve the common goal. (See Tactical Department, Item 113). (pp. 81-82, 98-100)
37. Restructure the Leadership Evaluation System to eliminate peer ratings and their potential to encourage undesirable behaviors. (See also the Corps of Cadets, Item 131). (pp. 64, 111-113)
38. Reorganize the cadet chain of command and other military duties to eliminate unnecessary administrative details and inefficiencies which interfere with study activities. (See also the Corps of Cadets, Item 130). (p. 111)
39. Administer on a periodic basis the Institutional Functioning Inventory of the Educational Testing Service to provide the Academy's leadership information on attitudinal trends. (pp. 66-67, 177-181)

Academic Curriculum

40. Improve the quality of instruction, and enforce uniformly high standards of student performance. (pp. 80-82, 89)
41. Draft objectives for each department indicating the learning outcomes pertinent to core curriculum course offerings. Integrate all the various aspects of the cadets' educational experience. (p. 67)
42. Review academic departmental structures, disestablishing and combining where appropriate. (pp. 71-72)
43. Reduce the overall academic program to approximately 40 courses to diminish fragmentation of cadet time and effort. (pp. 64, 67-74)
44. Restructure the time allocated to academic pursuits. Ensure that scheduling fewer courses allows greater time for individual study, approximately double the time spent in the classroom. (pp. 89-90)
45. Establish a core curriculum required for all cadets at not more than three-fourths of the total program. Ensure that each cadet is given a broad general education. (pp. 71-76)
46. Retain a strong, though somewhat reduced, math/science/engineering component in the core structure so that cadets learn the experimental and analytical techniques of the basic sciences. This sequence should provide integrated and progressively more advanced courses leading through electronics and engineering science into engineering analysis and synthesis, with emphasis on concepts in the basic and engineering sciences and emphasis on decision making in engineering. (pp. 71-72)
47. Allocate sufficient courses from the core to ensure thorough exposure to theoretical and conceptual problems that have no set solutions, such as are found in the behavioral sciences and social sciences. Material in systems engineering and related areas of the applied sciences should also stress problems for which there is no single solution and which include consideration of social values and consequences. (p. 69)
48. Provide a strong preprofessional sequence of social sciences, behavioral sciences, history, and public affairs to develop each cadet's awareness of the people, government and society which he will serve. This should include courses such as modern and military history, economics, law, political science, international relations, and cultural/political geography, basic and social psychology, and organisational development. (pp. 71-73)

49. Ensure that the physical and applied sciences, economics, and behavioral science courses and sequences coordinate closely with the mathematics courses to require use of mathematical skills as soon as possible after they are acquired by the students. (pp. 84-85)

50. Emphasize analysis, critical evaluation, and the handling of masses of data in applied sciences and engineering courses, diminishing wherever possible the descriptive approach. (p. 68)

51. Reinforce current programs aimed at producing competence in written and oral communication skills by establishing a more intensive, coordinated interdepartmental effort running through the entire four-year curriculum. (pp. 71-72)

52. Maintain a four-semester foreign language program for all cadets. Give consideration to making its placement flexible within the eight available semesters so that cadets can receive this instruction at a time most mutually advantageous to the institution and individuals. (pp. 72-73)

53. Eliminate the core course in graphics and mechanical drawing. (p. 72)

54. Include instruction in computer use and management in cadet Automatic Data Processing courses.

55. Avoid establishing a full disciplinary "majors" program, which would require too many elective sequences in a variety of areas to support the objectives of a broad, general education. Interdisciplinary areas of concentration ensure a desired degree of specialization without the high costs involved in accredited majors. (pp. 61, 70)

56. Construct comprehensive elective programs from which each cadet is required, with the guidance of a qualified faculty advisor, to select an area of concentration according to his talents, abilities, and interests. Require him to structure a sequence of courses reaching a fourth year college standard in the selected area to develop the confidence that comes from fuller comprehension and to satisfy intellectual curiosity. (pp. 71, 73-75)

57. Discourage dilettantism in elective selections by deleting a general studies track as an option. The smorgasbord approach in such a track is contrary to the stated goals of concentration. (pp. 70-73)

58. Offer elective sequences in systems engineering and operations analysis building upon realistic problems and examples from Army life. These sequences might include courses in the methodology of

systems engineering followed by practical situations analysis, methodological and analytical tools for problem solving, concepts of modeling, applications to small and large military unit actions, campaign analysis and gaming, and, at the highest level, politico-military interactions. (pp. 75-76)

59. Carefully review and reduce the variety of elective courses offered and emphasize quality in the remaining offerings. (pp. 69-71)

60. Initiate elective study for most, if not all, cadets not later than the second semester of Third Class (sophomore) year to permit more thorough study of at least one elective area (note the possibility of a five-semester sequence) and to provide intellectual stimulation through emphasis on personal interests and abilities. (p. 75)

61. Ease pressure on the entering Fourth Class cadets by reducing the heavy current loading of mathematics and substituting a program more balanced among the four principal disciplinary areas. (pp. 69-70)

Ethics and Professionalism Curriculum

62. Establish a comprehensive and progressive program in ethics and professionalism to prepare cadets for the ethical, personal, and other leadership problems that confront commissioned officers. This program should include courses in introductory and social psychology, organizational behavior and development, leadership, philosophy, introductory and military law, and American institutions and should extend into other appropriate courses. (p. 73)

63. Institute a course in philosophy and ethics for Fourth Class or Third Class year. (p. 73)

64. Institute a course for Second Class or First Class year on American Institutions to address problems of the military profession and other institutions of American society. (p. 75)

65. For the staff and faculty conduct seminars and symposia on philosophy and ethics. See also 46 and 47 Curriculum. (p. 73)

66. Establish a committee or other mechanism with the task of integrating ethics and professionalism courses with the cadets' other training and experience so that they are mutually supportive. (p. 73)

Library (pp. 76-77)

67. Consider reducing the issue of instructor reference materials to increase faculty use of library. (p. 77)

68. Establish a long-term loan policy for cadets to assist in reducing congestion in the library during peak-use periods. (p. 77)
69. Reduce use of duplicated extracts in an effort to promote more use of the library by both faculty and the cadets. (p. 77)
70. Coordinate timing of writing assignments to distribute demands on library. (p. 77)
71. Diversify writing and reading assignments to distribute demands on the collection. (p. 77)
72. Continue orientation programs for cadets and faculty. (p. 77)
73. Provide a position for the Librarian within the governance structure and include his counsel when planning courses. (p. 77)
74. Continue to appoint departmental representatives to the library. (p. 77)
75. Designate assistant librarians as department advisors to allow closer coordination between the department and main libraries. (p. 77)
76. Continue to solicit faculty input to the selection and purging programs to ensure the currency of the collection. (p. 77)
77. Develop a comprehensive long-range plan to incorporate the latest library technology to support the learning needs of the Academy in the future and to minimize the costs of future modernization and expansion. The Academy should review the work being done at Carnegie-Mellon University in this area. (p. 77)

Faculty

78. Establish a formal system for selection of tenured faculty which includes review of candidates by committees of the Academic Board, by the Administration, and by selected outside advisors chosen as appropriate from the Advisory Committee, ad hoc visiting committees or other sources. (p. 78)
79. Consider rotation of department heads after five-year terms and increase the number of tenured faculty to allow reasonable rotation. Current department heads need not be affected unless they so desire. (pp. 79-80)

80. Encourage professors with administrative duties to teach each semester a minimum of one course, the nature of which varies from year to year and which frequently is a core course. Expect course directors as a matter of routine to teach the courses they direct. (p. 78)

81. Consider assigning a permanent associate professor as one of the regimental tactical officers (typically for a term of 1-2 years). (p. 84)

82. Consider allowing selected permanent associate professors to extend their tenure beyond 30 years.

83. Make the academic rank of full professor attainable by permanent associate professors (those with tenure to 30 years service). (p. 79)

84. Increase the continuity, maturity, experience, diversity, and overall quality of the faculty.

a. Encourage the faculty's scholarly research and professional activities. (p. 78)

b. Increase the number of instructors teaching a fourth year. (p. 80)

c. Return more former instructors for second or third tours. (p. 80)

d. Consider granting a limited number of outstanding instructors a new class of tenure guaranteeing retention at the Academy until completion of their twentieth year of service. (p. 80)

e. Secure instructors from such sources as the Foreign Area Officer Program, career civilians, and Material Development and Readiness Command officer project managers and laboratory supervisors. Develop programs for repetitive tours of such officers. (p. 80)

f. Develop a faculty exchange program with civilian institutions.

g. Increase the number of visiting professors to achieve civilian representation on the faculty of about 5 percent. Use this program as a source for the early addition of women to the faculty. Consider placing two or three visiting professors in departments such as English, history, and chemistry rather than one in each. Authorize grade levels commensurate with their civilian positions. (p. 81)

h. Increase the proportion of non-Academy graduates on the staff and faculty to 50 percent or more. (p. 82)

i. Ensure instructors in each department attend a variety of high-quality graduate schools and receive formal training for the subjects they are to teach. Consider extending selected officers in graduate school for a third year. Allow officers on direct assignment to the faculty to attend refresher graduate schooling. (pp. 80-81)

85. Ensure that an Academy teaching tour is and is viewed as being career enhancing. (Requires combination of actions on part of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, and Military Personnel Center). Possible actions include providing facts of school and promotion selection to assignment officers, to individuals at the Academy and to the officer corps; integration of Academy assignments with career specialities, careful management of the timing of assignments to West Point and subsequently, improving each department's management of opportunities for career development and instruction to individuals and boards involved in personnel actions. (p. 82)

86. Create in departments an environment of free communication between the senior and junior faculty. (p. 82)

Pedagogy

87. Employ a variety of learning strategies.

a. Continue to emphasize instruction in small sections, but take greater advantage of them by stabilizing the academic section and the instructor. (pp. 86-87)

b. Continue to deemphasize standardization of pedagogical techniques in favor of greater instructor flexibility. (p. 81)

c. Increase the use of lectures where special instructor knowledge is needed. (p. 86)

d. Experiment with and improve the use of computer assisted instruction. Enter computer networks to make use of software developed by others. Exploit modeling techniques, Monte Carlo simulation, computer graphics, and engineering design programs. (p. 88)

e. Improve the use of visual aids including educational television, computer graphics, models, mock-ups, and demonstration laboratories. The blackboard should be used creatively and dynamically so that a problem develops before the cadets. It should not simply serve as a static display. (p. 87)

f. Consider experiments with individualized instruction using combinations of lectures and seminars in conjunction with a self-paced program requiring mastery at the "A" or "B" grade level before advancing. (p. 88)

88. Continue to improve instructor qualifications by guiding their graduate study and by training instructors in teaching techniques with emphasis on the small section and seminar technique. (pp. 86-87)

89. Improve the ability of cadets to participate in small sections.

a. Teach a logic subcourse, early in the curriculum, for example, in Fourth Class math or English. (p. 87)

b. Assign different supplementary readings from the library to different cadets in a section when appropriate. (p. 87)

90. Improve the motivation for cadets to study.

a. Ensure that cadets understand the interrelationships of sequential courses and the interrelationships among disciplines. Establish prerequisites as appropriate. Hold cadets accountable for previous learning. (pp. 84-85)

b. Consider the interdepartmental use of readings which are applicable to two or more departments or disciplines.

c. Ensure that faculty and staff understand the rationale of the curriculum. Whenever possible relate course work to Army experience. (pp. 84-85)

d. Review the required readings to select significant ones which can be assigned in their entirety. (p. 86)

e. Show a greater willingness to fail marginal performers. This will only happen if the consequences of failure can be made less drastic by improved makeup systems and alternate commissioning options for failing cadets who have leadership ability. (p. 88)

91. Improve laboratories.

a. Review the laboratory program to require practical work in fewer disciplines while raising the quality of the work done. Computer assisted and project laboratories of up to four hours in length should be considered. (p. 86)

b. Reduce the time and resources used in two hour laboratories by a greater use of in-class demonstration laboratories. (p. 86)

92. Improve the ability of the cadets to write and to use mathematics. Establish interdepartmental committees, reporting to the Dean, to coordinate instruction in and use of these skills throughout the curriculum. (pp. 83-84)

93. Improve retention of basic course principles.

a. Reduce the frequency of evaluation giving greater flexibility to the instructor but increasing the relative weight of Written Partial Reviews and Term End Examinations. (p. 95)

b. Resection infrequently.

c. In addition to in-class problems, require homework problems of increased depth. (p. 86)

94. Provide an improved program for academically marginal cadets, giving consideration to alternate tracking and temporarily reduced course loads. (p. 88)

95. Establish a high quality book store in order to stimulate interest in outside reading.

96. Consider providing flexibility in the foreign language sequences for some cadets by establishing optional shorter but more intense language courses.

Academic Administration

97. Revise the academic calendar and daily schedule.

a. Consider establishing two terms with approximately equal numbers of attendances. The first term should end in December. (p. 89)

b. Establish standard length for all class periods (50 to 60 minutes). Schedule the academic day in one-hour blocks, using multi-hour periods for problem sessions and laboratories. (p. 89)

c. Consider staggering attendance at noon meal. (p. 89)

d. Consider expanding scheduled day somewhat beyond 1515 hours. (p. 89)

e. Consider reducing time required for meals and associated formations. (p. 89)

98. Improve incentives.

a. Eliminate 3.0 grading system. (p. 89)

b. Use a letter grade system. (p. 89)

c. Continue other features of USMA Initiative #1, except as it allows 3.0 grading system. (p. 89)

d. Use a Quality Point Average to identify cadets who are to receive honors (Distinguished Cadets, Dean's List). Normally compute Quality Point Average at term end, except for plebes and cadets in academic difficulty. For these, a mid-term computation may be appropriate. (p. 90)

e. Consider establishing a probationary system to motivate marginal performers (see graduation requirements). (p. 91)

f. Continue the policy of assigning graduates to initial tour with troops in their basic specialty; postpone graduate schooling, except for certain scholarship winners. (pp. 90-91)

99. Provide alternative service obligation for separated cadets by one or more of the following: (pp. 91-92)

a. Revoke DOD Directive 1332.23 (cadets separated after the start of Second Class year normally will be called to active duty in an enlisted status for at least two years).

OR

b. Modify DOD Directive 1332.23 so that ex-cadets separated after the start of Second Class year may enroll in any pre-commissioning program within nine months of separation. Successful completion and acceptance of commission will cancel any requirement to serve in an enlisted status.

OR

c. Modify DOD Directive 1332.23 to require cadets separated after the Start of Second Class year as a result of circumstances indicating an intent to evade obligations incurred as a result of attendance at the Academy to repay those costs directly attributable to the education and training received.

100. Improve counseling services.

a. Develop a comprehensive plan for a decentralized counseling program. (p. 93)

b. Develop a formal program that would establish a mentor relationship between officers and cadets on the basis of one officer to 6 to 8 cadets. All faculty members and staff should participate in this program. (p. 93)

c. Develop an improved visual display of course inter-relationships for academic counseling. (p. 93)

d. Initiate efforts to administer interest or attitudinal surveys to successful officers, both early and late in their careers. Utilize the information thus derived to assist in counseling cadets in such matters as branch choice. (p. 93)

101. Change graduation requirements.

a. Establish requirements for the successful completion of an approved program of a set number of courses through study in residence and the achievement of a set minimum Quality Point Average. (p. 93)

b. Determine specific requirements after further study by the faculty.

c. Permit turnback cadets to continue summer military training with their original class. (p. 93)

d. Require turnback cadets to attend summer academic sessions in lieu of leave as necessary. (p. 93)

e. Permit turnback cadets to enroll in all upper class courses for which they satisfy prerequisites, including Military Science and Physical Education. (p. 93)

f. Permit turnback cadets to carry reduced academic loads. (p. 93)

g. Graduate turnback cadets when they satisfy requirements for graduation (mid-year possible). (p. 93)

Intercollegiate Athletics

102. Manifest institutional commitment to intercollegiate athletics by:

a. Publishing a policy statement on athletics. (pp. 125-126).

b. Setting goals for the intercollegiate athletic program. (p. 125)

- c. Increasing appropriated fund support. (p. 129)
- d. Constructing, and maintaining outstanding athletic facilities, beginning with a winter athletic complex. (pp. 126-127)
- e. Increasing the frequency of key officials' attendance at practices, NCAA contests, and press functions. (p. 126)
- f. Ensuring continuing professional management of the intercollegiate athletic program. (pp. 128-129)
- g. Increasing alumni support and participation. (p. 127)

103. Reconstitute the Athletic Board as a standing athletic committee with the following tasks:

- a. To advise the Superintendent on matters of policy and facilities. (pp. 127-128)
- b. To provide for an integrated, coordinated and balanced athletic program. (pp. 127-128)

104. Establish new guidelines for the position of Director of Intercollegiate Athletics (DIA). He should not be an active duty Army officer. He should be a West Point graduate, knowledgeable and experienced in athletics and business, and he should be hired on a long-term basis. Job performance, however, should be the overriding consideration. (pp. 128-129)

Tactical Department (Office of the Commandant)

105. Augment the Office of the Commandant by the addition of a separate operations and plans section. (p. 107)

106. Increase the access of the tactical officer to cadets. Make clear that tactical officers should be free to counsel individuals for brief periods during study time. Ensure that there is a period during the week when a tactical officer can meet with his entire company or any part of it. (pp. 98-99)

107. Consider establishing offices for tactical officers in the company areas to improve the access between tactical staff and cadets. (pp. 99-105)

108. Consider forming Tactical Officer Teams wherein a tactical officer would have primary responsibility for one company but would also have collateral responsibility in one or more additional com-

panies. This organization would increase the continuity and consistency of leadership and would assist in the proper orientation of newly assigned tactical officers. (p. 104)

109. Assign one Command Sergeant Major to each of the four cadet regiments to perform in the traditional noncommissioned officer role thereby furthering consistency and stability as well as improving cadets' ability to deal with soldiers on their initial assignment.

110. Assign one Tactical Noncommissioned Officer for each company to assist the tactical officers.

111. Consider eliminating (at least for some years) the Cadet Company Commander and clearly reaffirm the tactical officer as the commander. Continue to have a Cadet Captain in the company but designated as the "Company Captain." Change the title of Battalion and Regimental Commander to Battalion and Regimental Captain. These changes would clarify authority of the tactical officer and establish an effective barrier to the cadet chain of "administrivia." (pp. 98-99, 110)

112. Institute a better selection process for tactical officers to ensure that the criteria include wide military experience and academic achievement as well as outstanding performance as an officer. Prospective tactical officers should be interviewed. (pp. 101-104)

113. Provide a better orientation for all newly arrived personnel. This program should be comprehensive to ensure it develops an understanding of the objectives of the Academy and the ways they are to be achieved. At a minimum the program should include:

a. Mission, goals, environment, and cadet systems (i.e., Disciplinary System, Fourth Class System, Leadership Evaluation System, Ethics and the Honor Code and System, and Regulations).

b. Leadership/academic development philosophy and program.

c. Staff and faculty officer responsibilities for cadet leadership (academic development, enforcement of regulations, and maintenance of standards).

d. Tactical Officer, academic faculty, and cadet relationships.

e. Cadet motivation; attitudes toward issues of concern (e.g., women at the Academy and in the Army, EE 304 status).

- f. Skills and methods needed to develop leadership and motivate cadets.
- g. Interpersonal skills; performance counseling skills; techniques of group problem solving.
- h. Familiarization with the reports and studies that have been significant in the Academy's evolution.
- i. Future Army battlefield systems, as part of understanding the goals for cadet development.
- j. The relationship between success as a cadet and success in the Army.

114. Ensure that all officers, particularly new instructors, are advised prior to attending graduate school that they will be expected to: (1) adhere to and enforce Academy standards of appearance and discipline; (2) contribute to a variety of additional activities, e.g., cadet sponsor, coaching, summer training program. (pp. 98-100)

115. Consider instituting a formal exchange program (2 years as Tactical Officer and 2 years as instructor). This program will assist in reducing conflict between academic and military demands on cadets, merge two role models in the eyes of the cadets, and reinforce the academic environment in cadet companies. (See also Shaping Cadet Academic Attitudes, Item 35). (pp. 98-100) The features of the program are:

- a. Officers with outstanding service records and outstanding academic credentials in various disciplines would be assigned either to the tactical staff or faculty. After two years, the tactical officers would become instructors, and the instructors would become tactical officers.
- b. The input should be about six per year so that the number in the program would be 12 tactical officers and 12 instructors.
- c. All academic departments should participate.
- d. Officers selected for this program need to be selected early in their career to manage career progression carefully. (Department of the Army has examined the concept and can manage the small number of officers involved through a proper career progression).

116. Revitalize the nature of the Company Academic Counselor Program or develop an Associate Tactical Officer Program whereby a faculty member as an associate tactical officer learns the duties of the

tactical officer and could assume them if needed. This program will assist in bridging the gap between the tactical officer and instructor and will improve cadet attitudes towards academic pursuits. (p. 97)

117. All tactical officers should be given some opportunity to instruct. This step should improve their relations with cadets and enhance their prestige. (p. 121)

118. Promulgate a central leadership principle to guide the basic approach used by all tactical officers and to help eliminate questionable leadership practices by officers and cadets who do not understand positive, supportive leadership. (p. 105)

119. Review all requirements placed upon tactical officers to determine whether they are essential or whether they can be done elsewhere. We strongly urge a thorough analysis to determine which requirements might be simplified by computer assistance. (p. 98)

120. Create a sense of participation for the tactical officers by ensuring their input into policy decisions and by creating a forum for tactical officers to talk with the Commandant and Superintendent about the health of the Corps. (pp. 99-100)

121. Consider according to a Senior officer in the Commandant's office status equivalent to "Permanent Assistant Professor" to assure the perpetuation of reforms, consistency in philosophy, and continuity of institutional memory. (p. 104)

Military Instruction and Training

122. Improve significantly the academic content of Military Science taught during the academic year. The curricula and pedagogy changes would take advantage of the unique opportunity afforded West Point to provide intellectual depth in the study of the military profession. (p. 121)

123. Teach Military Science by teams and, depending on content, use Office of Military Instruction instructors assisted by a tactical officer or academic instructor, or both. The team approach will also assist in bridging the gap between military professional instruction and academic studies and will reinstitute the role of the tactical officer as instructor and teacher. (p. 121)

124. Improve the summer training programs by instituting the following actions:

a. Introduce a "Drill Cadet" Program for the Second Class summer in which cadets work as a Drill Cadet in the Army Training Centers under the supervision of Army Drill Sergeants. This program

will assist in eliminating recognized weaknesses in cadets' "ability to talk with soldiers" and "concern for the welfare of men" by placing them in an environment where effective interpersonal communication and supportive leadership are required. (p. 121-122)

b. Eliminate some cadet military skill training for Second Class cadets, particularly that high-cost training that has relatively narrow application to the active Army, e.g., helicopter training. If the ranger and airborne courses are eliminated from the cadet program, graduates should be allowed to attend them after graduation. (p. 121-122)

c. Eliminate First Class participation at Camp Buckner to free the First Class for branch-oriented Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT). Some First Class cadets might be needed as instructors and would get a shorter CCTLT, but the new Third Class should assume major responsibility for running their own organization at Camp Buckner. (p. 122)

d. Establish and promulgate to the Active Army a clear set of policies and objectives for the conduct of CCTLT and Drill Cadet programs to ensure that each cadet undergoes the desired experience.

e. Ensure that a positive and supportive environment exists in Cadet Basic Training (CBT). The physical training, demanding schedule, and general environment are important to the transition from civilian to cadet. (p. 122)

125. Develop regular communication with the Army Training and Doctrine Command in order to ensure current knowledge of doctrine and advances in military training. Care should be taken, however, to avoid forced relevance to the Active Army at expense of greater intellectual depth in the profession of arms.

Physical Education

126. Replace "curve" grading in physical education with criterion-referenced grading. A minimum absolute standard with either Pass/Fail or successive absolute levels for higher grades would eliminate unnecessary competition that currently exists. (p. 123)

127. Re-evaluate the physical education standards for women. The Study Group believes that the physical stress on women is excessive and that the level of physical conditioning being demanded on them may not be justified by future service. (p. 123)

128. Continue the Academy's high quality physical education program, which we note is both well done and important to Army service. (pp. 123-124)

The Corps of Cadets

129. Stability. Adopt policies which lead to stability in the Corps. Do not rotate cadets among companies routinely. (pp. 110-111)

130. Cadet Rank and the Cadet Chain of Command

a. Prescribe a single chain of command each year (no rotation) designated on a merit basis. (p. 111)

b. Eliminate chain of command positions and duties that are trivial in nature and are essentially a source of "make work." (p. 111)

131. Leadership Evaluation

a. Eliminate the "peer type" ratings, but retain ratings by tactical officers and cadet officers. (pp. 111-112)

b. Sever the relationship between Leadership Evaluation System (LES) and General Order of Merit or class standing. (pp. 111-112)

c. Simplify and reduce the frequency of ratings. (pp. 111-112)

132. Disciplinary System

a. Revise the system of positive incentives to encourage and recognize outstanding performance and balance the existing emphasis on punishment, which encourages minimum acceptable behavior. (p. 113)

b. Create a Disciplinary Review Committee (composed of cadets and members of Tactical and Academic staffs) to draft a system of rewards. (pp. 113-114)

133. Competition. Replace inter-personal competition with challenging objective standards of performance. (p. 115)

134. The Fourth Class System

a. Continue efforts to eliminate abusive and negative leadership while emphasizing supportive, developmental leadership in the Fourth Class System and Cadet Basic Training. (pp. 115-118)

b. Initiate a comprehensive follow-up to the 1969 Study of the Fourth Class System to include a re-examination of the underlying assumptions and prevailing attitudes surrounding the Fourth Class

System with particular emphasis regarding the role and effect of stress. Consider engaging expert consultants in human behavior to do an analysis of the Fourth Class System. (pp. 116-118)

c. Take immediate action to:

- 1) Eliminate written examinations on Fourth Class knowledge. (p. 118)
- 2) Eliminate specious material in Fourth Class knowledge. (p. 118)

135. Women

a. Establish a continuing comprehensive study of the performance of women as cadets and subsequent to graduation.

b. Begin assigning women as tactical officers in AY 1977-78. (p. 119)

136. Establish a program of sex education for all cadets that would be straightforward, mature, and sufficiently broad to encompass physiology, reproduction, contraception, hygiene, and responsibility. (p. 119)

137. Branching. Separate branch assignment from General Order of Merit and allow tentative branch assignments to be made in the Second Class year. Permit First Class cadets to participate in branch-related Cadet Troop Leader Training during First Class year. Base branch selections on demonstrated ability, aptitude and interest rather than the General Order of Merit. (p. 124)

Honor Code and Honor System

138. Develop an "Honor Ethic" which subsumes the Honor Code in a broader concept making clear the importance of an obligation which transcends individuals and individual loyalties without appearing to subvert the bond between cadets. This more general statement should place the Honor Code in perspective, clearly identifying it as the central experience for a cadet in the process of developing a personal standard of ethical behavior. (pp. 137-139)

139. Affirm the statement of the Honor Code. (p. 139)

140. Retain the Honor Code in its present form with no change to the requirement that cadets report all honor violations, i.e., retain the non-toleration clause. (p. 139)

141. The Honor Code is a reasonable standard against which to measure behavior as long as the slightest transgression does not result in permanent separation in all cases. (pp. 138-140)

a. Recognize the Honor Code as being less than a comprehensive prescription for honorable behavior. (p. 137)

b. Encourage the Corps of Cadets to permit the Full Honor Board to recommend "discretion" (i.e., other than permanent separation) in appropriate cases where a cadet is found to have committed an honor violation. (p. 138)

142. Continue a supervisory role for the Special Assistant to the Commandant for Honor Matters within the administration of the Cadet Honor Code and Honor System. (p. 137)

143. The Superintendent's Honor Review Committee should have an expanded role with wider representation. This committee should not be the final interpreter of the Honor Code; that responsibility rests solely with the Superintendent, acting for the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army. (p. 142)

144. New cadets should be fully under the Honor Code at the outset; the Superintendent's discretionary powers are adequate to deal with extraordinary circumstances. (p. 140)

145. The jurisdiction of the Honor Code should be universal; that is, the Code should apply at all places and at all times. Nevertheless, there are troubling questions concerning the responsibility of the Honor System for enforcement. Should the Code and System be coterminous or are there situations where there is only personal responsibility for enforcement? Continuing review of this matter will be needed. (pp. 140-142)

146. Retain the new Honor Committee procedures for further evaluation during Academic Year 1977-78. (p. 140)

147. Award cadet rank to executives of the Honor Committee. (p. 146)

148. Define lying in the Cadet Honor Code to be the making of an oral or written statement or gesture of communication made in the presence of and to another, intended by the maker to deceive or mislead. (p. 141)

149. Include the offense of wrongful appropriation as defined under Uniform Code of Military Justice in the definition of stealing in the Cadet Honor Code.

150. Eliminate the absence card completely (or, as a minimum, simplify the card). (pp. 140-141)

151. Establish a formal procedure for redress involving the Company Honor Representative and/or the Special Assistant for Honor Matters for the cadet who feels that his punishment or implication resulted from improper questioning. (p. 141)

152. Continue to improve the education plan for all aspects of the Honor Code and System. (pp. 137-138)

U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS)

The Study Group conducted, in effect, a separate study of the Military Academy Preparatory School, the details of which have been available to the Department of the Army, the Superintendent, USMA, and the Commandant, USMAPS. Our recommendations are listed below:

1. Establish a Board of Visitors for the Preparatory School with representation from Department of the Army, the Academy, civilian educators, and appropriate Army agencies.
2. Retain the present assignment of the Preparatory School under the jurisdiction of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and ensure closer coordination between the Academy and the Preparatory School.
3. Retain the Preparatory School at Fort Monmouth, N.J. Prevent instability experienced in recent moves.
4. Retain the current funding system and provide funding at levels necessary to support the mission effectively.

CHAPTER III

THE ENVIRONMENT

The environment of the Academy significantly shapes cadet development. Although difficult to analyze, the environment is an aggregate of all aspects of the West Point experience. But it is more. For each service academy or college is unique, an inimitable combination of interacting forces and circumstances which may be greater or less than the sum of its parts. At West Point, academic studies build an intellectual base, military training provides fundamental soldierly skills, physical education and athletics build strength and self-confidence, chapel activities sustain spiritual values, and the Honor Code promotes dedication to an ethical standard. All these elements combine to lead cadets toward strong commitment to selfless service. The Study Group believes that West Point is greater than the total of its collected parts; it gives the nation an educational resource which is much needed and nowhere duplicated.

This unique environment contributes to creating within cadets a growing allegiance to the motto: Duty, Honor, Country. Academic excellence exists in many civilian colleges, and military training is not unique to West Point. But West Point performs its academic mission in a military milieu. Thus, the military environment of West Point is a major difference between civilian universities and the Academy; it nurtures the attitudes and develops the knowledge essential to service as a professional Army officer.

The intensity and duration--the unremitting purposefulness--of the military environment pervade cadet life. Except for periods of leave, cadets constantly feel its pressures and meet its demands for the four undergraduate years. Cadets are totally immersed in a world that prescribes the clothing they will wear, the hours of their day, the food they will eat, and the times they will eat it. This total--almost monastic--control of cadet life is a complex process of socialization. Army officers, who formally and informally transmit to cadets their values and their concern for the future of the Army and its officer corps, oversee this environment. From them and fellow cadets, the meanings of self-discipline, personal responsibility, teamwork, time management, self-sacrifice, and concepts of duty and honor are learned.

Tradition also influences the cadet environment. West Point is a national historic site, dating from the American Revolution. Forts Putnam and Clinton, Washington's statue, the Great Chain, battle trophies, Constitution Island, the architectural style and names of the buildings, statues and monuments, Cullum Hall, the West Point Museum, the regimental colors in the chapel--the cadet uniform itself--all reinforce the

history and traditions of West Point and the United States Army. "Beast Barracks" and the Fourth Class system are major elements in the traditions of the Military Academy. The "Thayer System," substantially modernized, pervades the life of every cadet. Graduates serve as tactical officers and academic instructors thereby perpetuating tradition in the Corps of Cadets. The ties of the profession of arms and experiences as cadets and as a class forge powerful bonds among graduates. Tradition is a strong and useful force in assimilating civilians into the Corps of Cadets and into the officer corps. Properly used, tradition is a positive force; improperly used, it may be a disaster.

It is commonly said that the cadet environment is static and resistent to change, but in fact there are continuous attempts to adapt to the varying currents of the contemporary Army and American society. The Army is dynamic, changing constantly by the evolution of its needs and its assigned missions. Technological developments, as complex and comprehensive in the Army as they are in civilian life, occur continuously. Simultaneously, the Army must sustain its traditional strengths: discipline and a strong ethical code are prerequisites for mission accomplishment. Today's American society places less trust in traditional forms of discipline and authority and more in individual autonomy and self-government.

Both the Army and the civilian community send ambassadors of change into the cadet environment. Instructors, tactical officers, and administrative personnel are selected from the Army for service at the Academy. Since many officers attend civilian graduate schools enroute to the Academy, they arrive imbued with recent civilian educational attitudes, techniques, and ideas. Each officer leaves his imprint on the cadet environment. Because instructors, tactical officers, and administrative officers are drawn from the Army with traditions and heritages different from those of the Navy and Air Force, the cadet environment will always reflect this difference and remain distinct from the environments of other service academies.

Other ambassadors of change are the cadets themselves--a heterogenous student population of varying ethnic, scholastic and socio-economic backgrounds that mirror the values, needs, and trends of their civilian peers.

The interaction of all these people, values, and traditions promises that the cadet environment will always be unique and that West Point will provide education and training that cannot be found elsewhere.

CHAPTER IV

GOVERNANCE

A. Introduction.

The Military Academy is an accredited institution of higher education for undergraduates - a college in a military environment. Structures of governance for such an institution marry customs of collegial autonomy with traditions of military command, a marriage which has numerous counterparts in American higher education. Most public universities, for example, combine hierarchical management modes (including provisions for accountability to the state) with broadly based consultative and deliberative bodies to influence or determine institutional policies and to assist the chief executive officer in administering them.

In the past, governance of the Military Academy has been more characteristically military than collegial, more hierarchical than deliberative and consultative. The main--indeed, almost the only--example of collegial self-government is the Academic Board, with such attendant features as academic departments, special purpose standing committees, and the Office of the Dean of the Academic Board. This collegial substructure, with responsibility for the program of academic instruction, is integrated into a specialized variant of the usual military organization. Other operational and staff units conduct programs for professional military development and for athletics and extracurricular activities; still others maintain the support installation. This environment produces a comprehensive cadet experience which is directed toward the growth of cadets in many dimensions--intellectual, professional, physical, social, ethical, and spiritual. Ideally, all members of the Military Academy staff and faculty, wherever assigned, endeavor to integrate all parts of this complex environment. The structure of governance should be a means to that end.

Several purposes shaped the Study Group's review of the Academy's governance structure. First, we wished to improve the Superintendent's ability to accomplish the Academy's mission and to provide coherence in the policy advice given to the Superintendent as well as the integration of all aspects of cadet life as policy decisions are implemented. We also sought to ensure the primacy of the academic program during the school year. Additionally, we wished to reduce the burden of routine administration borne by the Superintendent, Dean, Commandant, and heads of academic departments to permit them to concentrate on improving the quality of the educational experience. An increase in the benefits of advice received from and accountings provided to external constituents, civilian and military, constituted another goal. Finally we wanted to accomplish all these ends with minimum added cost.

B. The Academic Board.

Federal law gives the Academic Board authority to carry out three responsibilities--recommend admission of qualified alternates, readmission of cadets, and selection of memorials. All other Board duties are prescribed by USMA Regulations, which include a provision to "make recommendations to the Superintendent from time to time concerning any matters affecting the Military Academy or the post of West Point." Thus, other than three functions imposed by law, the Academic Board is a creation of West Point. Despite its sweeping mandate, the Board is limited in its purview--at least in practice--and is similarly limited in the composition of its membership. Board members include the Superintendent, the Commandant, Dean, heads of all academic departments, directors of the Office of Military Leadership and the Office of Physical Education, and the Professor of Military Hygiene, who is also the commander of the West Point Army Hospital. The Director of Admissions sits as secretary without vote. While the Academic Board itself meets frequently--28 times during 1975, 44 times in 1976--standing committees of the Board accomplish much of the routine academic administrative work, such as admissions, disposition of deficient cadets, and accreditation of cadet candidates for graduate scholarships. (See Figure 1. All figures appear at the end of this chapter). These committees normally report directly to the Academic Board and are manned almost exclusively by members of the Board. Few exceptions to this arrangement exist and usually they are limited to the position of non-voting secretary or to a specialist (e.g., Librarian). All heads of department serve on at least three such committees, and some serve on as many as nine. Some committees, such as the Admissions Committee or a Class Committee, function as decision-making bodies when acting within policy previously established by the Board.

From time to time the Board establishes ad hoc committees to deal with such matters as curriculum review, selection of permanent faculty, and allocation of cadet time. The majority of the ad hoc committees are heavily weighted with Academic Board members. Board members fill all chairman positions and, in many instances, the majority of other positions. In theory, ad hoc committees report directly to the Academic Board; in practice, the General Committee, a standing committee of the Board, often reviews their reports. The role of the General Committee warrants separate comment.

The General Committee's membership is exactly the same as the Academic Board, less two of its usual voting members--the Superintendent and the Surgeon--and its non-voting secretary, the Director of Admissions and Registrar. The Commandant of Cadets attends its meetings by invitation as a full participant. The Committee is a forum for discussion of studies made at the direction of the Superintendent or Dean and is sometimes a sounding board for proposals related to academic matters.

In some cases, the Committees analyzes items before they are considered by the Academic Board, but it does not always constitute an efficient sifting agency or forum for compromise--members frequently reserve discussion and judgment for a meeting of the Academic Board. In other cases, the Committee's agreement to a proposal constitutes the final step prior to implementation.

Interviews with younger officers at the Military Academy gave the Study Group an insight to their view of institutional governance. Many of these officers believe the Academy is run by the heads of academic departments, who have little understanding of the problems of the younger faculty or the tactical officer. Some attribute great and pervasive power to the Academic Board; some believe it reaches into cadet lives even to act on such routine matters as requests for absence. They neither understand the functioning of the standing committees nor hold much hope of influencing decisions.

The overwhelming majority of observers, including the Study Group, believes that the Academic Board impedes rather than facilitates progressive change. This judgment does not criticize the men who may be members of the Board, although the tenuring process does tend to select "safe" people and reject those who have a penchant for change. Rather it is a judgment about the structure itself. An organization in which authority is exercised by a small cadre of the same people over long periods tends to be stable and to resist change. This propensity is enhanced, in the case of the Academic Board, by the tradition of departmental autonomy in many academic matters and in non-tenured faculty selection, by much direct influence by the head of department over the selection of his tenured faculty, and by the corollary efforts of departments to maintain their domains. The full professors constitute a substantial element of the institutional power structure. The structure thus contributes to inbreeding and emphasizes internal not external influences.

The aggregation of power, both perceived and real, in the Academic Board results inevitably from the absence of countervailing forces to challenge the status quo. Apart from the tenured faculty, numbering fewer than 50, officers on three-year tours of duty comprise the faculty and staff. Understandably, these officers' lack of experience weakens their capacity to influence a system dominated by a small collegiate body of colonels, whose average tenure on the Academic Board is 10 years. Into the category of transient educators fall the Superintendent, the Commandant, virtually all members of the Department of Tactics, and the majority of the faculty.

In contrast to the stability of the Academic Board, the Department of Tactics and most staff agencies experience frequent turnover in per-

soull and instability of both policy and practice. No central policy group exists to reduce these instabilities. Whether by the preference of members or at the direction of the Superintendent, the Academic Board has not been influential in the formulation of programs for the professional development of cadets, character development, or athletics--all central to the mission. (Traditionally, however, some members of the Board, acting as individuals, serve on a variety of committees which have influence in these areas).

The implications of these observations are clear. First, heads of departments have been overworked as governors. During 1976 (excluding the summer months), the Board met on 35 occasions; and the General Committee 23 other times, with meetings lasting one-and-a-half to two hours. Heads of departments, on the average, attended a meeting of one of those bodies every third day while classes were in session during 1976. In addition, they had other standing ad hoc committee assignments; some heads of departments serve on as many as twelve of those. The time devoted to governance detracts from that given to departmental supervision, teaching, and research.

Second, the non-tenured faculty and staff believe that their participation in the governance of the institution and their ability to affect the way it achieves its objectives are extremely limited. Few non-tenured faculty and staff serve on any of the ad hoc or standing committees. An Institutional Functioning Inventory (by Educational Testing Service; see Appendix F) was administered to members of the staff and faculty in April 1977. Compared with similar faculty at 37 other colleges and universities, the Academy faculty placed at the second percentile with respect to the subject of participatory governance. Overwhelmingly, faculty members believe they lack the ability to contribute to that aspect of institutional life.

Third, the Academic Board does not and, given its structure and interests, probably cannot, provide the Superintendent with broadly based advice for shaping the total cadet experience, which embodies programs for professional, athletic, and character development as well as academic pursuits. In recent years the bulk of the Academic Board's work, measured in terms of meetings, issues, or time, has involved decisions on individual candidates for admission or the disposition of deficient cadets. It also has studied and taken action on the administration of the academic curriculum. In short, the Board has focused on matters directly concerned with the academic program. Other important areas have received little consideration. The Board's concern with the intercollegiate athletic program, for example, is indirect, limited mainly to the work of individual Board members; it has not addressed the overall athletic program. Its involvement in the disciplinary, leadership, and military training programs has occurred at the time cadets are separated because of deficiencies in those areas. They have not undertaken any broad

examination of the purposes and policies of those systems and their contribution to the cadet experience, in spite, for example, of a widely held concern by Board members of the adverse effects of the Leadership Evaluation System (LES) on cadet academic attitudes.

In summary, the responsibilities and purviews of the Academic Board, as defined by law, regulation and practice, are too limited to provide adequately comprehensive policy advice to the Superintendent; the membership of the Board and its committees are too restricted, needlessly excluding talented and interested contributors from the faculty and staff; heads of departments are too heavily taxed by Board work, to the detriment of their teaching, their professional development, and their leadership of the departments. Structural changes are in order.

C. Recommendations for Change to the Governance Structure

1. General. The Study Group considers the qualifications and tenure of future Superintendents central to its recommendations for change. Selectees for that position should have achieved marked professional success and possess the level of academic competence normally associated with presidents of undergraduate institutions. The Superintendent should serve a four- to eight-year tour.

The Study Group further recommends:

- Retaining the Academic Board with modifications of its membership and confining its responsibilities to statutory matters and to advising the Superintendent on academic matters.
- Establishing a new Policy Board as the primary advisory group for the Superintendent.
- Reforming the structure of advisory and administrative committees, Academy-wide.

The Study Group envisions a newly established deliberative body, the Policy Board, with a comprehensive focus and a clearly defined role as the primary element for policy advice and recommendations for the Superintendent. Reporting to the Policy Board will be a number of standing committees (Figure 2). With the exception of standing and ad hoc committees of the Policy Board and the Academic Board, a committee normally should not report to another committee. Committees should draw from both non-tenured and tenured members of the staff and faculty and from academic, tactical, and staff officers. All should serve specified terms. Committees having responsibilities for Academy-wide activities generally should report to the Dean, Commandant, Deputy Post Commander, or Academic Board as appropriate. Although department heads might chair

selected committees, in general, they should not be members of the sub-structure committees. One objective of these recommendations is to permit academic department heads to concentrate on their departmental duties.

2. The Policy Board. The Policy Board should be composed of the Superintendent as Chairman, the Deputy Superintendent, the Dean, four permanent professors elected by the Academic Board for three-year terms, the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, the Chief of Staff, the Commandant of Cadets, the Brigade Tactical Officer, and the Director of Plans and Analysis as Secretary without vote. On policy matters for which they have operational responsibility, the Director of Policy, Plans and Analysis, the Director of Admissions, the Deputy Post Commander, or other officials should participate in the deliberations without vote.

The mission of the Policy Board should be to advise the Superintendent on all matters having general significance for the Academy.

The Policy Board should have the following specific functions:

- Advise the Superintendent on all aspects of the education and training of cadets, the management of resources, the governance of the Academy, and on such other matters as the Superintendent or the Policy Board deems important.
- Recommend policies for admission, readmission, graduation, and academic, military, physical, and disciplinary proficiency.
- Review master plans for construction.
- Recommend policies for all tenured appointments.

By recommending a Policy Board with a purview broader than that of any other body at the Academy, the Study Group intends greater comprehensiveness, coherence, and unity than has been achieved in the past, both in formulating and executing policy. The large faculty representation on the Policy Board is intended to magnify the influence of the faculty in the central governance of the Academy and to increase the emphasis on education.

3. The Academic Board. The Academic Board should be continued, with its membership augmented by the Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, the Director of the Office of Physical Education and the Director of the Office of Military Instruction. If a head of department is elected to serve on the Policy Board, consideration should be given to seating some other tenured department faculty member on the Academic Board in his place. The workload of the Academic

Board has become unduly burdensome with the increase in the size of the Corps of Cadets and with greater complexity in the demands of academic administration. These conditions prompt the Study Group to recommend realignment of responsibilities to give relief to the Academic Board to ensure that it may concentrate on academic matters.

The mission of the Academic Board should be to execute those functions directed by law and to advise the Superintendent on academic matters. The Academic Board should be a forum for the exchange of views among members and should be a means for heads of departments to communicate directly with the Superintendent.

The Academic Board should have the following specific functions:

- Recommend for return or reappointment to the Academy a cadet who is reported as deficient in conduct or studies and recommended to be discharged from the Academy.
- Select the candidates and recommend those candidates selected to the Secretary of the Army, for any additional appointments authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 4343.
- Recommend to the Superintendent those cadets to be separated for any reason except under Article 12, Regulations for USMA, and for medical disqualification. Cases for dismissal for academic deficiency will be brought to the Academic Board by the Dean and for conduct and leadership, by the Commandant after each has considered the concerns of the other.
- Recommend to the Superintendent those cadets to receive diplomas and those to be commissioned in the services.
- Select the memorials to be placed in Cullum Memorial Hall, decisions requiring a majority vote in a quorum of not less than two thirds of the entire Academic Board.
- Recommend policies and procedures for graduate education of faculty members.
- Recommend persons to receive permanent appointments to the faculty. (See also recommendation 78 for others involved).

4. Office of the Director of Policy and Plans and Analysis. The Study Group recommends that an Office of Policy, Plans and Analysis be established to perform these functions: institutional research to include data collection and analysis; long-range planning for the Academy;

organizational effectiveness; assistance to the Superintendent in setting the agendas of the Policy and Academic Boards, the Board of Visitors, and the USMA Advisory Committee; and coordination and analysis of the scheduling of all significant activities of the Academy. The Director should be a colonel who will serve as Secretary to the Policy Board and who will have a tour of duty of 4-5 years.

The Superintendent requires an independent look at all aspects of cadet time. No single agency is now charged to oversee the use of cadet time. For this reason, the Superintendent must continually monitor the demands placed on cadet time and adjust its allocation and use accordingly. In addition, the Academy needs an operations research approach to the scheduling of the educational and training systems to ensure the best "mix" of staff, facilities, and time. Therefore, it is recommended that the Director of Policy, Plans and Analysis (DPA) be responsible for the following:

- To evaluate and report on the adherence of Academy elements to existing scheduling policies and procedures.
- To analyze and develop scheduling plans to maximize use of personnel and facilities.
- To provide the Secretary of the Scheduling Committee of the Policy Board.
- To conduct research and to disseminate the analysis of this research in time management and scheduling techniques.

While there is a distinct difference between long-range planning and traditional institutional research, there is merit in the close integration of the two functions under the DPA. Lack of effective long-range planning capability, with adequate access to ADP and analytical support, has caused the Superintendent to rely on a series of ad hoc committees, each with a single purpose. While this is both necessary and desirable, it has created the perception that West Point practices only crises management.

The Superintendent should also have at his disposal trained management personnel to analyze, interpret, and advise him on organizational problems. The establishment of an Organizational Effectiveness (OE) capability at West Point is in keeping with current Army policies. The establishment of an Organizational Effectiveness Staff Office (or elements thereof) can provide the Superintendent with a systematic application of management science and leadership methods to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of organizational elements at West Point. The placement of the OE staff effort for the Academy within the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis is in keeping with the appropriate func-

tions of that office. Such assignment will provide the OE staff an institutional memory, access to a data bank, and ADP capability, which they may require.

A Boards Secretariat should be located in the Office of Policy, Plans and Analysis. DPA's administrative branch will support secretaries of the Policy Board, Academic Board, Board of Visitors, Advisory Committee and serve as Office of Record for their committees.

5. Faculty Council. The Study Group recommends establishing a Faculty Council composed of all tenured faculty and staff members and two non-tenured faculty members from each academic department elected by non-tenured departmental colleagues. The Council should meet at the call of the Superintendent or Dean (its chairman), or at the request of a specified low number (e.g., 10 percent) of its members. The Council should facilitate communication with the Superintendent.

6. Superintendent's Honor Review Committee. Because of the importance of the Cadet Honor Code and the Cadet Honor System to the vitality of the institution, this Committee should continue to have a special relationship to the Superintendent. It reports directly to him; its members are chosen by him. The Committee should also transmit its reports to the Policy Board for consideration and comment. Additional comment on the Committee's composition and manner of operation is contained in the Military Professional Development portion of this report.

7. Dean. The Dean's responsibilities increase in this recommended restructuring. He is the Superintendent's chief advisor and executive for academic matters. He will recommend to the Superintendent any changes to the program of instruction, the time to be allocated to each department of instruction, and the credit-hour weight of each course. His duties include supervision of the programs and personnel of the academic departments and the library; allocation of financial resources to these agencies upon approval of the Superintendent; coordination of assignments for academic personnel; coordination of academic schedules and instructional facilities within approved policy guidelines; membership on the Policy and Academic Boards, and any other boards and committees to which he may be assigned; and any other duties which may be assigned to him by the Superintendent.

The Dean should oversee permanent committees which report recommendations to him for his decision (see Figure 2); he may, at his discretion and within established guidelines, forward the recommendations to the Superintendent for final decision or for referral to the Academic or Policy Boards.

8. Director of Automation and Training Support (DATS). Another organizational area of concern to the Study Group was the management of

computer and training support operations. Improvements in cadet instruction on and academy use of the computers are required. Academy assistance to the US Military Academy Preparatory School in evaluating their automation requirements should also be considered.

The Academy Management Information Systems Officer is positioned in the Comptroller's Office and cannot effectively manage West Point's computer resources owing to his limited authority over certain major computer elements that support cadet instruction. Similarly, responsibility for other instructional technology resources fragment among separate Academy agencies.

A single manager of both computer and training support resources is recommended via the Director of Automation and Training Support (Figure 3). The DATS should have management control over existing computer and training support facilities, report to the USMA Chief of Staff, and interface with an Academy Computer Advisory Committee and Computer Users Group.

Within the DATS organization, the Academic Automation Support Coordinator is the key figure. His role is that of the innovator seeking new ways to integrate use of the Academic Computer and instructional technology in the classroom. He should be a tenured faculty member.

5. Director of Admissions and Registrar (DAR). Because the quality of the entering class dramatically influences the Academy, the Study Group examined the entire admissions process. (Details of this examination are at Appendix E). Under the leadership of the DAR, the Admissions Office managed efficiently the changes required by the expansion of the Corps of Cadets during a period of vocal anti-militarism in the United States. It has reacted similarly to the requirements for the admission of women.

The indications are that the Admissions Office has moved aggressively to recruit, spread information, and make personal contacts. The Cadet Public Relations program is excellent. Contacts through the Reserve Officer Liaison program, use of alumni societies, and educator visits are being pursued. The supporting computer program is innovative. Significantly, Scholastic Aptitude Test scores of entering classes have remained constant while these scores nationwide have declined.

There are areas, however, that need improvement. Although entrant quality remains high, a more aggressive early acceptance program and studies of qualified candidates who decline admission could improve the Academy's recruitment position. Recruiting in the future is likely to require more effort, and factors which hamper recruiting should be identified and eliminated. In any case, the incoming classes should not be filled if sufficient fully qualified and properly motivated candidates are not available.

Admission procedures are unnecessarily cumbersome. The Admissions Committee is currently authorized to act concerning those candidates who are obviously qualified and those obviously not. Approximately 500 candidate files on which the Committee cannot agree are forwarded each year to the Academic Board for consideration. This number is excessive, and the authority of the Admissions Committee should be broadened to permit their decision on all cases that do not represent major deviation from admissions policy.

10. Discussion. This proposed structure is functional, efficient, and administratively frugal. Committee realignment eliminates unnecessary layering. The streamlined, broadly-based Policy Board is a manageable size. The structure will permit timely surfacing of issues, decision making at the appropriate level, and a representative membership that will elicit mutual support.

An important feature of the proposed Policy Board is its broad purview. It advises the Superintendent on all policy matters. The presence of the Dean and four heads of departments on the Policy Board grants academic departments a powerful voice in all deliberations. Election of the four department head Policy Board members by the Academic Board provides for proper representation of departmental and tenured faculty views and concerns in the highest governance body of the Academy. This strong faculty membership, coupled with the broad scope of the Policy Board, increases the emphasis on and primacy of educational excellence throughout the system of governance of West Point.

A major advantage of the recommended structure is that it releases the heads of academic departments from their current excessive involvement in committee work, which in turn permits them to concentrate on their department interests to a degree not previously possible.

The recommended structure includes a Superintendent with established academic competence who should serve for at least 4 years and preferably longer. The Study Group expects that the Superintendent will take counsel from time to time with former Superintendents, Deans, and Commandants and obtain their views on matters of moment. Further stability accrues through the provision for a long assignment for the Director of Policy, Plans and Analysis and assigning that office the responsibility for long-range planning.

The presence of four tenured department heads and the Dean on the Policy Board and tenured staff and faculty representation on the key governance committees also provides stability of view and policy on all Academy matters and perpetuation of an institutional memory. The Academic Board, the Faculty Council, and the chain of command provide for checks and balances.

On almost all committees of the recommended governance substructure, the academic departments and the Office of the Commandant have representation. On many others, the special interests of athletics, post functions, and other activities are represented where appropriate. The details of composition of these subcommittees are at Appendix D to this report.

The recommended structure, through its representational approach, permits greater use of the talented personnel assigned to West Point. This increased participation facilitates the surfacing of new ideas and early discussion of issues and concerns.

D. External Governance Bodies.

1. General. At present there is no body external to the Academy which provides continuing advice, counsel, and assistance to the Superintendent through in-depth review of the Academy's activities. The Board of Visitors is charged to "inquire into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic method, and other matters relating to the Academy..." (10 USC, Sec. 4355). Its membership includes various members of the Congress, including Chairmen of both Armed Services Committees, and other important individuals recommended by the President.

Those distinguished persons have not had the time or staff to accomplish more than brief annual inspections. Most institutions of higher learning provide for such external review and assistance for their presidents through boards of trustees. While ad hoc groups such as this Study Group have examined various aspects of the Academy from time to time, there has rarely been any continuity among the membership; and, more importantly, much time passes between the adjournment of one and convening of its successor. As beneficial as these occasional studies may be, they are sporadic and isolated, not regular or integrated.

The Study Group agrees with the recommendation of the Borman Report to establish an external advisory body.

2. USMA Advisory Committee. Following these guidelines, the Study Group recommends the establishment of an external advisory body called the USMA Advisory Committee, with the mission of providing advice and assistance to the Superintendent by reviewing any activities that bear on accomplishing the mission of the Academy. The committee should consist of a chairman and approximately 12 members. Standing or temporary subcommittees should be formed as necessary. The committee should establish ad hoc visiting committees with membership not limited to that of the Advisory Committee itself. These subcommittees should convene as necessary to review academic departments or other components of the

Academy. The chairmen of such visiting committees should be drawn from either the ranks of the regularly appointed members or elsewhere as appropriate.

The members should be distinguished civilians and military leaders. A membership slate might include one or two persons from such categories as college or university presidents, educational administrators, deans, heads of academic departments, teaching faculty, corporate executives, and active or retired military personnel. They should be selected with the goal of engendering confidence and trust between the Committee and the Superintendent. There should be no ex officio members. The Committee will be governed by the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 USC, Appendix 1).

A Secretariat stationed at West Point would serve the Committee. The secretary himself should be a former faculty member who has served with distinction for at least two years and should serve for a normal tour of duty of 2 years as secretary.

The members of the Committee should be nominated by the Superintendent, approved by the Chief of Staff, and appointed by the Secretary of the Army. Contiguous terms of service should not exceed 6 years and should be managed so that no more than one third of the members are newly appointed during any two-year period.

The Advisory Committee should report to the Superintendent at least annually. The Superintendent should forward copies of the report to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and the Board of Visitors. Visiting committees should be formed to assist the Advisory Committee in its work and should become an important channel of communication between departments and the Advisory Committee. They should also advise the heads of departments. The composition of each visiting committee should be determined by its chairman, and its members should be persons of competence on their fields. Members should be nominated by the USMA head of department concerned, approved by the Dean, and appointed by the Superintendent with the advice of the Chairman, USMA Advisory Committee. Visiting committees periodically should review departmental activities, confer with the leaders and members of the department, speak with cadets, and observe the departments at work.

The Advisory Committee should meet in the manner, at the frequency, and for the duration determined by the chairman, but not less than twice annually. Visiting committees should plan to visit all portions of the Academy as needed. During periods of marked change or when unusual conditions demand, greater frequency might be required.

Areas of review should include:

Academic activities, to include curriculum structure and content; instructional technology and methods; faculty quality, morale, staffing, and structure; laboratory and other instructional facilities; USMA Library; cadet attitudes toward academic study.

Professional development activities, to include cadet morale, military training program structure and content, staff training and structure, cadet duties, physical education, training activities conducted away from the Academy, intramural athletic programs.

Admissions activities, to include selection criteria, organization to conduct the admissions process, and publicity programs.

Other activities that bear on the cadet life, to include extra-curricular clubs and groups, intercollegiate athletics, institutional research, scheduling of cadet and Academy activities, counseling, health care, and religious life.

Organization for the efficiency of the conduct of other post support activities, to include housing, maintenance, personnel, museum operations, public affairs, and other activities related to the operations of the post of West Point.

Selection of tenured personnel should also constitute an area of continuing concern for the Committee. Review of the academic credentials of those nominated for tenured positions and provision of recommendations to the Superintendent would be two appropriate activities.

Such other matters as the Committee, the Superintendent, or the Chief of Staff of the Army might determine.

3. Summary. The Study Group believes that the proposed USMA Advisory Committee will benefit the Military Academy with regular consultations by highly qualified and interested men and women who are dedicated to the welfare of the institution and who will improve the Academy's accountability to the American people.

E. Command and Staff Organization.

The Borman Commission's examination of the the Academy's command and control structure indicated that the Superintendent was overcommitted. The subcommittee concurs with the Commission's conclusion that the current organizational span of control is too great. Currently, too many elements could report directly to the Superintendent and Chief of Staff

(see Figure 4). Of the other academies and universities studied, the span of control of the superintendents or presidents, exclusive of boards, was significantly less. The wide span of control of the Superintendent has been complicated by the assignment of additional functions to the Chief of Staff. He also serves as the Deputy Post Commander, supervising all of the installation activities and coordinating the Academy staff at the same time.

The general staff at West Point is not a true general staff as found in other Army organizations. Preponderantly involved in post support, it is in reality a post staff. While some unique staff elements are recognized, a more standard organization would improve management, efficiency, and relations with external agencies. The Academy's organization should be no more unusual than necessary. Organizational inconsistencies, complicated by doubling the size of Corps of Cadets, and a plethora of highly sensitive management problems--court challenges, Electrical Engineering 304, admission of women and others--created special strains on the management structure. West Point's designation as a national historic site further compounds its management problems. These considerations may have been responsible for the following problem areas:

- Some routine decisions are made at a higher level than at most other Army installations;
- Real or perceived inadequacies in the direction and control of the increasing number of cadet activities have contributed to cadet time problems;
- The amount of information which can be brought to the Superintendent's attention has been limited;
- Time available for the Superintendent to be personally involved with cadets has been reduced;
- Management problems have been presented directly to the Superintendent.

All these factors taken together indicate that, in addition to his normal Academy and post functions, the Superintendent has a myriad of other duties competing for his time.

As a consequence of the Army response to the Borman Commission, the issue of an additional general officer position at West Point received extensive examination. This issue is a subjective one at best. During the events of the past few years, another general officer (probably a Deputy Superintendent, rather than a Provost) would have been useful to the Superintendent. These events include expansion of the Corps,

integration of women, and the Electrical Engineering 304 cheating scandal. The broad spectrum of individuals consulted, however, did not voice strong support for increasing the general officers at West Point. Reasons varied from a general feeling that reorganization would not solve current problems, that establishment of an additional position would indicate that more was better, and that another general officer was not justified. Another consideration was the organizational structure of the Air Force and Naval Academies and the number of general officers assigned to each. Further, the size and perceived complexity of West Point alone do not justify a fourth general officer position, especially when compared with other active Army installations. Also, the excessive span of control of the Superintendent can be reduced to an acceptable level by reorganization without adding another general officer.

The Study Group's recommended organization (Figure 5) is to provide the optimum command and control organization to assist the Superintendent in the performance of his duties in keeping with the DA response to the Borman Commission Report. The recommended proposal is conservative and based on proven concepts. It attacks the heart of past problems, the excessive and distorted span of control of the command group at West Point. This proposal recommends no addition of a fourth general officer over the long term. However, this does not imply that another general officer for the immediate future is not necessary. The new Superintendent must look deeply into overall Military Academy policies, programs, and procedures throughout the institution during this unique period. The delegation of support functions to a general officer Deputy Superintendent would allow the Superintendent to concentrate on the fundamental issues of the Academy without the burden of routine administration of support activities.

In view of the implications associated with the aftermath of the cheating scandal and the potential impact of this study, the next few years could be a critical period for the Academy. This study could change aspects of the institution from academic to administrative. It can be expected that the Academy will be subjected to increased interest by the Congress and the American public during this period. This heightened interest and expectations as a consequence of a new Superintendent along with changes anticipated from this study will create unprecedented demands on the Superintendent. The Study Group thinks that it is desirable to assign an additional general officer as Deputy Superintendent to assist the Superintendent during this period of adjustment (Figure 6). This addition will allow the Superintendent to concentrate on pressing fundamental issues that require quick resolution.

One changes in Academy governance and organization, academic curriculum, military professional development, and others are firmly implemented, the position of Deputy Superintendent should be reevaluated and, if considered unnecessary, the position should be abolished. With a

return to normality, the Study Group's proposed organization should function efficiently and preclude the crisis management often experienced in the past.

Concurrently, the Office of the Commandant is reorganized to reassert the Commandant's role as the central source of control and direction for the Corps of Cadets and to provide for more effective control of the scheduling and coordination of cadet activities. The proposed organization, in terms of major components, establishes the Office of the Commandant, consisting of three departments - Military Instruction, Physical Education, and Military Development (under the direction of the Brigade Tactical Officer). Each of these organizations is headed by a colonel. The Commandant's staff, identified by functional area, is made up of four divisions, each supervised by a lieutenant colonel--Personnel and Administration, Operations and Plans, Logistics, and Cadet Counseling. The Commandant also supervises the activities of two special staff officers--The Special Assistant for Honor Matters and the Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer. Both hold the grade of major.

The principal features of this organization (Figure 7) are the establishment of the Department of Military Development headed by the Brigade Tactical Officer (the position of the Brigade Tactical Officer is explained more fully on P.96) and the creation of four Regimental Tactical Officers. The Department of Military Development contains all the Company Tactical Officers, who have overall supervisory responsibility for the cadets and particular interest in their military development.

On the Academy staff, the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics and the Director of Admissions and Registrar remain organizationally unchanged. But the Director of Policy, Plans and Analysis has been established and assigned responsibilities for an expanded analytic capability, the organizational effectiveness program, long-range planning, and time and scheduling analysis.

The Office of the Director, Automation and Training Support (DATS) has been created in order to supervise all automatic data processing and instructional technology resources.

The Comptroller, less his former Management Information Systems element, should remain directly under the Superintendent. Because of the preponderance of resources involved in the education and training missions of the Military Academy, the Comptroller at the Academy should be acknowledged as unique and not placed under the Deputy Post Commander.


Cadet support activities (Treasurer and Cadet Activities Office) group under the Director, Cadet Activities (DCA) and fall under the Chief

of Staff for the short term. This placement should facilitate the coordination of installation support to cadet activities and will relieve the Commandant of the burden of many dysfunctional concerns. In the long run, the DCA organization might be assigned to the Commandant.

Several critical functions--time and scheduling analysis, organizational effectiveness, and long-range planning--are deemed essential and suitable for placement in the Office of Policy, Plans and Analysis.

The proposed organization will be highly effective in assisting the Superintendent in accomplishing the Academy mission. It provides a single manager for installation activities and frees the Superintendent from direct supervision of the installation. Also it provides the Academy with an increased and independent research, planning, and evaluation capability so that planning can be systematized and current programs or proposed changes can be analyzed. This organization provides an increased focus for cadet activities.

**CURRENT
BOARDS AND COMMITTEES**



RECOMMENDED





Figure 2




— — — Supervision

— · — Coordination/Representation

Figure 3

CURRENT



RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATION (LONG TERM)




Figure 5

* Currently Director, Institutional Research
 ** See figure 3 for details
 *** See figure 7 for details

RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATION (NEAR TERM)





Figure 6

* Currently Director, Institutional Research

** See figure 3 for details

*** See figure 7 for details

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION: OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT



NOTES:

1. Cadet Activities established as a "department" headed by a colonel and, in the near term, to report initially to the Deputy Superintendent. At some future date, this organization might be returned to the Commandant.
2. Cadet Counseling Division remains under the Commandant.
3. Regimental tactical officer structure possibly reorganized to six battalions in Academic Year 1978-79; battalion tactical officer in grade of lieutenant colonel to direct each battalion.
(NOTE: Above Regimental and Battalion Tactical Officer positions intended to convey the eventual metamorphosis of the existing four regiments into six, or more, battalions.)

Figure 7

CHAPTER V
ACADEMIC PROGRAM

A. Introduction

The Study Group began its examination of the academic program with the expectation, soon confirmed by many observations, that the Academy is a sound institution. Our task was to find ways to make it better, which meant that the process of the study paralleled in many respects an accreditation review. We initiated conversation with the Executive Director of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, and we have found his assistance substantial and encouraging. We are confident that when the Academy undergoes its forthcoming ten-year accreditation review, it will be judged an institution of high quality. We hope that the recommendations of our report will point toward the achievement of even greater distinction in coming years.

An Academy education lays the foundation for a life-long career of service. The shape and needs of the Army of the future are not clear, and Department of the Army has yet to specify its future officer education needs. A base of knowledge allowing graduates to adapt to weapons systems of increasingly complex technology is essential, but equally essential is the base of knowledge needed to lead soldiers effectively, to develop a set of personal values, and to understand political, economic, and cultural issues, both foreign and domestic. The "Concept for the US Military Academy" recommended earlier in the report states the academic objectives necessary to lay such a general foundation. Significantly, it represents a conscious decision that the Academy should graduate officers who can deal with both the technical and the non-technical worlds. This decision in turn leads to the conclusion that conventional academic majors are neither necessary nor desirable, a subject discussed later in the curriculum section of this chapter. We believe that the Army officers of the future will perform in a variety of roles as they have in the past. Their intellectual base must be constructed of skills and principles fully mastered, none of which are more important than the power to communicate effectively in the basic languages of daily life—standard English and scientific language. Likewise, an Academy education should emphasize the understanding of general principles, not the memorization of problem-solving formulas. The program should foster a continual development of judgement, ethics, dedication to selfless service, and an appreciation of society.

The Study Group examined many proposals for change. No proposal was significantly more costly or inexpensive than current methods; therefore, no detailed analysis of cost has been included in our report. The Study Group believes that to make radical change in a basically sound academic program is not wise. Moreover, many changes in the academic program

will require detailed study and planning by the Academy. Hence, the most important recommendations to improve the academic program are those which restructure the governance of the Academy so that it can adapt to change more readily in the future; these recommendations have already been discussed in the preceding chapter.

The Study Group has been impressed by the academic achievements and attitudes of the upper portion of each class--approximately the top 30 to 40 percent. Major improvements in opportunities for enrollment in accelerated and advanced courses have been well used. Recently cadets have won Rhodes scholarships for study not only in social sciences but in physical sciences. The results of Hertz, Olmstead, and other national fellowship competitions are similarly impressive. However, we do not believe that attitudes toward academic pursuits are satisfactory among many cadets in the lower 60 to 70 percent of each class. These attitudes are summarized in cadet slang as "cool on academics," "the goat," "2.0 and go," "spec and dump," and "cooperate and graduate," each with its own variation on the theme of giving only that effort to studies needed to graduate. Undoubtedly, such attitudes accelerate the development of poor attitudes in other areas, including honor.

The improvement of these attitudes is the first and most critical prerequisite to improvement of the education for most cadets. Evidence of poor attitudes has been overwhelming and consistent from interviews with cadets, faculty, and graduates, from surveys, and from observations of exchange Air Force and Naval Academy students who note that scholastic pursuits have higher regard at the other academies. Improvements depend on the full cooperation of the entire institution; our recommendations require changes in matters under purview of the Commandant, the Dean, and the administrative staff. It must become clear to every cadet that the Army believes a sound education is a valuable cornerstone of a lifetime career. Common agreement on objectives and measures of effectiveness is a necessary first step. More interaction with people outside the Academy, both military and academic, is needed. All groups at the Academy must pull together for the good of the largest number of cadets by making the best possible use of the fine resources available.

Certain recommendations for no change are as significant as those for change and should not be overlooked, for example, the recommendations to continue a predominantly military faculty, to eschew conventional majors programs, to keep a common core of about 30 subjects, and to postpone the introduction of certain ethics instruction until such courses can be more thoroughly prepared.

Regardless of all other recommendations, the key to academic excellence is the excellence of the faculty and the student body. We find great strength in both groups.

B. Academic Attitudes

The attitudes cadets have toward their studies in many ways reflect the larger problems of the institution. Cadets arrive at the Academy wishing for and expecting to find a good education, but certain characteristics of the environment undercut the academic program. In the closely organized society that is West Point, such factors synergistically assume greater importance than they would in the less structured environment of the typical civilian university. The particular nature of this society constitutes much of West Point's uniqueness, but it also has the potential to magnify unhealthy attitudes and has reinforced poor attitudes toward scholastic pursuits.

Most high school seniors approach college idealistically, but many find that the college experience fails to match their ideals. In such cases disillusionment may curb their academic effort and achievement. This sequence is perhaps inevitable, yet some 30 to 40 percent of all cadets appear to handle the situation well and live up to their potential. To cope with competing demands for their time, however, the remaining 60 to 70 percent, to some degree like college students everywhere, adapt and get by with less than their best when faced with unrelenting pressures, some from the institution and some from within the body of cadets. Apparently no one becomes particularly upset about the situation. In fact, cadets in some "cool-on-academics" companies support such behavior. Tactical Officers who allow such attitudes to develop are at fault. Even the academic departments, where there should be particular concern about the situation, display a tendency to acquiesce. In the words of one instructor,

We seem to lower the standard of performance expected of cadets in academic courses for political reasons--too many cadets may fail our course, or if our standards are too demanding, then cadets may not take elective courses in our department.

Although cadets continue to view the academic program as important to their success at West Point and as Army officers, the "system" does not seem to support that view. It does not require uniformly high performance, and it allows some relatively unqualified cadets to pass courses and graduate. Many cadets resolve this obvious inconsistency by adopting the attitude that although education per se has importance, studies at West Point are often irrelevant and merit only a superficial approach.

Reports of the Office of Institutional Research at the Academy concerning the performance of cadets prior to entering West Point give clear evidence that entering students view education favorably and have enjoyed

prior academic success. Over 90 percent of the Class of 1978 had better than a B average in high school, and the figures are higher for the Class of 1979. A major factor influencing most candidates who enter West Point is its good academic reputation; more than 90 percent of the Class of 1978, for example, cited this reason. After arriving at West Point, cadets continue to value a good education. In a March 1977 sample survey of all four classes, cadets rated academic instruction, the Honor Code, and relationships with classmates as the most important factors in their success at West Point. Among factors important to their long-term success as regular Army officers, academic instruction was ranked third of 17 items (the Honor Code and competition were rated first and second).

On the same survey, cadets were asked to rank the priority they give to several ways of spending their time. Although these results are not necessarily indicative of how cadets actually behave, study and classroom activities were rated first followed by athletics, military duties, leisure, and extracurricular activities.

Obviously, cadets have a favorable attitude in general toward instruction and education. How they view their academic experiences at West Point specifically is another question. Academic disincentives occur both outside and inside the academic program. The main competitors with academic activities for cadet time are military duties, physical education, extracurricular activities, and leisure time. While these activities are important to the overall development and well-being of cadets, their unintended negative effects on studies require recognition and correction. Proper priorities must be established.

In spite of the priorities cadets indicated in the surveys cited above, military and chain of command duties tend to divert time from study, often because those non-academic obligations present more immediate requirements. Cadets know that late reports or unshined shoes quickly result in demerits or other punishment. By contrast, a failure to study one particular lesson may incur little or no immediate penalty and may be offset by later satisfactory work. Administrative details and passing information by slow, clumsy methods waste time which might be devoted to study. Examples from interviews include the cadet adjutant who spends 3 to 4 hours in one evening obtaining the names for a trip section roster and the squad leader who consumes precious time going from room to room to announce information which should be posted on a central bulletin board. Not only do these activities waste the adjutant's and squad leader's time but they also interrupt the studies and concentration of the other cadets.

Physical education and athletics also crowd ahead of academic work at times, partly because of the normative grading system used for physical education and physical fitness tests. The cadets compete

against classmates in a system which guarantees that half of them will score "below average." This system causes some cadets to spend time on physical training beyond that required to meet a specified standard and hence to have less time for study. Such strenuous activity also leaves some cadets too tired to gain from classroom instruction.

Several other factors in the military environment which affect cadet attitudes about studies relate so closely to each other that they are best discussed together. These are the Fourth Class System, the Leadership Evaluation System (LES), and the Company Tactical Officer. The Fourth Class System serves a good purpose in providing an initiation and rite of passage from civilian to military life. It creates a disciplined environment, subjecting fourth classmen to pressure, forcing them to establish priorities and to cooperate with others. The system is also a socialization process in which upperclassmen impress their norms on the plebes. Among these may be certain counterproductive behavior such as being "cool on academics." Plebes may be taught that to excel harms classmates who are not performing as well. Since grades and order of merit are common knowledge, those doing well academically stand out quickly. The tools for enforcing the norms in a company lie readily at hand. The Fourth Class System can be used to indoctrinate the new cadets, and the peer ratings of the Leadership Evaluation System are available for the reinforcement of norms. Of course, these same procedures can produce positive results; but they are subject to abuse, and they accelerate the decline of company norms when such decline begins. The attitudes of Company Tactical Officers toward academic efforts are extremely important. Without the Tactical Officer's support, the academic program will always operate under an unnecessary handicap. The effect of the Tactical Officers' attitudes toward scholastic pursuits and our recommendations for change are discussed in Chapter VI, Military Professional Development Program.

The myriad of well-organized, well-led extracurricular activities and attractive, but sometimes overcrowded, recreational and leisure facilities also compete for cadet time and can distract cadets from academic pursuits. College students have similar excuses to postpone studying, but they operate in a less structured environment than the Academy's. The Academy system of privileges does little more than entice cadets from their studies. Since it is deemed a "privilege" to go to the gymnasium, to the movies, to officers' quarters, on trips, and on weekend leave, the logical conclusion is that remaining in the barracks to study is deplorable. Another difference between cadets and college students is their perception of what happens if they do not study. Students at college expect to fail or receive low grades, sanctions which ultimately affect their employability. Most cadets know that while it is difficult to make an "A," it is even more difficult to fail, and they know all will have the same Army rank initially regardless of order of merit standing. Cadets also view expulsion for academic deficiency

as a remote threat. For the past 10 classes, an average of only 4.1 percent of each class has been separated or turned back for academic deficiency during its four years. Thus, the possibility of separation does not significantly affect allocation of time. The Academic Probation System instituted this year may have relieved some of the pressure to pass cadets as indicated by the increased failure rate of 5.6 percent for AY 76-77.

Certain aspects of the curriculum, pedagogy, and academic administration are also viewed negatively. Cadets believe that their study efforts are fragmented among too many courses, and they desire increased academic specialization in line with their own individual aptitudes and interests. Although cadets may not be the best judges to determine the content of the curriculum, the factors mentioned may have a negative effect on their attitudes. In a survey of 298 first and second classmen, 10 percent of the respondents claimed they do not see the relevance of course material to their future careers in the Army. Cadets reiterated this complaint during interviews. In fact, many of the courses mentioned by the respondents do have great relevance to Army officers, but this has not been made sufficiently apparent to the cadets. Other dissatisfactions mentioned were the frequency of grading in some courses and periodic overloads occurring when several examinations are scheduled and major papers are due within a short time span. On the same survey, over half of the respondents listed one or more of their courses as offering knowledge they would not retain beyond test time. Added written comments indicated that cadets believe courses are forced into this pattern of memorize, be tested, then forget because of the problems already mentioned.

Even the grading system insidiously undermines academic achievement. A grade of 2.0 or above on the scale of 0 to 3.0 is called "proficient," and everything below is "deficient." A barely proficient grade is perceived as acceptable and is viewed as a "C" grade would be at other institutions. In most courses and certainly in other institutions, a 2.1 semester average would receive a transcript letter grade of "D." The differences between the 3.0 system and the letter grades simply add to the confusion over what is academically acceptable. A more conventional letter grading system is now in the test stage prior to final adoption.

The "goat syndrome" is a synthesis of all the negative attitudes on academic excellence. Probably the quintessential manifestation of the "goat" cult occurs each June at graduation, when the last person in the class crosses the stage amid popping flashbulbs to receive a dollar from each of his classmates and greater acclaim than the top ten graduates. If cadets were not continuously and publicly given their relative standings, there would be no particular reason to adopt the goat attitude. When reseating, some departments seat cadets in the classroom according to their academic standing; thus, everyone knows who ranks low in the course. The current system of order of merit rankings for each

course emphasizes the position of each cadet relative to all others, calling particular attention to those at the low end of the scales.

The "goat syndrome" may be unconsciously abetted in some cases by other aspects of the institution's approach to studies. Each company has both cadets and instructors designated as academic representatives for those doing poorly. Each academic department makes additional instruction available for anyone who desires it. Some instructors even have repute as "goat Ps" or professors, because they are good at instructing the bottom sections. Such efforts are commendable examples of the individualized attention for students at the Academy as long as they do not become overused crutches.

We conclude that numerous factors both internal and external to the academic program tend to interfere with the cadets' desire for a good education. Military, athletic, extracurricular, and leisure activities aid cadet development but are not always conducted in ways that complement academic objectives. Noting the strong cadet belief that education is valuable and important, we are not particularly surprised that cadets think something is wrong. We believe that too many cadets try to eliminate the dissonance by retaining the ideal view of what an education should be but dismiss much of the academic system at West Point as lacking merit or relevance to their future career. Curriculum and pedagogical shortcomings have significance beyond their brief description here and receive more complete treatment later in this chapter. To change attitudes and eventually to alter cadet behavior will be a long-term process requiring numerous adjustments and, above all, a high standard of academic excellence set by the institution and demanded of cadets.

C. Curriculum

1. Analysis of the Current Curriculum. The dominant characteristic of the West Point curriculum is the comprehensive core of 40 required courses. Academic conservatism has protected the Academy from the curricular oscillations experienced in civilian colleges during the 1960's. Recent studies at Harvard, Princeton, MIT, and other distinguished institutions have firmly reestablished the principle of a broad central core of studies for the undergraduate.

Cadets take six academic courses each semester of the four years. Classes meet five and one half days per week between early morning and mid-afternoon. This schedule, coupled with mandatory physical training and military instruction and supplemented by voluntary extracurricular activities, all conducted in a military environment affected by a perception that every class or drill or activity is equally important, produces an unusually demanding workload. Competition for cadet time and

the necessity for cadets to set meticulous priorities breed a mentality, apparently unconsciously abetted by some faculty and staff, in which some cadets try to cope with overwhelming demands by doing just enough to satisfy each, but no more. Our interviews with cadets, junior faculty, and recent graduates repeat this theme. In the April 1977 Institutional Functioning Inventory (IFI) (see Appendix F) at least half of the cadets polled (out of a sample of 298) designated at least one course which epitomizes this approach, which cadet slang calls "spec and dump."

The Study Group found no comprehensive, coordinated, set of desired learning outcomes or objectives for the individual departmental offerings making up the core curriculum. Some departments (notably History and Mathematics) have set objectives which relate course offerings to the requirements of a military career, but most have not, or when they have tried to establish objectives have made them unhelpfully vague. The uniqueness of the West Point preprofessional education--pointing toward a very specific career--makes it all the more important that the core curriculum, at least, be guided by a unified and coherent set of educational goals. As a first step in the process, the Study Group presents its "Concept for the US Military Academy," which appears on page 3, Chapter I.

Cadets repeatedly report their inability to perceive the relationships among the parts of their education or the relevance of the curriculum to their concept of military service requirements. While it can be argued that their plight is inherent in their status as novices, interview responses convinced us that the cadets have too many scheduled demands on them and too little time to put the results of their efforts into large perspective. More than a quarter of the 298 cadets surveyed by the Institutional Functioning Inventory cited "too many courses" as a major flaw in the West Point academic program.

We reviewed the curricula of five engineering institutions, eight liberal arts colleges and universities, three military colleges, and three state universities. None currently require as many as the Academy's 48 courses. The average graduation requirement for these institutions is 40 to 42 courses except in professional engineering sequences, where the total is a few more. Even in colleges with ROTC programs whose cadets carry a somewhat greater academic and extracurricular load than their non-ROTC peers, the total is still substantially smaller than West Point's.

Cadets must complete 41 or 42 of the 48 courses in the structured core curriculum, leaving six or seven in which to pursue individual interests. Although these elective choices may focus within one of four interdisciplinary areas of concentration (basic sciences and mathematics, applied sciences and engineering, the humanities, or national security and public affairs), a lack of sequential or building block electives

and the existence of a fifth "general" track mean that many cadets never take courses above the intermediate level (i.e., typical of the first semester of junior year). For many cadets, their heavy load of prescribed courses is especially onerous and uninteresting when such courses (particularly those late in the curriculum) fall outside their primary areas of interest or aptitude.

A related issue is the "survey" approach of some required courses that attempt to cover an entire field or discipline in one or two semesters. Zealous faculty members, recognizing that they have only a limited fraction of cadets' academic attention and sincerely believing in the importance of their subject, may try to do too much.

The core curriculum includes six semesters of mathematics, two of engineering science, two of electrical engineering, two of engineering, and two each in physics and chemistry. Cadets electing basic or applied sciences surrender one elective and add another semester of engineering sciences. While these are formidable requirements, particularly for cadets more interested in the humanities and social sciences, this sequence is still not sufficient, without additional electives, to prepare cadets for graduate study in engineering. At the same time, it provides more engineering education than required for the general competence in technology needed by Army officers. Therefore, reduction in the mathematics, science, and engineering core sequence could be accomplished in ways which would retain emphasis on the basic sciences and still provide sufficient study of engineering. Furthermore, such a reduction would be consistent with continuing emphasis on engineering for a substantial number of cadets, provided there is a corresponding increase in engineering electives. A recent survey shows that, given a free choice of elective fields, 49 percent of the cadets responding preferred mathematics, science, or engineering. This percentage would be sufficient to meet current Army needs for Academy graduates in graduate science programs. If necessary, any decline in engineering concentration at the Academy could be compensated by controlling the areas of study allowed in the ROTC scholarship program.

In reply to a Study Group inquiry, responses from field commanders at the division and service school level have helped to highlight curricular shortcomings. These senior leaders as well as subordinate commanders and staff were asked to base their assessments on the performance of recent graduates. Our survey results rated Academy graduates as generally superior to other junior officers in such qualities as strength of character, physical fitness, understanding the role of the officer in the Army, potential for advancement, sense of integrity, devotion to duty, and getting the job done. On the other hand three areas of relative weakness were also reported: (1) seldom are graduates good writers, (2) they do not relate well to enlisted soldiers, and (3) they lack con-

fidence and skill in solving problems that have no set solutions. The Study Group tried to determine whether these deficiencies can be traced to the Academy.

Weakness in writing is a well-recognized and much-discussed inadequacy of American education at all levels. The section on pedagogy contains corrective measures we recommend for adoption.

The problem which young Academy graduates seem to have in their dealings with subordinates emanates to some extent from insufficient instruction in the behavioral sciences, but far more importantly, from inappropriate styles, models, and practices of leadership to which cadets are exposed in their relationships with Academy officers, in their own chain of command, in the Fourth Class System, and in their summer military training program. As a net effect of their Academy experiences and their comparative isolation from society, some graduates have become accustomed to harsh and insensitive patterns of leadership. The Military and Professional Development Chapter addresses this leadership problem.

The third relative weakness which was identified in the survey of commanders also has roots in the Academy experience. Shortcomings in dealing with issues for which there are no clear "right" answers result from the cadets having too few opportunities to study and solve problems characterized by ambiguity rather than certainty. Decision making in combat deals most often in uncertainty. The most successful wartime leaders have been trained to sort meager, often conflicting data, to develop a workable solution when none is perfect, and then to execute the plan well. The survey responses from the field appear to be saying that the curriculum does not adequately prepare cadets for such situations.

The 1976 honor investigations and the Borman Commission's report underscored the inadequacy of instruction in ethics. A semester course in philosophy taught in the First Class year constitutes the sole formal classroom approach to the presentation of ethical systems in the core curriculum. Although this course has been part of the core curriculum for eight years, it has never been taught by instructors trained in philosophy. Rather, the instruction is given by faculty members whose graduate schooling is in literature. Our sampling of the classes of 1977 and 1978 suggests that a substantial number of cadets respond negatively to this course. Moreover, placing this course in the last year misses the opportunity for an earlier introduction to the philosophical basis for professional ethics.

The Study Group observed another problem in the placing of courses in the curriculum. Mathematics and an engineering fundamentals

course dominate Fourth Class year. They comprise 50 percent of the schedule and place an unbalanced load on entering cadets whose preparation for such concentrated study of mathematics varies widely. New cadets who are weak in mathematics are at a significant disadvantage. Cadets whose interests and talents lie outside the natural and applied sciences must postpone study of their preferred subjects.

Having discussed the dimensions and content of the curriculum, we now address the question of options for specialization within a program aimed primarily at general studies. In contrast to the pattern of colleges offering "majors," the Academy has few advanced level required or elective courses. With a core of general studies taking up 42 of the 48 courses in the curriculum, the remaining 6 courses, predominately located in the First Class year, are too few to permit study beyond the intermediate college level for most cadets. The Study Group found, in addition, that the undemanding popular electives offered do not provide rigorous advanced work. Given the heavy workload of required courses, many cadets shy away from electives promising even more work. The Study Group believes that some cadets would benefit greatly from a better structuring of elective fields of concentration. As matters now stand, we believe few cadets experience the intellectual satisfaction that comes from achieving a real sense of mastery over a parcel of knowledge.

Too often, Academy administrative procedures seem to give little encouragement to effective planning of programs of study. By and large, cadets may choose electives free of any restraints. Good academic advice can discourage dilletantism, but it is not always available to cadets. Selection of elective courses and a field of concentration normally does not occur until Second Class year. Four of the six electives are available only in First Class year, a fact which minimizes the possibility of electing sequential or building block courses. Finally we note that attempts by cadets to schedule a rigorous First Class year obviously conflict in many ways with the heavy demands of leadership positions in the cadet chain of command.

Interviews with 150 cadets and questionnaires administered by the Study Group indicate significant cadet pressure for more academic specialization. While some cadets favor the current ratio between core courses and electives, twice as many indicate a desire for greater concentration.

In summary, the research of the Study Group including the advice of members of the military, the input of field commanders, the sampling of cadets and graduates by interview and questionnaire, and civilian consultants has shown several areas for potential improvement of the curriculum.

Authorities at the Military Academy have not been unmindful of the need for self-examination and curriculum reform. In the past twenty years, several studies of the curriculum have been made, both by internal and external groups. As a result, the curriculum has evolved deliberately and carefully but, in the minds of some observers, too slowly. The latest analysis was made by a curricular study group appointed in January 1976 and charged with conducting a comprehensive study of the academic program and curriculum and recommending "modifications and changes considered necessary to strengthen and improve the quality and appropriateness of the program and curriculum within the continuum of the United States Regular Army officer."

The Academy's Curricular Study Group identified many of the problem areas which have been examined by our Study Group. The Academy's so-called Initiative No. 3 addressed these problem areas but simply did not go far enough in our judgment.

2. Suggestions for curricula change. The central idea of the curriculum has been its emphasis on a broad general education intended to provide a sound foundation for the wide range of experiences encountered by the professional Army officer. Since the precise future needs of the service can never be completely defined, the curriculum has been designed to provide an academic base which would support a variety of future requirements. The education stresses the basic and applied sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences. The Study Group recommends no change in this basic approach. The steps necessary for improvement are those which reduce its size, increase the number of electives taken and provide more structure in elective fields.

Of the 15 curriculum proposals considered by the Study Group, the vast majority favored a structured general education approach centering on a broadly based core curriculum. Typically, these proposals contained roughly thirty courses out of a total academic program of roughly 40 courses and ranged from a low of 26 required courses to a high of 34. The majority retained an introduction to engineering and technology in the core curriculum. The consensus that emerged is outlined below.

The Core curriculum must provide early grounding in written and oral communication and in logic. Throughout the four years, cadet writing should be evaluated in every course not only for content but also for form. This effort calls for establishing an integrating agency, crossing departmental lines, setting direction, monitoring progress, and coordinating all activities that bear on the capability of cadets to write and speak effectively. Moreover, the frequency of short (3-5 pages) writing requirements should be increased in the core courses, including courses in science and engineering.

- The academic experience should establish the theoretical foundations of the future Army officer's ability to direct the efforts of people. Needed instruction in the behavioral sciences and military leadership should be coordinated with those summer military training experiences which constitute direct applications of the theoretical material.

- The core curriculum should include a progressive sequence in mathematics of roughly four semesters which covers differential and integral calculus, differential equations, statistics, and probability. This sequence should begin in the first semester of Fourth Class year to ensure the appropriate foundation for course work in the natural and applied sciences, economics and other social sciences, and behavioral science.

- There should be sufficient study of the physical and natural sciences to establish understanding of the physical world, scientific thinking, and experimental methods. This study should include a physics sequence leading to a semester of electronics and an introduction to chemistry or modern physics. At least one major experimental laboratory project should be mandatory. The applied science sequence should be oriented toward decision making and should provide experience in and technical knowledge of problems which do not have unique solutions. The first course in the engineering sequence, preferably taught during Fourth Class year, should be an engineering fundamentals course focusing on engineering methods and an introduction to the use of the computer. The course in engineering graphics should be dropped. Approximately 12 or 13 courses should make up the four-year sequence in mathematics, science, and engineering.

- In the area of the humanities and the social sciences, we considered proposals covering a wide range of specific course designs. The Study Group recommends sequences in rhetoric and literature, military and modern history, economics, government, international relations, and law with roughly eight to ten courses in these subjects.

- We believe that fewer than four terms of a foreign language is unproductive and therefore unwise. We note that language skills decay rapidly but also that about one fifth of the cadets take at least one elective beyond the required sequence. Most cadets completing the core sequence achieve a "level 2" capability on the Defense Language Proficiency Test, which, incidentally, should be reinstated in all language courses.

- The Study Group concludes that the current language program with its strong and successful elective offerings is sound. Most cadets

should study foreign languages in the core curriculum; every effort should be made to ensure that cadets study a language in which they have some experience; and no cadet should be required to take Russian, Chinese, Portuguese, or Arabic unless that language is his or her first choice. We also commend language validation procedures and accelerated programs.

- A sound philosophical basis for ethical standards should be provided. The minimum required courses should include philosophy and ethics, general psychology, constitutional and military law, leadership, and a seminar in American Institutions. Philosophy instruction should occur early in the core curriculum, but appropriate faculty will have to be found. Supporting electives should be available. The work of the Academy's Committee on Instruction in Ethics and Professionalism should be expanded in scope and expert advice obtained on approaches to education in this difficult area. Ethical issues of interest to Army officers and cadets should be discussed wherever appropriate throughout the curriculum and should be emphasized in summer training. The entire staff and faculty must be alert to their roles in shaping the behavior of the cadets. They would also benefit from active participation in colloquia and symposia on this subject. The Study Group recognizes that the entire program cannot be instituted immediately. Competent instructors are essential, and a premature effort could do more harm than good.

- If the higher figures for the number of core courses required in each area as discussed above were used, the total would exceed 30 and the number of electives would fall below 10 for a curriculum of 40 courses. The Study Group recommends a structured elective program which permits cadets to develop depth in their chosen areas of interest. Such a program would follow a carefully designed sequence that builds upon core courses and progresses to a senior level of content. Core courses should be presented in different versions for concentrators in different fields. Eight electives are required for concentration in an interdisciplinary areas, but 10 would be preferable. The desire for breadth in the core curriculum must be weighed against the need for adequate specialization in the elective program. The Study Group hoped to recommend no more than 30 core courses, but the 32 suggested below still permit an acceptable elective program.

- The Study Group has not addressed the issue of the most appropriate number of tracking alternatives in great depth. However, in a curriculum structured on a board-based core there should be some freedom in selecting areas of concentration and sub-specialties. We do not recommend the option of general studies with its unrestricted elective choice. Such a program does not meet the objective of ensuring specialization for all cadets.

Model Standard Curriculum (A Notional Example)

First Class (Senior)	2d Sem	Engineering	American Institutions	Military Law	Elective	Elective
	1st Sem	Engineering	Elective	Intro to Law	Elective	Elective
Second Class (Junior)	2d Sem	Engineering Science	Leadership & Group Psych	Military History	International Relations	Elective
	1st Sem	Electronics	Literature	Military History	Intro to Polit Sci	Elective
Third Class (Sophomore)	2d Sem	Statistics	Elective	Fgn Lang	Economics	Mod Physics or Chemistry
	1st Sem	Differential Equations	Philosophy	Fgn Lang	Modern History	Physics II
Fourth Class (Freshman)	2d Sem	Calculus II	Composition & Rhetoric	Fgn Lang	Psychology	Physics I
	1st Sem	Calculus I	Composition & Rhetoric	Fgn Lang	Cult & Polit Geography	Intro to Syst & Computers

NOTE: Course titles shown above do not imply equal course credit weights or period requirements. Problem sessions, laboratories and language laboratories may be added.

Each sequence of courses was developed separately by asking the question—what knowledge is needed to achieve understanding of the main concepts of a discipline? This curriculum necessitated several compromises, one of which was accepting 32 core courses. The Study Group offers it as a model which synthesizes the needs of the Army, the current generation of cadets, and the principles of a sound education. This suggestion includes 12 courses in math/science/engineering (37.5 percent), 12 courses in the social and behavioral sciences (37.5 percent), and eight in the humanities (25 percent) for a total of 32 core courses.

Certain design ideas deserve mention. The two human dynamics courses, psychology and leadership, are placed in Fourth and Second Class years respectively, to take advantage of the proposed summer military training (Drill Cadet and Cadet Troop Leader Training and upper class duties) that would follow. The American Institutions course should be the culmination of the ethics, human dynamics, and leadership sequence. The engineering sequence proposed above departs considerably from previous practice. Not all cadets concentrate in an engineering field, but all must learn the engineering approach to problem solving and analysis. Cadets would be required to select one of the several sequences—perhaps systems, electronic, mechanical, or civil—and to follow one of these from theory to practical application. An important consideration of this curriculum model is the placement of an elective in the Third Class year. This construction has several advantages. It introduces choice earlier in the program. It permits an earlier start on concentration and provides five semesters to structure it, rather than four. Alternatively, it permits cadets in academic difficulty to schedule a remedial course during term time as well as in the summer so that disruptions of course sequences can be repaired without major delay.

Our proposal presupposes an eight-course elective sequence in general areas of concentration--basic science and mathematics, applied science and engineering, the social and behavioral sciences, or the humanities--selected at mid-point of the Third Class year with the guidance of a trained advisor. Two graphic examples of concentration tracks--intended only for illustration--appear at pages 94-95. While our model shows eight electives as the desired level of individual choice, the reduction of the overall program to 40 courses offers considerably greater flexibility for capable cadets to go beyond the minimum graduation requirement by overloading. A maximum overload of one additional course per semester would double elective options. A variant of our model is also worthy of consideration. It would replace the fixed scheduling of courses over the four years with a variable and flexible sequence for perhaps half of the core program. The mathematics and writing sequences should remain firm since they are essential to later work. The basic science sequence should also begin in the Fourth Class

year. Foreign language instruction, on the other hand, could be scheduled flexibly. Cadets with strong aptitude and interest in language and who desire to progress through electives could begin their study early. Cadets with other educational preferences or who visualize the possibility of an overseas assignment soon after graduation might want to complete the requirement in the two upperclass years. Similar considerations obtain in scheduling the applied science/engineering sequence.

The scheduling problems are obvious. In addition, more flexibility calls for more information on which to base choices and more advice by experienced faculty. We believe, however, that this can be done.

One alternative curriculum which received serious attention was designed using a system engineering approach. It included several suggestions for multi-course sequences. Certain of its design principles deserve serious future consideration. One sequence of courses was particularly relevant to a military career. It was composed of courses in numerical techniques and modeling to include operational analysis and simulations of small and large unit actions. We recommend that the Academy develop such a sequence as an elective choice on a test basis and that such innovations in military education be evaluated in future curriculum planning efforts.

We believe that the model curriculum, of all the proposals considered, most nearly reaches the objectives defined. We offer it with the intention of being suggestive rather than prescriptive. The variety of coordination and scheduling considerations involved in such change were not addressed. Course titles do not imply equal time allotments or emphasis. Mathematics courses, for example, might have added problem-solving sessions. Only the Academy is in a position to determine the detailed form of such a curriculum.

D. Library

The Academy's library is an attractive facility well situated at the center of the campus. In general, the library is a place conducive to study and work. The staff is well qualified and has a strong desire to serve the Academy.

The concern of the Study Group is that the library is not being used as well as it might by faculty or students. If one accepts the premise that cadet use of the library is proportional to that of the faculty, then it is important to increase faculty use of and interest in the library. Faculty use of the main library is hindered by the departmental libraries because their availability discourages instructors from becoming familiar with the more comprehensive main library holdings. On the other hand, these decentralized collections make sense because they are immediately available to instructors and reduce congestion in the

main library. Faculty use of the main library may be incrementally reduced by the practice in some departments of issuing instructors small collections of books to support their instruction. This practice also discourages instructor interest in the main library.

Cadets' use of the library is similarly less than optimal. Their use varies from almost none at all during many periods to tremendous peak loading immediately before major papers are due in core courses. The lack of a long-term loan policy may contribute to the congestion during peak periods. A related difficulty is that large numbers of cadets frequently all have the same assignment at the same time. Better coordinated scheduling and more diversified reading and writing assignments would help to ease this situation.

Formal faculty involvement in the running of the library occurs through the mechanisms of the Academic Board, the Library Committee, and departmental representatives. The Academic Board becomes involved in major questions of policy, but the Librarian does not sit on this Board. The assignment of a library officer within each department as is currently the practice facilitates fiscal control and monitoring of the collection, but the program would be strengthened if the library designated a staff member for liaison with each department. The library assistants so designated might attend departmental meetings and otherwise attain greater involvement with the departments served.

Finally, the library does not have a comprehensive plan to ensure that a decade hence it will be the kind of library that will best serve the Academy. The impact of technology on libraries is increasingly great, and unless plans are made to capitalize on these trends, the Academy will be left behind.

E. Faculty

The faculty authorized for the United States Military Academy in Academic Year 1976-77 consists of 540 US officers, three foreign officers, six uniformed civil service teachers, one foreign service officer, and two visiting professors. The US officers fall into three categories. Twenty hold the statutory rank of Professor as Presidential appointees; they can, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, remain until age 64. Thirty-five serve as associate professors and have tenure until thirty years service. The remainder are instructors serving three- or four-year teaching tours.

The Study Group unequivocally supports the practice of drawing the bulk of the West Point faculty from the commissioned ranks. The dedication

tion, enthusiasm, and maturity of these officers comprise an irreplaceable component of the West Point experience. The faculty has traditionally received high marks from observers such as the Kappel Board in 1972, visiting civilian professors, the General Accounting Office, the Middle States Accreditation Committee, and numerous Boards of Visitors. While concurring in those complimentary views, the Study Group recognizes some areas of possible improvement.

The very composition of West Point's faculty imposes certain limits upon the depth of academic background the instructors bring to the classroom. While this limitation constitutes part of the price paid to continue the valuable policy of staffing the faculty with commissioned officers, the Study Group believes that some internal and external alterations will measurably increase the academic expertise available to the cadets.

Currently, administrative duties overburden the professors and hinder them from effectively discharging other responsibilities. True, the senior professors must provide institutional governance and manage the Academy's academic affairs. But they also bear, to a large extent, the responsibility for the institution's academic stature. They should, therefore, engage in research and scholarly activities. Additionally, they should remain current in knowledge of the Army and maintain contacts both with cadets and faculty through teaching courses, elective and core, and by managing their respective departments. To do these tasks well requires a judicious balancing of priorities. Presently, the professors devote the largest portion of their time to institutional governance and administrative management and thus diminish the value of their experience and background in other areas. The heads of departments, for instance, each sit on an average of 10 committees. During the academic portion of 1975 two of these committees upon which every head of department sits met 35 times, and during the academic portion of 1976 they met 58 times.

The Study Group believes that the amount and type of certain administrative details which occupy the time of the professors are improper and may, in many cases, be more profitably delegated. The Academic Board, for example, frequently considers hundreds of individual cases of admission and deficiency. While some few cases undoubtedly warrant the attention of the Academic Board, most probably can be handled by a subordinate agency. In the April 1977 Institutional Functioning Inventory administered to the West Point Faculty, 61 percent of those responding indicated that the non-tenured faculty should share more of the administrative duties. The Study Group fully supports the steps being taken by the Academy to shift some of the administrative duties from professors to other members of the faculty. A further discussion of the administrative duties appears in the governance chapter of this report.

A second point concerns the issue of change. The Study Group concludes that the professors occasionally delay unnecessarily changes within the departments and the Academy. We fully recognize the benefits of the stability provided by the professors. We also realize revolutionary institutional change is frequently undesirable and evolutionary change is usually healthy. But changes within the current structure of the Academy have been too deliberate in the recent past. Departmental reorganizations, for example, have frequently awaited a specific retirement. Curriculum revisions have been approved only after exceptionally long periods of consideration.

The Study Group recommends that the Academy consider rotating the position of department head of academic departments among the tenured faculty in each department at four- to seven-year intervals. We do not view a hierarchical system of management as necessary in an academic department. The Academy does have a large number of three-year instructors, a situation which suggests more control by the tenured faculty than would be required in a civilian institution; but this control could be exercised by the tenured faculty of a department as a group rather than by one department head at the top. Professors should continue to exercise guidance concerning course content and pedagogical techniques within their respective departments, drawing on their experience and knowledge. By allowing a different officer to assume the duties of department head approximately every five years, fresh ideas would be introduced into the governance structures of the departments and the Academy. Changing department heads would also result in a sharing of administrative duties and would allow greater attention to be placed on scholastic matters, thus improving academic excellence across the institution.

Unlike the professors, the associate professors have too small a share of the institutional governance and academic management. The Associate Professors Council as such has no vote in curriculum and governance issues nor do the associates as individuals. The Study Group believes that granting the associate professors a larger role will have the twin benefits of bringing a wider perspective to academic and institutional questions and lightening the load borne by the professors. Some of the administrative duties currently discharged by the associate professors should be passed on to members of the non-tenured faculty.

The selection process for tenured faculty must incorporate an improved system of checks and balances. A possible method would include an internal screening committee to review prospective candidates, narrowing the field. Following the screening committee's selection, the vitae of the candidates should be further reviewed by a committee consisting of all full professors and, separately, by the Dean.

The three agencies (the Dean, screening committee, and full professor committee) would then rank the three candidates, any two votes for one candidate outweighing the third. When at least a two-vote consensus is reached, the name of the selected candidate would be then forwarded to the Superintendent. In addition to the internal screening by the three agencies described above, an ad hoc visiting committee of the Superintendent's Advisory Committee recommended in the governance chapter of this report should also sit as a review agency prior to any final decision on a candidate by the Superintendent.

In the judgment of the Study Group, the Academy's non-tenured instructors possess adequate qualifications but would benefit from increased study. The typical instructor arrives with a master's degree earned in a two-year program. Occasionally, an instructor has a PhD, but such officers are rare. The Study Group recommends allowing some officers to continue their studies to the dissertation phase of the doctoral program. Approving a limited number of four-year tours would provide still another means of increasing faculty expertise. Department of the Army must ensure that the Military Personnel Center understands the value of such extensions and takes all reasonable steps necessary to allow approval of the extension without damaging the officer's career.

A second tactic is repetitive assignments for good instructors who have also had an intervening tour using their graduate degree. Such individuals would have the additional benefit of being able to relate their specific discipline to the Army. The Study Group recommends that the Military Personnel Center, Department of Army, Materiel Development and Readiness Command, and the Academy establish a program for laboratory managers or project managers to serve alternating and multiple tours in Materiel Development and Readiness Command and at West Point. A similar program should be established for officers in the Foreign Area Officer program whose education and experience qualify them as instructors. Third, the Academy should consider granting a limited number of exceptional junior instructors a form of limited tenure, allowing them to remain at West Point until their twentieth year of service. Only a few such appointments should be made in any department. Depending upon the amount of time remaining in the service at the time tenure is granted, they might return to graduate school either full or part time. Finally, the Academy must ensure that its instructors attend only first-rate schools. Only by such attendance can the Academy guarantee that its prospective instructors will derive maximum benefit from their graduate schooling. The Study Group supports the Academy in opposing the policy of assigning an officer as an instructor solely on the strength of holding a master's degree in a particular discipline. Such officers

may not be the best qualified, and their degree may be from an undistinguished or inappropriate school. Also a period of years may have elapsed between the graduate study and the teaching tour. Individual qualification and teaching potential should determine instructor assignments, not merely the possession of an advanced degree.

The Study Group notes that in a few cases once instructors do arrive at the Academy, they do not teach courses for which they were educated. This situation sometimes occurs because not all courses can be offered simultaneously. In other cases, instructors regularly find themselves teaching courses for which they are not properly prepared. The Office of Military Leadership has suffered from an insufficient number of instructors qualified in psychology. In the English department the vast majority of the instructors do their graduate work in literature, yet the department's curriculum also embraces the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric. The Study Group believes that the department would significantly benefit by schooling an appropriate number of its instructors in these disciplines. As another method of increasing faculty quality, the Study Group recommends an expansion of the visiting professor program until the total civilian representation is about 5 percent of the faculty. In view of the recent addition of women to the Corps, we recommend this program be used as a source for the early addition of women to the faculty. Assignment of visiting professors should be based on the need of the discipline rather than equity in all departments. English, history, and chemistry skills, for example, are difficult to find in the active Army. Likewise, some subjects require greater experience than others to handle successfully. It is important that the Academy offer visiting professors appointments in grade levels commensurate with those held in their civilian institutions. Finally, the Academy and the Department of the Army should establish one- to two-year appointments for outstanding Army and Defense Department Career Civilians working, for example, in Department of the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command laboratories.

The Study Group has noted certain instructor attitudes which, if modified, would yield considerable pedagogical dividends. One attitude, addressed in greater detail elsewhere in the report, involves the unsupportive attitude held by some members of academic departments toward the members of the Department of Tactics. To a large degree the members of the Department of Tactics reciprocate, and the situation results in many cadets divorcing academic achievement from professional success and playing one group against the other, blaming academic deficiencies on the military system, and attributing leadership failures and disciplinary problems to the academic load. The Academy should consider selecting one permanent associate professor per year to serve as a regimental tactical officer which would help alleviate this problem. Also, about six officers per year should be selected to serve split four-year tours, two as a tactical officer and two as an instructor or vice versa.

A second attitude of concern to the Study Group appears in the belief among instructors and assistant professors that their tour at West Point does not enhance their careers. Not only does this perception affect the motivation of instructors, but, should it become widespread, soon the best officers would avoid tours at the Academy. A puzzling aspect of this problem is that the facts of promotion rates and school and command selection show clearly that such tours are career enhancing. Military Personnel Center and the Academy must do a better job of bringing such information to the attention of past, present, and prospective instructors. Assignment officers must know the facts as should the officers stationed at West Point and the Officer Corps in general. Academy assignments should be integrated with career specialities. The timing of assignment to the Academy must be carefully planned as must the nature of the tour immediately after leaving West Point. The various departments must encourage their officers to take advantage of opportunities which will help develop their overall careers. Appropriate instruction and information should be provided to boards involved in personnel decisions.

It is desirable for the junior faculty to feel free to seek advice from others with deeper understanding and broader experience. Theoretically, the associate professors and professors fulfill this role. In practice, however, some instructors indicated in interviews that they do not feel the permanent faculty is accessible to them. Regardless of the degree to which the faculty sees itself as accessible to the junior faculty, if the instructors do not sense such an openness, little communication will take place. New effort is required. We see a role for an organizational effectiveness expert here.

Finally, the Study Group applauds the progress made towards a more representative balance of instructors between Academy graduates and graduates from other institutions but feels that more progress is called for in this area. Graduates of the Academy presently make up approximately 60 percent of the faculty assigned for three-year teaching tours, a sharp reduction from the 70 percent common before AY 74-75. Although academic departments attempt to add officers whose undergraduate degrees are from colleges other than West Point, the Academy does not have a faculty with as great an undergraduate diversity as could and should be obtained. The Military Personnel Center must assist in this effort.

F. Pedagogy

The positive aspects of the Thayer System have been praised over the years. The system demands regular preparation and accustoms cadets to working under stress by requiring them to think on their feet and to express themselves before peers and instructors. It teaches them to

establish priorities and meet deadlines. Small sections facilitate interaction among instructors and cadets. Sectioning by ability permits the introduction of advanced material in the upper sections and concentration on fundamentals in the lower sections, thereby adjusting the learning experience to the ability of the group. The 3.0 daily grading scheme has some features of a criterion-referenced system in that the instructor determines whether the cadet has mastered the lesson for that day and declares him proficient or deficient. The system thus rewards success and punishes failure regularly.

The challenge the Academy faces is to retain the desirable features of the Thayer heritage while implementing progressive change. The Study Group observed many outstanding classes in the course of its work. With the aim of achieving an even better educational program, the comments that follow point to the problems that we found.

The Study Group identified five general areas for improvement. Two of these--cadet writing ability and facility in the use of mathematics--pertain to cadet performance. The other three--academic professionalism, curricular coherence, and instructional methods--related to institutional practices.

Most senior field commanders surveyed by the Study Group declare that graduates are woefully poor writers. West Point graduates do not stand alone. Poor writing is a national malaise, and officers from other colleges suffer equally. But there are steps the Academy can take to improve writing skills. Contributing to the deficiency at the Academy are disagreements about the purpose of cadet writing, inconsistent standards for content and style, a lack of coordination of written requirements, and most importantly, a lack of frequent, short, thoroughly evaluated written work.

The question of purpose is complicated. The English Department teaches argumentative writing--a logical defense of a restricted thesis. Other departments prefer a narrative or expository style which may or may not support a specific thesis. Of course, no single approach to writing is "right" or "wrong," but cadets become confused when departments seem to be at loggerheads. Most departments do not grade cadet writing on grammar, spelling, diction, or style; they concentrate on content. Yet every faculty member knows that writing improves only through critical evaluation of both form and content. The Academy should establish an interdepartmental committee on writing to address these problems and to coordinate a program of progressive instruction in writing throughout the four years. Without coordination, there has been inconsistency in standards, form, evaluation, and frequency of work. The Study Group recognizes the complexity of this problem and realizes that a new committee will not solve it easily. But a start should be made.

Similar deficiencies exist with respect to mathematics. Again, no interdepartmental committee bears responsibility for assessing cadet performance and coordinating the teaching of mathematics or its application in other courses. The Report of the Military Applications Committee Correlation Study, 1975-76, our interviews with instructors, and our personal observations all lead to the conclusion that many cadets in the middle and lower sections have significant difficulty with mathematics. Their situation results from deficiencies in their preparation at entrance, their poor attitudes toward studies, deficiencies in Academy instruction, and perhaps most important, ineffective reinforcement in other disciplines. The Study Group concludes that the Academy should mount vigorous efforts toward improving mathematical skills among cadets. In addition, we wish to call attention to three major areas of institutional practices which need strengthening.

The Study Group finds that academic professionalism throughout the Academy faculty and staff requires reemphasis. Every consultant who visited classes reported isolated cases of instructional error or laxity which amount to little in a single case but cumulatively have the effect of vitiating the academic experience and in some cases leading to fundamental misunderstandings. For example, they saw instructors who made errors in grammar and in mathematical calculations. It hardly needs to be said that carelessness and inaccuracy can be learned more easily than the habits of scrupulousness and precision. The faculty should take pains to set the right example.

A discussion of cadet attitudes toward studies appears elsewhere, but we mention the subject here because pedagogy influences these attitudes. In any particular course, its demonstrated relevance to other courses and to the Army will greatly affect the interest and enthusiasm of cadets. In general, instructors do not clearly relate their courses to work the cadets are doing in other courses. Nor are cadets regularly held accountable for material previously presented or required to use techniques and skills learned earlier. The lack of such linkages and sequences frustrates the desire of most cadets to understand the ways in which knowledge is unified.

Engineering courses taught at the upper level needlessly devote substantial review time to material thoroughly covered in earlier calculus courses. The thermodynamics course emphasizes such narrow areas as use of steam tables but omits important linkages with earlier courses on statistics and probability. The computer science course stresses Fortran programming without placing sufficient emphasis on a broad range of other computer applications which would be useful later in the curriculum and in an Army career heavily dependent upon the use of computers. The core economics course makes little use of calculus and statistics.

It would be possible to coordinate instruction in the core curriculum so that cadets would learn a particular technique or principle then promptly use it in related disciplines. The Study Group recognizes the difficulties associated with structuring courses in this way, but we note that few institutions would even have the Academy's administrative capacity to manage the coordination. The Academy could do it and should, we believe, to enhance the motivation of cadets.

Cadets are especially interested in the relevance of their Academy education to their future careers as regular Army officers. Accordingly, cadets should learn why and how as military professionals they will use their understanding of the physical world as well as their knowledge of culture, politics, economics, history, and human behavior. The relevance of the academic program to a military career needs greater emphasis.

Another institutional practice in need of change is the excessively firm adherence in core courses to the standardized outlines and procedures which are given to new instructors. Frequent quizzes or recitations, standard written exams, the requirement to rank all students in each course, and the rotation of instructors--all tend toward homogenized teaching. These procedures properly support new instructors, but they also hinder innovation and insulate courses from the fresh ideas brought by faculty members who have recently come from graduate study. As we discuss elsewhere, we also believe that the importance of the General Order of Merit has also contributed in some departments to excessive and unnecessary standardization. We urge maintaining balance between support for new instructors and a reasonable degree of innovation and individual style.

In other sections of this report we discuss what has been called the fragmentation of the educational experience at West Point, the feeling of cadets that the system never stops pulling them apart, never ceases making demands, never allows them periods of reflection and consolidation. Some of this fragmentation stems from the pedagogy, so we comment on the subject here, looking at three factors: grading, period length, and assignments.

Overly frequent grading contributes to fragmentation by artificially dividing course material into small segments for evaluation. No department any longer practices daily recitation and grading, but some come close, grading two of every three lessons. This practice often emphasizes drill at the expense of understanding. Cadets may find themselves proficient in certain lesson-sized bits of knowledge or problem solving but unable to relate them to larger generalizations or more fundamental principles. Frequent grading entices some of the less adept students into destructive gamesmanship; they search constantly for the minimum

amount of factual material that must be memorized to suffice for that day--in cadet jargon, "the pop." This approach will succeed when examinations focus on small segments and do not require cadets to synthesize. Cadets themselves dislike such frequent grading and would prefer fewer evaluations.

Period length can also contribute to fragmentation. The 80-minute period as it is used in mathematics permits, some say encourages, the continual use of 20 to 30 minutes per day for evaluated board work. This limited time often produces little conceptual understanding and is usually inadequate for treating difficult problems. Current policies limiting the time a given department can require for homework restrict the complexity of problems that can be assigned and lead to greater stress on class drill. Reliance on daily board work for evaluation means that exchanges between instructors and the cadets are brief, public, and oral. They have no written work to review later.

Scheduling of laboratories in blocks no longer than two hours also adds to the fragmentation. This brief time means that many labs take a "cookbook" approach, one that compares unfavorably with better civilian colleges. Existing procedures also inhibit the development of project-based labs. In these the nature of projects selected by cadets determines the number of four-hour labs devoted to them. The Study Group does not suggest that all labs take the project approach, but we recommend that each cadet take at least one such lab in some subject.

Another concern related to the adverse effects of overly frequent grading and ill-designed periods is the fragmentation of assignments which occurs in many courses. Judicious use of excerpts often provides a beneficial method to present central concepts or examples of larger works, but novels and plays rarely submit to such abridgement. Full works of literature should be assigned whenever possible, and courses should be structured to permit some class discussions of entire works, not merely one day's reading assignments.

One of the main instructional settings in use at the Academy is the small section, a situation with potentially great benefits. The Study Group, however, notes some problems. There is a tendency to overwork the small section method. Lectures are used rarely and tend to be large evening lectures of uneven quality. When the cadets attend lectures, generally they are inattentive and do not take notes since they do not believe that they will be tested on material presented in that way. We note that while many sections operate effectively, some do not. Sometimes the instructor lacks knowledge of the subject or does not understand how to lead a small group; sometimes the students have not studied the material or they lack skill in discussion.

West Point instructors work hard to compensate for their inexperience as faculty members by intensive preparation, enthusiasm, dedication, and efforts to relate course material to Army applications. Naturally, cadet questions may exceed an instructor's background, particularly when he teaches outside his immediate field. Continuing education of the junior faculty should help to solve this particular problem. Any such program should include the development of skills in discussion leadership. But group discussions may fail for lack of cadet preparation too. As discussed elsewhere, many cadets believe that grades of "A" are almost unattainable, so some resign themselves to working only enough to achieve a minimum passing grade--2.0. Thus, discussion, which flourishes only with informed participation by all parties, flounders. Improvement might follow from assigning different readings to cadets in the same section. Knowing that they depend upon each other for information might spur cadets to more effective reading, listening, and speaking.

The final difficulty of teaching cadets by group discussion is that they have little preparation in critical thinking. A logic course would teach cadets the principles of evidence and the relation between evidence and conclusions; it would lead to more rigorous discussions. While a full semester course in logic may not be appropriate, instruction should be included in the curriculum and should be coordinated among departments that require argumentative discourse.

The audio-visual facilities at the Academy are unrivaled by most civilian colleges. Several of our civilian consultants commented enviously on the quantity of available support, and most departments make good use of the facilities. More, however, could and should be done. Television, the preferred medium for displaying images, and the computer, the best device for manipulating data, should be joined imaginatively to exploit the strengths of each. The Study Group was disappointed to observe lackluster use of the blackboard. Perhaps because of the military instruction tradition that discourages in-class writing on the blackboard, many instructors use the blackboard ineffectively. This deficiency considered alone would hardly merit more than passing comment in our report. But it is another example showing the need for an instructional development program at the Academy. Many teaching skills and techniques need polishing: lecturing, leading discussions, evaluating papers, employing audio-visual equipment, and using the blackboard. Especially because the majority of the Academy faculty is inexperienced in the college classroom (approximately one-third are fresh from graduate school each year), we would expect considerable improvement in teaching as a result of such a program.

The Study Group is concerned about the apparent hesitation of the Academy to experiment with new instructional techniques. In general new ideas have not been tested on a segment of the Corps to determine the advantages of various learning strategies. It is neither necessary nor desirable to try an idea on the entire Corps of Cadets. The Study Group suggests that the Academy consider the following techniques.

- Individually paced, mastery-based instruction. This approach is used at Purdue University and Oklahoma State University, institutions which do not enjoy the favorable instructor-student ratio of West Point. It appears to be particularly compatible with small sections. While there have been some experiments with this technique, there has been no major effort to determine its potential for West Point.

- Computer-assisted instruction. Gaming and simulation would enhance cadets' understanding of the tools available to assist in making decisions in the face of uncertainty. The Academy has the capability for computer analysis of variance and regression, but neither subject appears in the core curriculum. Sensitivity analysis, antiderivative routines, and other topics could also be introduced.

The final area of our concern in pedagogy is the examination process. Cadets and instructors alike believe that significant numbers of cadets who have not mastered course material nevertheless pass. Why the apparent unwillingness to fail the marginal or clearly deficient cadet? The first possible reason is the severity of the penalty for failure. It can cause dismissal, although in practice some lesser punishment normally occurs. But in many cases failure results in loss of summer leave, a full academic year, or both. Second, the publicity given high attrition rates may contribute to a general reluctance to declare cadets deficient. While recognizing these influences, the Study Group believes that there should be a greater willingness to fail those who do not measure up. We strongly support reducing the penalty for failing a single course, and we recommend further steps to increase the flexibility of options for dealing with deficient or failing cadets and to ensure that isolated substandard performance does not lead to separation from the Academy.

G. Academic Administration

The Study Group reviewed the administration of the academic program, specifically looking at scheduling, incentives for academic excellence to include grading, service obligations for separated cadets, counseling, graduation requirements, and the interrelations among these topics.

1. Scheduling. Cadets follow a full daily schedule. Normally, their day extends from 0625 until 2330, with the academic day ending at noon into two 60-minute periods. The daily schedule affects the administration of the academic program in many ways, but the net effects are rigid scheduling, fragmented student time, and inefficient use of facilities.

The Study Group suggests a schedule featuring a standard period length, for example, 50 or 60 minutes, and class attendance by regiment to the extent possible. In such a scheme, all periods could be interchangeable, a characteristic which would not only add flexibility and distribute facility use by making labs, lecture halls, and playing fields available during more of the day but would also afford cadets substantial periods (two to four hours or more) of uncommitted time. Possible variations in scheduling include staggering lunch attendance which would add another period and still more flexibility, continuing the scheduled day somewhat beyond 1515 (with appropriate periods reserved for members of intercollegiate teams), and reducing time allotted for meals and associated formations.

The Study Group also sees opportunities for improvement in the academic calendar. The first semester now extends past the Christmas vacation. Cadets return from their leave for two weeks of instruction and then take their term-end examinations. The schedule interferes with their enjoyment of the holiday and requires a significant mental readjustment to prepare for examinations. The Study Group prefers a fall term beginning in January and ending in May. This change would better align study requirements with the holiday. A slight cost savings to the Academy would result since each class would spend about somewhat less time at West Point. The crucial issue with respect to semester scheduling is the time required for cadet basic training (CBT). The new cadets' reporting date must remain in July since many high schools do not graduate until late June. Elsewhere in this report the Study Group notes that CBT and organization week could be shortened. We therefore believe the first term can begin in August.

2. Incentives and Sanctions. Among the prime academic incentives is the grading system. The basic system in use at West Point theoretically arrays cadet academic achievement on a scale between 0.0 and 3.0, with satisfactory performance denoted by 2.0 or above. However, actual practice compresses most grades into the upper one-third of the scale. This system emphasizes this 2.0 threshold, terming achievement at or above this level "proficient" and all below as "deficient." Although the system theoretically allows a full range of assessment, the cadets view it as a "pass-fail" system. Thus a 2.0 rating--equivalent to a borderline "D minus"--has long been viewed by the cadets as adequate.

Within the recent past, West Point recognized these grading system deficiencies. The Academy's 1976 Curriculum Study Group recommended a new grading system. The new system is somewhat cumbersome and does not go far enough to eliminate counterproductive attitudes since departments internally may still use the 3.0 system. We support the intent of the Academy's initiatives but recommend adoption of standard letter grading and a quality point average by all elements.

Like other institutions, the Academy rewards demonstrated academic excellence. Such recognition has included designations as Distinguished Cadet (top 5 percent of a class in all areas of measured performance) and Dean's List (top 30 percent in all academic courses). Cumulative performance and performance within a single year determine separate honors. The Academy ranks all cadets in a class and publishes specific class standings called the General Order of Merit.

The West Point Study Group agrees with the Academy that the General Order of Merit (GOM) hinders the achievement of the academic goals of the Academy and should be abolished. While the GOM serves a variety of uses, its primary function is to determine the order in which cadets chose their specialty assignment and first duty station. It also determines the order of graduates and subsequent date of commissioning and has several other minor purposes. None of the uses of the GOM seem appropriate nor truly necessary. Just as the uses to which the GOM is put are improper, its effects on attitudes of cadets (discussed in a previous section), administrative load of instructors, and the Army depart drastically from those desired. Long considered a motivator of cadets, the GOM is in fact a discouragement. The incorporation of the Leadership Evaluation System (LES) into the GOM aggravates problems. The peer rating portion of the LES pressures cadets to conform, to be popular, and to do only that necessary to "get by." The effect of the GOM on academic departments is generally to emphasize the teaching of the same material in the same manner to as many cadets as possible. In spite of the effort in some departments to break this mold, some instructors are still told to maintain fairness in the system by teaching, examining, and grading cadets in a standard way. The GOM also has an adverse effect on the Army as a whole. Specialty selection by order of graduation concentrates successful graduates in certain branches. The combination of location and specialty selection in turn produces an undesirable distribution of graduates among various Army posts.

Clearly, a program of academic incentives should be retained; however, an alternative system of recognition should be developed using the quality point average to determine those to receive honors at set intervals such as term end or year end. Furthermore, only those achieving honors should be identified. Precise course or class rank should not be published. By not identifying class standing and by incorporating a Quality Point Average in graduation requirements, cadets will be forced to meet absolute standards rather than allowed to rely on the security or relative class position. This system has the added advantage of not attaching notoriety to those who barely escape failure.

Another incentive, guaranteed graduate schooling, warrants separate discussion. This program terminated with the Class of 1977. Some exceptions exist, since cadets may continue to compete for certain graduate scholarships. But winners are usually advised to defer schooling until

they have completed an initial tour of duty with troops. The advantages of that first tour with troops are significant. Performance as a troop leader is a critical indicator of future potential, a measure that should be taken early in an officer's career. Furthermore, the entire Academy experience points toward positions of leadership, and to delay such duty is undesirable. After about four years of service all graduates are considered along with their contemporaries from all commissioning sources for fully funded graduate schooling programs that support the projected needs of the Army. Selection criteria include duty performance, undergraduate records, potential for future service, officer interests, and the needs of the service. Competition for the program is keen. We think that all officers should compete on an equal footing, regardless of source of commission. We believe the Academy should not reestablish a separate program to guarantee graduate schooling.

Under the current system of rewards, the cadet who excels receives additional privileges, but the marginal performer suffers no significant loss of privileges. The primacy of academic pursuits would be enhanced by devising a stronger set of sanctions for marginal performance. With the addition of a set minimum quality point average (QPA) as a requirement for graduation, it would be prudent to apply this same criterion at intermediate points (term and year end) to identify as early as possible the marginal performer who has accumulated repeated "D" grades. A cadet whose QPA falls below the established standard should attend individual counseling sessions and assume a probationary status for some period with an attendant loss of privileges and eligibility for certain extracurricular, athletic, and chain of command positions.

A more restrictive privilege system during the week but with more liberal weekend privileges should be considered. Facilities in Eisenhower Hall which reflect contemporary standards would benefit cadets not wishing to leave the post. The Study Group supports a system of increasing freedom of choice over the four years approaching the status of junior officer coupled with the sanctions for marginal performance discussed above.

3. Service Obligation for Separated Cadets. Department of Defense Directive 1332.23, dated 9 May 1968, provides that "with the commencement of the Second Class Academic Year, a Second or First Classman who is separated prior to completing the course of instruction, except for physical disqualifications, unfitness, or unsuitability, will normally be transferred to the Reserve component in an enlisted status and be ordered to active duty for not less than two years...." When, however, separation results from a deficiency not considered willful, the active duty requirement may be waived.

In practice, cadets separated for academic deficiency have not been required to serve. As of 31 May 1977, 24 ex-cadets were serving on active duty in an enlisted status as a result of the directive, but none

for academic failure. The policy has had three adverse effects. First, it creates pressure to resign at the conclusion of Third Class year. Second, it causes some cadets to consider active duty service in the enlisted ranks as a form of punishment. It has also been suggested that this perception caused some reluctance to report violations of the Honor Code. Third, it means that separated cadets who enter active duty as a result of this policy are non-volunteers in the volunteer Army. In short, we are using Army service as a form of punishment and retaining the wrong type of individuals in the service.

Several alternatives to this policy are available. The first is to revoke the directive. Doing so would obviate any stigma associated with enlisted service since separated cadets would not serve. Furthermore, poorly motivated cadets could resign at their pleasure, and the services would not have to deal with an unmotivated officer. An obvious disadvantage is that cadets might obtain several years of free education and then resign without rendering subsequent national service. If a sanction is retained, the Study Group believes it should take a different form. For example, the ex-cadet might be required to repay some dollar amount for education and training received. The costs considered should be those directly attributable to the period of education and training. While the GAO previously made a similiar recommendation, we doubt the political feasibility of such a change in statute. Careful consideration should be given to possible variations of this sanction. Alternatively and perhaps best, cadets separated after the start of the Second Class Academic Year could be required to serve on active duty in the enlisted ranks for a period of two years unless they enroll in some other precommissioning program within nine months following separation from the Academy. Subsequent voluntary or involuntary departure from such a program for any reason other than physical disqualification normally would be grounds for immediate entry into active service in enlisted status. This alternative would afford ex-cadets already identified as having potential for commissioned service the opportunity to seek that commission in other ways, for example, the fine performer who resigns because of marriage. The services would benefit from the individual's subsequent service as a commissioned officer. Such a policy also permits ex-cadets greater freedom of choice yet does not remove the "pay back" provision for education and training received. It allows the services to capitalize on the precommissioning training the ex-cadet experienced while a member of the Corps. Canada successfully uses a somewhat similiar procedure.

4. Counseling. The Study Group's interviews with cadets and junior faculty indicated that cadets obtain most of the advice on which they base important decisions concerning elective courses, branch choice, and improvement in learning skills from peers rather than tactical officers, staff or faculty. This situation points to the need for an improved counseling program.

Several agencies have a portion of the counseling function: Tactical Officers, the Dean's office, academic departments, the Office of Military Leadership, the Office of Military Instruction, the medical staff, and the faculty. Only the Tactical Officers have the charge to deal with all aspects of cadets' development, but they have neither the time nor the expertise to address all areas. The entire counseling program suffers from fragmentation, inefficient use of resources, and a lack of effective assessment. A coordinated and comprehensive plan to develop a new counseling program does not exist. The Study Group believes the Academy should develop an efficient and comprehensive plan for a coordinated but decentralized counseling program using all available assets and establishing coordination requirements to provide cadets the full range of counseling services including diagnostic testing.

5. Graduation Requirements. Present requirements include a four-year residency containing 48 courses, completion or credit for prescribed courses, completion of military training, completion of physical education, and satisfactory conduct. Graduation is permitted only in June or before the start of the fall term. No minimum overall grade average is prescribed. Put another way, a cadet can graduate with the equivalent of straight "D" letter grades, a 2.0 average in Academy terms. Requiring a minimum Quality Point Average would raise the standards of academic performance and make clear that while marginal performance in isolated areas can be accepted, coasting to a marginal performance in all cannot.


Requiring the completion of 48 courses in residence (or 40 if the curriculum recommendation of this study is accepted) and requiring a four-year residency reduce the attractiveness of the Academy to transfer students and are costly in terms of dollars and manpower. We believe the Academy should consider allowing the transfer student to graduate at the end of his fourth summer training period or at mid-term of his last year providing he has satisfied all other requirements including military and physical.

A somewhat analogous situation faces a cadet who is deficient in one or more courses and joins the next lower class at the start of the next academic year (in Academy terms a "turnback"). He now is required to complete a five year residency carrying a full load and in some cases to complete 10 or more courses beyond the basic 48 required. If permitted to continue with his original class in military and summer training, he might, by use of leave time for course make-up and if necessary by use of the fall semester, be ready to graduate only one academic term behind his class thereby joining the active force five to six months earlier.

For illustrative purposes only two examples of structured elective sequences are shown, one in social sciences and one in basic science


* * * *
Social Science

A European history-oriented subcurriculum.



Basic Science

A mathematics/physics subcurriculum



Note: Literature course taken during Third Class year in lieu of elective and Introduction to Law moved to First Class year to allow fourth elective in Second Class year.

CHAPTER VI
MILITARY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

A. Introduction

The examination of military professional development of cadets involved:

--The organization and function of the Office of the Commandant of cadets, particularly with regard to the Company Tactical Officer (Tactical Officer), including military training and physical training.

--The functioning of the United States Corps of Cadets.

Leadership Evaluation System (LES).

The "Plebe" or Fourth Class System.

Disciplinary System.

Cadet Chain of Command.

--The Honor Code and System (discussed in a later chapter).

B. General Appraisal

The overall program of military professional development still produces young officers of uncommon ability and superior potential for sustained service. Notwithstanding the quality of the entering cadet, West Point and its programs must receive considerable credit for the successful transformation of young men and women from all sectors into the officers who lead our citizenry in the profession of arms. We should also note that West Point is changing and has changed even as we conducted our inquiry. For example, the reception of new cadets for the Class of 1981 was a model of positive and supportive leadership. Thus, some of the problems identified in this report may be solved problems--or, at least, the nature and impact of the problem may be somewhat different from that stated. Despite such a general endorsement, there are aspects of the military professional development program that might be changed to improve the institution and its product.

Our review and analysis convinced us that many of the conclusions drawn by the Borman Commission concerning the military aspects of the Academy were accurate. There are many institutional shortcomings at the Military Academy--shortcomings which have developed over the years largely through failure to adapt to change or failure to perceive that certain policies, programs, and procedures had developed, or were developing, dysfunctional characteristics.

West Point has, of course, made changes over the past several years although not as rapidly as one might prefer. Substantive change normally occurs slowly within the Corps of Cadets, particularly change involving cadet attitudes. This phenomenon makes it all the more important to avoid any hesitancy to introduce alterations at this time. In the aftermath of Electrical Engineering 304 and with a variety of internal and external pressures, an environment for change exists at West Point which should be exploited. Much remains to be done and now is the time to do it.

The Dual Nature of West Point: A Challenging Academic Experience in a Spartan Military Environment.

A fact of West Point is the tension between the demands of the academic institution and those of the military organization. This tension may have become more serious since World War II, and the present demands made upon West Point suggest it will continue. Ways must be devised to ameliorate the effects and to reduce the sources of the conflict as much as possible.

That conflict exists is clear from the many interviews conducted by the Study Group. As one academic instructor put it:

TAC's (Tactical Officer) see us as occupants of an ivory tower of academia--they think that they alone know the "real" West Point and the "real" Army. They see us as a halfway necessary evil, but doubt that we really contribute anything.

A Tactical Officer explained:

They (Instructors) see TAC's as narrow-minded, rigid disciplinarians who are far too conservative and far too concerned with visible results, standards, and statistics, and not interested in the development of internal thinking processes.

In fact West Point is unique because of this duality of purpose. Certainly, a quality academic experience can better be gained without the competing demands of cadetship. But the mission of providing officers to the US Army is the raison d'etre for a national military academy. All must be mindful of this mission and recognize that their role is to contribute to its accomplishment.

Unfortunately and too frequently the inherent tensions are made even more serious by a lack of understanding that the two systems while in conflict, can be mutually supporting. The academic instructor can be an exemplar of military standards without detracting from the

academic experience. And Tactical Officers, imbued with a respect for academic studies, can improve cadet attitudes toward academic subjects. Moreover, one can improve the qualification of a graduate to be a lieutenant without inhibiting the academic experience. But a concept of mutual support and responsibility must be fostered. The entire staff and faculty at West Point should consider themselves personally responsible for both the academic and military quality of the cadet.

Perhaps the most compelling needs are consistency of purpose and concinnity of philosophy. The output of West Point is an Army leader and West Point teaches, in a broad sense, Leadership—the components of which are academic knowledge, military skills, a strong personal ethic, and strength of character.

C. The Tactical Staff

1. Overview. The Borman Report comments on the delegation of authority to the cadet chain-of-command and on confusion over the proper role of the company tactical officer. Indeed, the role of the Tactical Officer has blurred over the years.

With the institution of a "First Class System" in the late 1950's, the cadet chain-of-command has been given greater responsibility and authority. With the laudable intent of giving the cadet increased leadership experience, the Academy began to change the Tactical Officer's role from his previous command function that required him to:

...perform the duties normally devolving upon a company commander. These will include such inspections of barracks, personnel or records as may be necessary to enforce orders and regulations and required standards of policy and discipline (Orders, USCC, 1939).

By 1969 the Commandant verified the evolving role of the Tactical Officer:

The trend toward placing added responsibility on the cadet chain-of-command, with the increased authority that goes with it, continued during the past year.

. . . Daily formal and informal contacts between the cadets and officers at the Academy continued to assist in the development of cadets.

Increased leadership opportunity for the cadet and opportunity for the Tactical Officer to spend time in the development of cadets are both worthwhile objectives. In recent years, however, something has gone awry. Cadets have become involved in a morass of administrative trivia, much of it self-generated. "Leadership experience"

frequently equates to drafting a schedule for a club trip. The Tactical Officer has drifted away from the cadet and cadet development, finding himself constantly involved in his own maze of "administrivia." Not only is the Tactical Officer diverted by a multitude of other duties, he also finds gaining access to the cadet when the latter is free nearly impossible. The schedule is one of frenetic activity with the evening study hours often being the first time the Tactical Officer can easily locate the cadet. But this period is also the cadet's time for study, and Tactical Officers often express a feeling of guilt when they have to interrupt it. That study time is available is not to say that the cadets use the time for study. A recent West Point time study indicated that cadets spend 38% of the evening period in recreation pursuits. The matter of cadet attitude towards study is discussed elsewhere.

The individual Tactical Officer does not bear sole blame for his isolation from cadets. The institution has failed to describe his role in clear, operational terms and has failed to give him a clear, coherent statement of purpose. The "Tactical Officer's Guide" describes the Tactical Officer's role as "advisor, counselor, and instructor." Among the eight "objectives" are "Motivate each cadet toward successful military service" and "Encourage each cadet to work to the upper limits of his capability"--vague generalities wanting in operational specifics.

The new cadets are quickly prepared through Cadet Basic Training for life as a cadet; the new Tactical Officer (or faculty member) is given little in the way of substantial orientation. So, he has to sort it out for himself, a task most Tactical Officers find confusing and frustrating. As one well-regarded Tactical Officer said:

Frustrated beyond explanation!!! Of all places in the Army this institution can and should be the most professionally and personally rewarding assignment imaginable; it is not!!! Instead, it has been and, from where I sit, will continue to be my worst assignment thus far and hopefully the worst I will have to endure.

And the rest of West Point does not make the Tactical Officer's life any easier. Many academic instructors admit they do not enforce the disciplinary and appearance standards of the Academy. As one instructor put it:

The TAC and I are two separate parts of a total system. He teaches the military stuff and hands out quill. I teach the academics and pass out grades. I don't do his job and he doesn't do mine.

The commonly heard rationale for not enforcing standards is that to do so would interfere with the teaching environment.

Moreover, some instructors simply do not know the rules. They, too, are not properly oriented when they arrive and are not kept informed. Of course, exceptions occur among instructors and departments. But there is no standardized, systematic orientation program; consequently there is a wide variety in quality and approach.

Whatever the reasons, there is uneven enforcement of the regulations and standards for the Corps of Cadets. The Tactical Officer frequently stands alone as the diligent enforcer of standards, without the active support of many officers at West Point. He sees himself as inferior relative to the instructors; the instructors agree. Members of the Academic Departments constantly criticize the Tactical Staff for the rules, regulations, and punishments which are generally characterized as interfering with the cadet's academic endeavors, or as trivial, inappropriate, or unproductive. Meanwhile, the Tactical Officer, feeling guilty and hesitant about claiming cadet time, has allowed the cadets themselves, in many instances, to establish the norms and standards in the cadet company. In sum, the entire institution bears major responsibility for failing to guide and support the Tactical Officer in the all-important task of developing cadets.

2. The Regimental Commander. While the Tactical Officer has been frustrated at the cadet company level, his communication upwards is confusing. Such communication is particularly important in accomplishing the Academy's mission of cadet development. Each of the four cadet regiments at West Point has a separate personality. Over time, the position of the Colonel Regimental Commander has grown so strong as to filter or distort communication between the Commandant and the Tactical Officers. The lack of coherent guidance and the inability "to be heard" heightens the Tactical Officer's sense of frustration.

Reversing an earlier decision and following the recommendations of both the Superintendent of the Academy and the Study Group, the Chief of Staff eliminated the position of Regimental Commander in the grade of colonel and replaced it with a Regimental Tactical Officer (not "commander") in the grade of lieutenant colonel. He also directed the creation of the position of Brigade Tactical Officer in the grade of colonel. Adding four Regimental Tactical Officer positions for 1977-78 recognizes that a major change in organization may not be possible now. However, the creation of six Regimental Tactical Officer positions (each in charge of six companies) should be considered for possible implementation in the Summer of 1978.

This decision should assist in a number of ways:

—Facilitates better communication between the Company Tactical Officer and the Commandant.

--Provides a closer approximation of the normal environment of serving junior officers for the Tactical Officer and the cadets.

--Reduces pressures to compete while fostering consistency and cooperation.

While the organizational change should contribute to an improved environment, other problems remain.


3. The Selection Process. The lack of a careful selection system in recent years has exacerbated problems. A review of certain indicators in a representative group of the Tactical Staff shows that, in contrast to the Academic Departments which begin to identify many future instructors while still cadets, new Tactical Officers are selected by an informal and inconsistent process. Moreover, there is a perception that being an instructor clearly offers more personal and professional rewards than being a Tactical Officer. The Tactical Officer works long hours in a frustrating environment, while the instructor is perceived as having better hours and a more rewarding job. Accordingly, there appears little enthusiasm for becoming a Tactical Officer on the part of the highest quality Academy graduates.

As an indicator of the attitude of Tactical Officers, the results of a recent survey show the Tactical Officer to be significantly lower in morale than the rest of the West Point community by nearly 30 percentile points and below the national average for faculty and administrators of educational institutions by 15 points. Of course, the aftermath of Electrical Engineering 304 has had a pronounced impact on Tactical Officer morale.


Another measure of the Tactical Officer emerged from the survey administered by the Study Group to graduates and cadets. When asked which person at the Academy they least wanted to be like, graduates overwhelmingly (51%) selected the Tactical Officer. In a similar survey, cadets indicate a similar lack of regard. The graph at Figure 1 of responses by class suggests there is a gradual disaffection in the cadet's view of the Tactical Officer. Only 20% of the Plebes (Class of '80) consider the Tactical Officer to be the person they would least want to be like, but by First Class year (Class of '77), 55% consider the Tactical Officer to be the person they would least want to be like. Although this interpretation is not conclusive, only an average of 17% of all year groups of both cadets and graduates surveyed select a Tactical Officer as the person they would most want to be like, while 59% select the Academic Instructor.

The chart at Figure 2 portrays certain indicators for officers assigned to the Tactical Department at regimental level and to the officers of two Academic Departments (in all cases the permanent professors and permanent associate professors have been excluded). For

% who would LEAST like to be like a:



% who would MOST like to be like a:



SELECTED QUALITY INDICATORS

		GOM - %					LES/ASR - %					Military Indicator			Field Grade Promotions	
		#	Quartiles				Quartiles				U M L			Early	Normal	
			1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4						
USMA GRADUATES																
TAC	27	3.1	15.6	37.5	43.8		43.8	37.5	9.4	9.3	24	2	1	8	7	
ACAD DEPT A	28	93.3	6.7	-	-		60	30	10	-	23	5	-	10	3	
DEPT B	19	18.2	36.3	27.3	18.2		27.3	27.3	27.3	18.1	15	4	-	1	3	
Non-USMA GRADUATES																
TAC	13										10	3	-	4	4	
A	14										5	9	-	1	6	
B	22										12	10	-	1	9	

Sources: USMA, MILPERCENT

GOM - General Order of Merit
 LES - Leadership Evaluation System Rating
 ASR - Aptitude for Service Rating
 TAC - Tactical Department
 Dept A - A Selected Academic Department
 Dept B - A Selected Academic Department
 U - Upper one-third of peers
 M - Middle one-third of peers
 L - Lower one-third of peers

FIGURE 2

the graduates assigned to the three departments, relative Cadet General Order of Merit (GOM) at graduation and Leadership Evaluation System (LES) or Aptitude for Service Ratings (ASR) rankings by quartile have been included.

The military indicator (upper, middle, lower one-third of peers) suggests that those officers assigned as instructors or Tactical Officers have enjoyed successful careers. However, two points must be made. First, officers selected for duty at West Point should come from the upper half of both GOM and LES/ASR, or whatever future measurements reflect academic performance and excellence in cadetship. To assign officers to the Tactical Department who ranked low academically (81.3% lower half, 43.8% bottom quarter) reinforces the cadet attitude that studies do not matter and do not relate to future success as an officer. Likewise, assigning officers as instructors or Tactical Officers who have fared poorly in cadetship communicates a similar message to cadets, too many of whom already accept as an article of faith that nothing at West Point matters beyond graduation.

Obviously, graduates do well in the Army from all quartiles of GOM and LES/ASR, however, the fact that those most likely to do well in the Army also ranked well in both at West Point needs to be reflected in the assignment of Tactical Officers.

The second point is that outstanding performance as a cadet combined with outstanding performance as an officer does not guarantee correspondingly outstanding service as a Tactical Officer. The Tactical Officer's leadership style is key to his success and may not be reflected in his written record or file. Interviews are an essential step in the selection of prospective Tactical Officers.

While no single set of data is conclusive, the cumulative effect of these data coupled with personal observation suggests strongly that the selection of Tactical Officers, their role, and the nature of their relationship with cadets deserve attention and warrant change. It should be emphasized that there are many outstanding Tactical Officers at West Point. But it is equally clear that occasionally there are some who, while being outstanding officers in many respects, are not suited to the task of developing cadets into officers.

4. Continuity. A further problem is the lack of continuity in the Tactical Department. As is discussed later, reforms introduced by a given Commandant of Cadets have little hope of survival so long as there is a class who arrived at West Point before the reform (and often before the Commandant) and who will remain after the Commandant departs. Moreover the absence of continuity puts the Commandant at considerable disadvantage in the continuing conflict between the two sides of the institution.

Accordingly, we feel that some stability is needed in the Commandant's office and that an extended term of assignment (4-5 years) for some senior members of his staff is needed.

5. Leadership. The "Tactical Officer's Guide" discusses at length the motivational and developmental objectives. And there is a good deal of discussion at West Point about "Positive Leadership." Most Tactical Officers, however, had great difficulty in describing "Positive Leadership" in operational terms. In fact, when asked what was their key or most important function, most Tactical Officers replied, "evaluation," or "to ensure the wrong guy doesn't graduate." This near obsession with evaluation makes it virtually impossible for a Tactical Officer to be supportive and developmental. Cadets are constantly evaluated in almost every endeavor. Moreover, the Disciplinary System is (and is perceived to be) punitive evaluation. Also, the results of most evaluations are either not conveyed to cadets or are conveyed infrequently or impersonally.

A clear, coherent and operational philosophy of leadership has never been conveyed to the Tactical Officers. This deficiency is caused, if not aggravated, by the regimental command structure, the lack of effective orientation for new officers, the enormous number of rules and regulations, the emphasis on evaluation, and the lack of a system of rewards in a punitive system. Additionally, Tactical Officers are too involved in administrative tasks to have time for leadership discussions with cadets.

6. Summary. In short, the Tactical Officer frequently has not been the one who sets the norms in the cadet company. The attenuation of his authority and responsibility, lack of a clear sense of role and identity, and absence of coherent philosophy are perhaps the most serious institutional shortcomings with the Tactical Department at West Point. The Tactical Officer is uniquely a focus of cadet development and no part of the institution will function well if the Tactical "system" functions poorly. But the "system" requires careful selection of the Tactical Officer and procedures to ensure that:

--He receives the support of the rest of West Point.

--The structure of the Tactical staff is supportive.

--He receives adequate orientation.

--There are clear lines of communication from the Superintendent and Commandant of Cadets expressing a coherent philosophy and from the Tactical Officer allowing him to air views and concerns to the West Point command authorities.

--And that he is willing to make the personal sacrifices required if he is to devote himself to developing cadets into Army officers.

D. Organization of the Office of the Commandant

Chapter III addresses the total issue of governance. The discussion and recommendations there which pertain to the Commandant of Cadets are consistent with the following.

On his departure a recent Commandant commented:

As you know, I recommended to you previously, and I understand that you now have approved, that OMI, OML and OPE all be named "departments" simply as an organizational improvement. With respect to OML and OPE, both should be made departments in the fullest sense of the word, and . . . the officer in charge of each should sit as a full-fledged member of the Academic Board.

The Borman Commission, making similar observations, recommended that the directors of the Office of Military Leadership (OML) and the Office of Physical Education (OPE) be full members of the Academic Board. They further recommended that the Office of Military Leadership, being properly an academic department, be placed under the Dean of the Academic Board.

Since publication of the Borman Report, West Point has, in fact, planned to remove the Office of Military Leadership from the control of the Commandant. This office will be redesignated the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership and will be transferred to the control of the Dean effective September 1977. A number of staff functions which were performed for the Commandant (e.g., Counseling Center, Cadet Troop Leader Training, and the Leadership Evaluation System) will remain under the Commandant. Regulations have been revised to permit the heads of OPE and OML to become members of the Academic Board.

Another provision of the recommendations on governance is the creation of a Director of Cadet Activities (DCA) with responsibility for the Cadet Activities Office and selected Cadet Treasurer functions now under the control of the Superintendent's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

We also recommend that the "offices" reporting to the Commandant be redesignated as "departments." In the current structure, the Commandant of Cadets heads the Department of Tactics, an organization which embraces OPE, OML, and the Tactical Officers. For reasons of consistency alone, the structure should be appropriately organized along lines analogous to the academic departments.

The Commandant's Staff has, over time, been pared away, as it has done little of the coordination and planning required. Rather, the planning has been done by the regiments, OMI, OML, and OPE. To coordinate and schedule more effectively and to relieve the Tactical Officer of additional duties (as passed through the regiment), the Commandant's Staff needs strengthening. The need is underscored by the decision of the Chief of Staff to eliminate the Regimental Commanders and to create Regimental and Brigade Tactical Officers. The chart on page 59 summarizes most of the changes we propose.

E. Cadetship and Officer Development

1. Overview. The study group endeavored to understand both the nature and effect of the cadet experience through research, interviews, and surveys. In a survey of graduates and their commanders, the evidence indicated that West Point graduates continue to be held in generally high regard, particularly because of their:

- Sense of Integrity
- Understanding the Role of an Officer
- Potential for Advancement
- Strength of Character
- Physical Fitness
- Bearing and Appearance
- Devotion to Duty

On the other hand, commanders and noncommissioned officers consider recent graduates to be least adept in:

- Ability to Talk with Troops
- Concern for the Welfare of Troops
- Maturity

Recent graduates also express concern over their inability to deal with enlisted men. When these observations are viewed in conjunction with the reasons graduates hold Tactical Officers in low esteem, e.g., "Inability to deal with people," it suggests that either cadets may be improperly influenced by the Tactical Officers or there is something missing from the cadet experience or both.

Further evaluation of the survey data and cadet interviews suggests systemic problems.

--The attitude of some cadets towards academic effort is poor. There is clearly a significant cadet subculture indifferent to scholastic pursuits at West Point.

--There is an equally disdainful attitude for much that is termed "military" at the Academy.

--The Leadership Evaluation System is seen as both unimportant and subversive.

--Cadet chain of command duties are viewed as time consuming and, in many cases, trivial.

--Discipline is considered arbitrary and unfairly administered. The Disciplinary System is thought to be punitive and controlling.

--The Fourth Class System is accepted by Plebes in a philosophically stoic manner, but there are clearly some dysfunctional aspects of the system particularly relating to the leadership techniques learned by upperclassmen.

2. Cadet Attitudes. The Borman Report observes that there has not been agreement at West Point on the relative importance of academic studies:

There has, for example, been serious disagreement over the proper role of education in the mission of the Academy: Should West Point train combat leaders for immediate service in junior ranks, or should it provide the fundamental education and study to allow graduates (a) to assimilate quickly the special skills required for junior officer service in the basic branches of the Army, and (b) after experience and further study, to provide the senior military leadership on which the nation depends for its security. We are convinced that the acquisition of a college education within a military environment must, during the academic year, have first call on the time and energies of each cadet; military training should be concentrated in the summer months. The failure of Academy constituencies to agree on the relative importance of the educational component of the mission has hindered the development of an academic atmosphere which discourages dishonesty.

Development of such an atmosphere has also been impeded by the failure to determine priorities among competing claims on cadets' time. Prior to curriculum changes adopted this Fall, cadets needed far more credit hours to graduate than are

required by most institutions of higher education. The academic pressures have been intensified by the increase, during the academic year, of military and physical training and cadet leadership responsibilities. In excess of two-thirds of the cadets surveyed in 1975 stated that they did not have sufficient time to satisfy overall demands. While cadets may not have been overworked, they clearly have been overscheduled.

The Borman Report also implies that there is a serious trend towards increasing military skill training during the academic year. "Many officers in the Academic Department are disturbed by what they see as a growing displacement of the academic curriculum and study time by military skill training."

As noted earlier, the Study Group finds clear evidence of a subculture indifferent to academic studies or achievement in the Corps and agrees there is reason for concern. The implied causes of this attitude, i.e., a perceived encroachment of military skill training and emphasis on training platoon leaders, may be simplistic.

Having had many months to build upon the Borman Commission's work, we conclude that the negative view of academic studies results from a number of factors. The problem is complex and not susceptible to simple solution.

In fact, there has been no recent increase in the net hours devoted to physical education and militarily related activities; there has been a reduction in both. While Sandhurst competition (a military skills competition between company teams) was introduced recently, it should be noted that it merely replaces, for the most part, intramural or extracurricular participation by those cadets involved in the competition. Routine military activities (except for cadet chain of command duties) have been reduced for the individual cadet in such areas as Saturday inspections and parades. Further, the physical education program at West Point has been sharply reduced over the years and claims significantly fewer hours of cadet time than the Air Force or Naval Academies.

It is the Study Group's view that the disdain for academic pursuits emanates from several conditions, among them being:

--Certain deficiencies in curricula and pedagogy. These are addressed in detail in Chapter V, Academic Program but deserve emphasis.

--The lack of clear support of and emphasis of the academic component by the Tactical Staff, either through lack of interaction with the cadet or through inadequate appreciation of the academic side of the institution.

--A perception among cadets that it is difficult to fail academically. Instructors admit that they go to great lengths to avoid failing a cadet.

--The availability and proximity, during the academic week, of a number of distractions (e.g., movie, gymnasium) which compete with study time. In the total peer environment of West Point, the pressure to yield to these distractions is particularly strong. It should be noted that the Air Force Academy has more stringent rules concerning activities on academic evenings.

--The instant and immediate nature of the demands of "Cadetship." Distinct from the military education and training are the demands of chain of command duties, inspections, the Disciplinary System, and other manifestations of administering the Corps. The "feed-back" on cadet performance is nearly instantaneous--failure to shine shoes results in an immediate award of demerits. The "feed-back" on the Academic side takes longer and is, consequently, less pressing.

--The multiplicity of demands on the cadet. Almost all of the cadets' time during the week is scheduled. Yet, they find a good deal of time for idle pursuits. Most observers view the problem as a combination of the fragmentation of cadet time and the variety of pressures with which he must cope. This situation may not be all bad. In learning to deal with multiple demands and pressures, the cadets may be gaining experience which will pay dividends later. Considering the fact that West Point cadets are some of the best supported college students in the world, it is not unreasonable to expect them to work hard. But, it is not our observation that they are overworked; they are overscheduled, and the price of this over scheduling is, for some, an inability to set sound priorities or to do more than the minimum acceptable in any area.

Of equal concern is the cadet's disdain for things which fall under the title of "military," a disconcerting phenomenon at the "national military academy." The Study Group detected a subtle cynicism about things military at West Point which derives from the cadet view that many military related activities are:

--Contrary and capricious, e.g., discipline, the Fourth Class System.

--Trivial and poorly accomplished, e.g., some aspects of Military Science.

The view is enhanced and sustained, in part, by the poor leadership examples of some few Tactical Officers. Unfortunately, many academic instructors encourage such pejorative attitudes towards Tactical Officers and the military aspects of the institution.

Thus, general cadet ambivalence toward academic pursuits and things military reflects the lack of a coherent institutional purpose at the Academy.

3. Cadet Rank and the Cadet Chain of Command. The history of the cadet chain of command is the corollary to the history of the separation of the Tactical Officers from the cadet company. The cadet chain of command provides for the efficient control and expeditious flow of information within the Corps of Cadets and for leadership development of cadets. There is an essential conflict between these purposes. The cadets who most need leadership development are those least likely to perform well in cadet leadership positions. As a result of this conflict, cadet rank and chain of command positions are awarded inconsistently. While not a serious morale factor, it is another of the numerous incongruities facing the cadet. Most Tactical Officers use a mixture of reward and developmental rationale in designating a chain of command, which, although reasonably well understood by cadets, still impacts on morale. West Point should adopt a single, consistent philosophy for the chain of command to avoid some of the ambiguity and inconsistency perceived by cadets. In our view, cadet rank in the chain of command should be on a reward basis only once each academic year.

Another dysfunctional aspect of the chain of command is the number of trivial positions and duties. Many of these jobs should be eliminated.

We would also consider eliminating the Cadet "Commander" at all levels. To some extent this is cosmetic since cadets would continue to be involved in the running of the Corps. The message, however, is totally clear--the one commander of the Corps is the Commandant and the one commander of the company is the Tactical Officer.

While some cadet leader experience during the academic year would be lost, the loss is not significant. (One West Point officer observed that cadets were "practicing to be bureaucrats"). The summer leadership experiences have much more impact on the cadets and their development.

4. Leadership Evaluation. There has been an increasing preoccupation with the evaluation of cadet performance outside the classroom. Prior to 1920 there was little need for a formal evaluation system. The Corps was small and the subjective judgment of the Academy staff was adequate for the purpose of selecting the cadet chain of command; if academic and disciplinary standards were met, cadets were graduated and commissioned. In 1920 cadets were selected for chain of command positions based on a rating which combined academic performance and certain indices of participation in athletics and extracurricular activities. At the same time peer ratings to evaluate leadership were introduced. The peer ratings were not included in the system used to select the chain of command.

Significantly, the ratings (academic, athletic, extracurricular) were used only for chain of command selection. In 1941, the Secretary of War approved a system of evaluation intended to justify the separation of a cadet (or to graduate a cadet without commissioning). By 1944, West Point had a complete Aptitude for the Service Ratings (ASR) System which contributed to the General Order of Merit and provided for ratings by cadets, Tactical Officers, and others.

In later years both peer ratings and Camp Buckner ratings were introduced. The system was redesignated the Leadership Evaluation System (LES). The number and frequency of ratings fluctuated, but the perceptible trend has been toward increased frequency of ratings and degree of complexity.

The Borman Commission noted a relationship between LES and the cheating subculture:

In some instances the Academy's Leadership Evaluation System has been used to enforce at least toleration of the subculture. With each violation, the subculture and its influence became more formidable.

The Study Group encountered ample evidence that the LES, particularly classmate peer ratings, has been subjected to extensive abuse and subversion. It also has failed to be of major significance in the elimination of cadets. For example, only an average of 11 cadets are separated from each class through LES. To many, LES is nothing more than an inconsistent, anxiety-producing popularity contest. Though cadets and graduates perceive the abuses in the system, they also believe that the system, particularly peer ratings, provides the most valid measure of potential. Numerous studies suggest that LES with its peer ratings is an important aggregate indicator of later Army success. Using these ratings as individual predictors, however, is questionable. At issue is the reliability of the ratings being rendered at West Point today.

The clear evidence of a strain of unreliability and that there have been cases of intentional subversion suggest that there should be significant revisions of the system. Part of the abuse is the reward connection between LES and COM (in addition to some fear of separation). The anxiety of being rated low reflects a fear of lowering class standing, thereby adversely affecting branch selection, choice of first duty station, and lineal rank in the Regular Army.

The minimum changes required in any effort to restore health to this evaluation system are:

--Eliminate the peer ratings of classmates (perhaps all cadet ratings other than chain of command).

--Sever the relationship between LES and GOM or class standing (elimination of GOM recommended elsewhere may render this moot).

--Reduce the administrative burden of LES.

--Instruct cadets in what to evaluate, what aptitude for service encompasses, and how to conduct performance counseling.

These would be the minimum changes. Perhaps the better approach would be to eliminate the leadership evaluation as it now exists preserving only Tactical Officer evaluations.

5. Disciplinary System. The present USCC Disciplinary System, reasonably well understood by cadets and officers, provides a convenient form for recording infractions and defines quite clearly the minimal acceptable behavior in a wide range of areas. In recent years, the Disciplinary System regulations have been abbreviated requiring increased judgment on the part of the Tactical Officers, the primary executors of the system. The Study Group strongly endorses such trends and concludes that emphasis should continue to fall on a simplified and generalized prescription for desired modes of conduct rather than on a detailed list of offenses and punishments. The latter alternative all too often becomes a shopping list for bad behavior in which the potential offender weighs his proposed transgression against the allotted punishment. Notwithstanding the improved and improving approaches to the Disciplinary System, it still appears overly punitive in its present configuration. Most cadets (85%) and recent graduates (72%) surveyed describe the Disciplinary System as either punitive or controlling, while only 15% of cadets and 28% of recent graduates describe it as either educational, administrative, or motivational. Experience with the system seems to have the effect of causing an increasing proportion of cadets to see the system as punitive. The data from recent graduates now serving as platoon leaders support the same conclusion. Recent graduates also most frequently selected the Disciplinary System as the factor which impacts most adversely on the Honor System (this question was not asked of cadets). Regardless of such perceptions, the Study Group acknowledges the necessity for rules and associated punishments as an integral part of any disciplinary system. But, a system overly punitive in nature or so perceived can be counter-productive, it:

- Fosters minimal acceptable performance.
- Promotes devious gamesmanship.
- Discourages misconduct for the wrong reasons.
- Promotes disaffection with the operators of the system.
- Fosters compliance not internalization.
- Enforces the "fear-of-failure" syndrome.
- Promotes an over-appreciation of punitive leadership.

Perhaps the most pernicious effects are the encouragement of minimal acceptable behavior and a view of organizational leadership based largely on rules and associated punishments. When asked how they would motivate their troops after graduation when demerits would not be available, a group of First class cadets concluded that "We'll still have the Article 15." There are clearly better ways to develop and nurture discipline.

We conclude that there is a structural imbalance in the Disciplinary System resulting in a well-defined and well-understood system of punishments on the one hand with no corresponding or even roughly analogous system of positive incentives on the other. Discipline at West Point should include more than punishment; punishment is incidental to discipline and not its purpose. The development of self-discipline certainly involves more than exacting a price for improper behavior.

There are positive incentives at West Point, but they are not in sufficient quantity or appropriate quality to balance the well structured punitive image of the punishment system--not a one-to-one correspondence --nor should a cadet be rewarded for merely doing his duty; but there should be rewards for uncommon or extraordinary performance in the routine of cadet life. The considerable body of privileges associated with each class may properly be construed as rewards of a sort, but these rewards or privileges are viewed by cadets as "rights" attained by virtue of remaining in the system for a period of time and which may be taken away as punishment.

6. Social Development. A significant conclusion from both surveys and interviews is the lack of social maturity displayed by new graduates. The cloistered atmosphere of the Academy, its remote location and the limited freedom accorded to cadets, shelters cadets from contemporary experiences. Both the demands of the academic and military programs and the austere nature of the cadet experience justify restrictions of cadet freedom. However, we believe that the Academy needs to consider carefully changes in the system of privileges to allow greater opportunity for maturation. Privileges tend to be

viewed as rewards; it is important to understand that freedom to leave the Academy also has intrinsic value in the development of cadets. The challenge is to find the proper balance.

7. Competition. The young men and women who come to West Point have a strong sense of competition. They have competed very successfully in athletics and study activities. They come to West Point eager for the challenge, and the Academy reinforces this powerful motivating influence. The art of the matter is to help cadets keep their attitude healthy. Competition always has the potential of becoming destructive. Winning can become more important than personal standards of honesty, integrity, and compassion for others. West Point needs to channel competition away from the inter-personal and towards relevant fixed standards wherever possible. Whether in academics or in athletics, the cadets should be challenged by a clear set of objective criteria rather than by the performance of their peers.

8. The Fourth Class System. The most vexing problem addressed by the Study Group was the analysis of the Fourth Class System. The beginnings of the system go as far back as Thayer, and so do the abuses. In one way or another, every Superintendent and every Commandant has had to cope with the abuses. In 1919, Superintendent Douglas McArthur formalized a system, in part, to eliminate the harsh treatment of Plebes, a practice which frequently carried over into handling of enlisted men in the Army. In 1976, Brigadier General Ulmer, Commandant of Cadets, said:

Abuses of the Fourth Class System represent the greatest potential for future public embarrassment of the Military Academy. We need to keep asking ourselves the rationale for everything we do within the Fourth Class System.

The Study Group readily recognizes the virtues of the Fourth Class System. It is an effective tool for socialization and equalization of cadets. And the stressful environment probably contributes to the learning and preparation necessary to become a cadet. The sense of pride and cohesion from having endured a grueling experience are clear contributors to individual and group confidence. Moreover, it is an important element of the traditional West Point Experience.

But, the Committee is seriously concerned over both the potential for abuse and the potential ill effects of the system itself.

Every year in the recent past, Cadet Basic Training--Beast Barracks--begins with the strict intent to provide supportive and positive leadership in a demanding environment. But soon, as one long-time observer puts it, "the mad-dogs of August are unleashed." It was reported to the committee that in 1976: "At the end of the first week the King of the Beasts called in the detail and told them, 'I want to see some smoking butt out there.'"

At the same time there are examples of more supportive leadership, and there are clear indications that those cadets exposed to such leadership perform better both during CBT and after joining the Corps. But, far too much negative leadership remains. And in September, when every Plebe is totally subject to every upperclassman, the difficulty of monitoring the system multiplies.

Throughout the year reports of problems ranging from personal services to verbal abuse and threats to run Plebes "out of the Corps" continue.

It has been said that the thing wrong with the Fourth Class System is not what is does to Plebes, but what it teaches upper-classmen. And, indeed, Plebes are somewhat stoic and philosophical about the system, although they view it as unfair and abusive. Of course, this year's Plebe is next year's upperclassman, and the lessons learned are not lost. And it is this self-perpetuating nature of the Plebe leadership experience which is so frustrating. Based upon a study of the Fourth Class System, an earlier Commandant established new precepts for the treatment of Plebes. The Commandant noted:

...Commencing on the first day of New Cadet Barracks... the Class has been functioning under the following percepts:

a. To treat Plebes with the same dignity and respect an officer displays towards an enlisted man.

b. To assume from the outset the Plebe had performed commendably while in secondary school in order to qualify for entrance, and was motivated to be a cadet, otherwise he would not have entered the gates; then to build upon his past performance and his motivation.

c. To realize that the mission is to train, develop and support the Plebe, not to terrorize, threaten, degrade or humiliate him.

But the Commandant was reassigned early in the Fall, once again, the continuity of purpose was broken and the self-perpetuating system was triumphant.

The Study Group is not only concerned over the difficulty in eliminating abuse but also with some fundamental aspects of the system itself.
We have concern over:

--The total and pervasive authority over Plebes.

--Fundamental assumptions about stress.

Basic to the abuses of the system and to the negative leadership experience is the near absolute authority held by upperclassmen. The Study Group has not done exhaustive review of psychological research in authoritarian relationships. There is, however, evidence which suggests that absolute authority not only encourages harsh and abusive behavior by the person in authority, but also encourages weak, indecisive, and negative behavior by the person subjected to the absolute authority. Moreover, since all upperclassmen wield authority but have routine leader responsibility only to the Plebes in their company, it becomes authority without responsibility and can be subject to capricious use when applied to others.

In practically every discussion of the Fourth Class System, one encounters the fundamental assumption that stress, however produced, is beneficial. Significantly, the official system refers to "controlled stress." Stress properly controlled, probably does enhance learning and shorten the adjustment period, but whether it develops a person who can function effectively under future stress is less clear. The major problem is that the system is administered by upperclassmen who do not understand stress, how it operates, or its potential for harm. In fact, part of the implicit logic supporting the continuance of harsh leadership is that "stress is good for the Plebe, it is easy to create stress by yelling, ergo, yelling is, if not good, not too bad." Many cadets express the idea that they are left without leadership tools if they cannot deprive Plebes of food or use verbal abuse. This belief, of course, ignores the fact that stress, if that is the aim of the system, can be created in a much more productive fashion through calm and even supportive challenges to meet demanding standards. Moreover, in its evaluative function, the stress aspect of the Fourth Class System also may be producing negative effects. A young man or woman who decides not to put up with the stress induced by negative, abusive leadership and purposeless activity may be, in fact, demonstrating the qualities of intelligence, independence, and maturity that West Point and the Army want.

That there is something wrong with the method of inducing stress is implied by a recent study of the Fourth Class System which makes the following observations:

That the unstated mission . . . of creating a stress-
ful environment for the new cadet . . . (and) the stated
mission of developing leadership skills of the upper
classes are antithetical and will remain so as long as
the upper classes are expected to do both, provide a
stressful environment and learn modern leadership
techniques.

Unfortunately, the study falls into the simplistic trap already discussed. It accepts the contention that stress can only be created through abuse. We find it difficult to accept practices at West Point that are not transferable to the Army. There remains the question of whether stress is the goal of the system; it may be only a by-product. The true challenge of the system may be simply to develop habits of responsibility and self-discipline by meeting rigorous but reasonable demands.

In summary, the Study Group views the Fourth Class System with much ambivalence.

--We recognize that there are abuses in the system, but we also recognize its uses. Thus, we cannot yet justify recommending its elimination.

--However, we think the Fourth Class System carries the seeds of continuing, self-perpetuating failure unless significant changes are introduced.

--If the closed cycle of dysfunctional leadership involving the Plebe, the upperclassmen, the new graduate, and the Tactical Officer cannot be broken, we would encourage the abandonment of the system for a least four years with its reintroduction being carefully designed from a "zero base."

Another, somewhat minor observation of the Study Group relates to Fourth Class knowledge--or "Plebe Poop." What originated partly as college humor and partly as a means for preserving traditions has become a purposeful, time-consuming system. It seems bizarre to give written examinations on "Plebe Poop" and to interlace the traditional with a sort of pseudo-relevance embodied in learning the specifications of missiles, tanks, and other hardware. We discovered that the information was neither well understood nor long remembered.

9. The Advent of Women. We noted with satisfaction the competence and sincerity that have characterized West Point's efforts to integrate women cadets into the routine of Academy life. The results of prior

planning and the sense of commitment on the part of West Point are evident. Many of our observations may only suggest areas to be watched in subsequent evaluations.

--The Effects of the Plebe Year. Though men have undergone the rigors of Plebe year for decades, the data obtained may not be completely transferable to women who may not react with the same psychological or physiological manifestations as their male counterparts.

--Appropriate Role Models. There are currently few women officers on the staff and faculty. Consequently, the female cadets have a limited number of role models for emulation. Of significance is the absence of a woman Tactical Officer. As the Tactical Officer is the most visible and influential member of the non-tenured staff and faculty, the absence of a female Tactical Officer would seem to be a problem.

--Speciality Selection for Women. Though at least three years distant at this juncture, the question of speciality choice for women graduates will continue to become increasingly important. Interest will come not only for the women cadet as she grapples with the realization of eventual commissioning and its concomitant responsibilities, but also from other observers both inside and outside the Academy. Early study and resolution of the speciality options available to women cadets would seem key to alleviating potential areas of misunderstanding or confusion.

10. Sex Education. Given both the intensity and proximity of living conditions at West Point, there would seem to be a need for sex education that addresses the mutual responsibilities and obligations for both sexes living in such an environment. The education should be straight forward, mature, and sufficiently broad to encompass physiological features, reproduction, contraception, hygiene, and responsibility.

F. Military Education and Training

1. Overview. One of the comments of the Borman Report and a recurring theme from interviews with senior officers, both active and retired, is that West Point should not be in the business of producing branch qualified lieutenants. Most hold this view because of a concern that such extensive military training will, inevitably, erode the academic side of the Academy, either through direct competition for time or through attraction of interest, or both. Others, conceding that branch qualification is reasonably within reach and not necessarily a negative force, are more concerned over the added pressure and intensity of the West Point experience. The Study Group was struck by the

unremitting purposefulness of West Point in its every activity. For example, after having heard from graduates of several years ago of the virtues of the Third Class summer at Camp Buckner in terms of class cohesion and a relaxed but productive field training program, we are surprised by the intensity of the contemporary Third Class Summer. While the official schedule would argue that there is ample free time, the schedule fails to reflect a myriad of things which absorb the cadet's time (e.g., preparation for training, travel to and from Fort Knox).

While speciality qualification probably can be accomplished in the summer without interfering with academic studies, the price increased intensity of the cadet experience probably makes it unwise. Moreover, the nature of recently planned changes in Officer Basic Schools make it clear that, in two or three years, it would be nearly impossible to achieve speciality qualification without a major impact on the cadet and probably the academic curricula.

This is not to say, however, that one should sacrifice quality training, perhaps some of which is speciality related, or fail to give the West Point graduate unique intellectual depth in the profession of arms. Unfortunately, the issue of academic education versus military training, the inherent duality of West Point, is too often misunderstood and debated in imprecise and improper terms:

--Much of the criticism of that called "Military" centers on Cadet regulations, Cadet discipline, and other uniquely cadet activities, which are viewed as harassing, inconsistent, and fundamentally unfair. The issue is not whether there should be regulations and discipline but, rather, is the application of regulations and discipline even, sensible and mature.

--Too frequently the responsibility for providing experience relevant to the Army is translated into the simplest of skill training rather than into the requirement for an intellectual grasp of the military calling and the alignment of leadership practices with those in the Army.

--Much of that which is done could be much improved, yet the issue is seen only infrequently as a matter of quality.

--Anything military is frequently considered unintellectual or antithetical to academic pursuits.

In short, the frequently emotional and always imprecise debate fails to address the important issues. The Study Group simply cannot accept the implication that bad lieutenants make good generals or that West Point should concentrate on developing lieutenants rather than

generals. These are false choices, choices that should not be posed to West Point. We believe that cadets can be given better than average pre-commission skills, relevant and beneficial leadership experiences, and a unique intellectual grasp of the military. But, the tone, content, and quality of the "military" component are not adequate to the task.

2. Academic Year. The Military Science instruction during the academic year closely approximates that taught in any ROTC program and is faithful to the pre-commissioning objectives established by the Army. The content and sequencing are tailored to prepare the cadet for summer training, e.g., squad tactics are taught in the spring before Buckner.

Given, however, the sizeable amount of time available for military training overall in the academic year and summer, there is enormous opportunity cost in the current program. West Point, alone among the pre-commissioning sources, offers the opportunity to provide intellectual depth in the study of the military profession--most things required for military skills can be provided during the summer period--and the academic year provides the opportunity for a unique experience.

The committee strongly urges major changes in the curricula and pedagogy for Military Science.

--Courses should be provided in subjects with intellectual content. Some examples are Evolution of the Military Profession, Comparative Military Systems, Modern Warfare, Professional Ethics, and the American Soldier.

--Both to bridge the gap between military professional instruction and academic studies and to reinstitute the role of the Tactical Officer as instructor and teacher, classes in Military Science should call upon Academic Instructors and Tactical Officers as team teachers.

3. Summer Training. The West Point summer training program offers a great opportunity to give the cadet challenging experience and meaningful leadership opportunities. The current program is both popular with cadets and effective in providing training and experience for development as Army Officers. Nevertheless, the Committee feels that there are some improvements which could be made. These improvements feature:

--Introduction of a summer program placing the cadet in the training base as a "Drill Cadet" assisting the Drill Sergeant. The cadet is well founded in the School of the Soldier and in basic rifle marksmanship. With these skills, the cadet could be exposed to a realistic leadership situation as a trainer. Both the Air Force and

the Navy already have a similar program. We believe this program will serve to attenuate some of the negative leadership experiences by placing the cadet in a real military environment. It is also important to note that it is intended that the cadets not be given officer privileges while in the field; rather they should get a total appreciation for the noncommissioned officer role.

--Elimination of some Cadet Military Skill Training (Airborne, Ranger, etc.). We seriously question the cost and utility of some of the Skill Training, particularly expensive training which has limited application and offers little return to the Army. And we would sacrifice all Skill Training prior to graduation if necessary to free Second Class summer for the Drill Cadet Program. We do acknowledge the value of Ranger and Airborne Training, but these could be taken after graduation. Alternatively, the sacrifice of some leave would allow both Airborne and Drill Cadet Training in the same summer.

--Elimination or reduction of First Class Participation at Camp Buckner to free the First Class Cadets for more rewarding activity such as branch-oriented Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT). The new Third Class would assume the major responsibility for running their own organization and much of the training. There is precedence for this arrangement, and we think it would be beneficial to the Third Class.

--Reduce the amount of leave for some cadets as required to meet the demands of the recommended training.

--Retention of Cadet Basic Training (CBT). This is one of the more important aspects of the cadet experience. While we do not believe that cadets retain the substance of CBT (analogous to Army Basic Training) the physical training, the demanding schedule, and general environment are important to the transition from civilian to cadet.

--Retention of Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT) but conducted in First Class summer and with branch-related experience. The CCTLT "3d Lieutenant" program is universally applauded as providing a realistic experience for cadets. By providing for tentative speciality selection in Second Class year and conducting CCTLT during First Class summer, we see a somewhat more relevant experience.

The opportunity for noncommissioned officer experience in the Army (Drill Cadet) and for speciality related "3d Lieutenant" experience (CTLT) is an important change to summer training, exploiting the opportunity to make West Point training unique.

In summary, the preferred summer training program is:

Fourth Class Summer	Cadet Basic Training (CBT)
Third Class Summer	Cadet Field Training (Camp Buckner)
Second Class Summer	Drill Cadet (and, possibly, Airborne)
First Class Summer	CBT Detail and CHT

4. Physical Education. Physical conditioning is critically important to the Army combat arms officer, and physical education is done exceedingly well at West Point. Although physical education absorbs a good deal of the cadet's energy, we are reluctant to recommend reducing the scheduled hours. The actual scheduled hours have been decreased over the years and are fewer than either of the other major academies:

	<u>Phys Ed Classes</u>	<u>Tests</u>	<u>Intramural</u>	<u>Total</u>
USMA	127 hours	12	42/9*	181/9*
USAFA	146.7	12	90	248.7
USNA	137.5	32	60	229.5

*There are 9 optional hours in Spring Intramurals. The 181 mandatory hours compare to approximately 225 total mandatory hours in 1958.

While we would not reduce the scheduled hours, we are concerned over the leverage exerted upon the cadet by the Office of Physical Education (OPE) grading system. Many of the grades are awarded on a normative basis (highest grade based on best individual cadet performance, with set percentages for failures), thereby introducing the potential for never-ending physical competition. It seems that a minimum absolute standard should be established with either Pass/Fail grading or successive absolute levels for higher grades.

Another concern of the study group is the program for women cadets. It is our observation that there is a near obsession at West Point when giving women, as nearly as possible, the same physical education program as men. Our intuitive feeling is that the physical stress is excessive and that the level of physical conditioning being demanded may not be justified for future service. The justification

for the physical education program is frequently that "equal effort" is being extracted from both male and female cadets. While the idea is appealing in support of the assertion that there is a "single-track," we are uncertain that such a precise distinction can be made.

5. Speciality Assignments. Traditionally, the selection and assignment of specialities (Branching) at West Point has been done by GOM standing. The Study Group has advocated elimination of GOM and we understand that it has been eliminated. The issue now is to devise an alternate branching method.

On examination, it seemed sensible to consider a way to assign specialities based upon demonstrated ability and aptitude rather than interpersonal competition. The solution appears remarkably simple:

--Department of Army would assign tentative speciality quotas to West Point during the spring of Second Class year, thereby permitting branch-related "3d Lieutenant" training.

--West Point would then assign tentative specialities to cadets based upon: branch preference, academic performance, military performance, and other criteria such as interest testing.

We visualize a continuing dialogue between West Point and Army personnel managers which might result in adjustments to quota allocations prior to tentative selections and could enable changes and reallocations after the branch-related CTLT.

The Study Group did not examine in detail the issues of which specialities should be available for women or the implications of allowing male cadets routinely to select other than combat arms. Any review of speciality selection for male cadets must, inevitably, consider the policy for women. We note, however, that the graduation of combat arms leaders is a unique rationale for West Point.

CHAPTER VII

INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

A. Introduction.

The athletic program at West Point, encompassing extracurricular, intramural and intercollegiate activities, plays a major role in shaping the Academy environment and contributes directly to the cadet development process. Aside from certain facilities shortfalls, the extracurricular and intramural athletic programs are sound, while the intercollegiate athletic program needs revitalization. The recent efforts towards improvement need to be continued and intensified.

Although the Army Athletic Association (AAA) fields more inter-collegiate teams whose yearly winning percentages are consistently better than most undergraduate schools in the country, the perception of success of the intercollegiate athletic program hinges directly on the achievements of the major sports, especially football. When major athletic teams fail to produce outstanding results, to include wins over other service academies and nationally recognized teams, there is a resultant negative impact on the esprit de corps of the community, the national image of the Academy, and the financial posture of the AAA.

In recent years, athletic teams in major sports at the Academy have not had impressive records. The 1957-1976 record of the traditional major athletic teams that compete against Navy reflects a losing trend. In the last five years, the net results against Navy are striking--11 wins, 39 losses and 2 ties. Traditional rivalries aside, results of intercollegiate athletic competition with the other service academies are especially meaningful since each faces, by and large, the same recruiting challenges.

Several factors have contributed to a general lack of intercollegiate athletic success. These key factors include: lack of an institutional commitment to intercollegiate athletics, role and composition of the Athletic Board, the tenure and qualifications of the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics (DIA) and the organization and management of the Army Athletic Association.

B. Institutional Commitment to Intercollegiate Athletics.

Excellence in athletics is as inherent to the mission of the Military Academy as excellence in studies and military training. USMA intercol-

legiate athletic teams, representative of the institution, are expected to excel in competitive athletics. Institutional commitment to excellence in intercollegiate athletics can be achieved without detriment to other outstanding Academy programs and can be manifested by: clearly defined statements of intercollegiate athletic policy; expression of concise intercollegiate athletic goals and objectives; visible efforts to increase the degree of alumni support through the Association of Graduates; construction, operation and maintenance of outstanding athletic facilities; frequency of visits of Academy officials at team practices, NCAA contests and press functions; enthusiastic, voluntary spectator support at team practices and games by the entire West Point community; the degree of professionalism exhibited in the management of the intercollegiate athletic program; and finally, making this commitment to excellence visible to the Corps of Cadets.

Informally, the Academy does have a goal relative to intercollegiate athletics--win 75% of the contests and at least 50% against other service Academies. Although a step in the right direction, a more complete statement of objectives should be developed and promulgated formally for each sport which would include the level of competition, the degree of national recognition desired, and post-season competition aspirations. An expression of such objectives can serve as the nucleus of a "win" philosophy at the Academy which coaches, managers, and officials at all levels of the Academy should support in the overall administration of the intercollegiate program.

The lack of institutional commitment is also apparent in the mediocre athletic facilities. A prominent Review Panel on Intercollegiate Athletics and Physical Education appointed by the Superintendent in 1972 declared as inconceivable the fact that the Nation would allow the athletic and physical education departments to function with the mediocre facilities which currently exist.

The Academy must not be satisfied with mediocre athletic facilities and must provide for their timely replacement or renovation. During the past ten years, more than 80 NCAA schools have built new basketball facilities. Seventy-five percent of these have seating capacities of 5,000 or greater and 48 percent seat more than 10,000. In addition, 29 NCAA schools will complete new basketball facilities in the next five years. At West Point, the current basketball floor is over 38 years old and located in a field house of equal vintage. The basketball court and stands, not only unsatisfactory for a basketball facility measured by today's standards, also preclude effective utilization of the field house for more suitable purposes. The current hockey facility, constructed in the early thirties, also needs a replacement.

At West Point the current 1,500 seats for hockey and 3,100 for basketball have been marginally adequate at best. In recent years, experience shows that standing room only has been available for games with recognized opponents and, given adequate facilities, greater attendance can be promoted. The Academy should plan on a priority basis for greater seating capacity for both hockey and basketball. Seating capacities of about 4,000 for hockey and 7,000 for basketball appear to be reasonable considering construction costs and future attendance expectations. Other priority needs include renovation of the football stadium, gymnasium alterations, and additional outdoor athletic areas.

Another area of support for the USMA intercollegiate athletic program, not fully exploited compared to other institutions, is the Alumni Association. Declarations of moral support from trustees as well as contributions to athletic programs and facilities should be solicited so that alumni interest and support complement the Academy's institutional commitment to athletics. Recent efforts in support of the astroturf project for football serve as an example of the potential benefits to be derived from increased alumni involvement.

The Superintendent must be the catalyst in the development or elaboration of the institution's commitment to intercollegiate athletics. Once the institutional commitment is defined and understood by the community, organizations can be formed or structured to attain stated goals, and managers can develop reasonable plans to achieve objectives.

C. Athletic Board.

Employing a board, council, or committee to advise college or university executives on athletic policy matters is a standard practice. The diversity and intensity of the West Point curriculum dictate the need for a representative, knowledgeable body to advise the Superintendent on athletic policy. Presently, the Academy supports approximately 59 sports at levels which include intercollegiate, club, intramural, physical education instruction, and recreation services. The diversity of the program is further amplified by the existence of intercollegiate "JV" or freshman teams backing up most varsity squads as well as the imminent establishment of a comparable structure for women cadets.

In comparison to athletic committees at most other schools, the Athletic Board is unique in its composition and scope of deliberations. In addition to a balance of faculty members and representatives of other university activities, many institutions include students and alumni on their boards whereas the Athletic Board at West Point is weighted heavily with senior personnel. In the majority of institutions, although not specifically stated, athletic committees exist as much for the purpose of serving as a community sounding board to assist athletic department heads as they do for advising institutional executives on specific athletic policy.

Because of the authority of the Athletic Board, the degree of autonomy accorded the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics at West Point to manage Army Athletic Association business is noticeably less than that found at other institutions. The Athletic Board involves itself in the operations and business practices of the AAA in great detail, which may be attributed to a lack of confidence in AAA management. Conversely, AAA management may not have been effective because of this involvement. Another possible reason for Athletic Board's involvement is the threat, real or imagined, of "big time" athletics detracting from the military and academic programs. Whatever the reasons, the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics cannot be held reasonably accountable for management of the AAA as long as the Athletic Board continues to exercise direct influence and involvement on most facets of AAA operations.

Based on a review of other institutions' experience, a standing committee on athletics, advisory to the Superintendent on athletic policy matters, could ensure an integrated, coordinated and balanced program at West Point. Since the expansion of the Corps in the mid-sixties, a significant growth in extracurricular athletic activities has occurred and is growing further with the introduction of women cadets. Several activities, to include the AAA, Office of Physical Education (OPE), Cadet Activities Office (CAO) and Recreation Services Division, compete for West Point's limited athletic resources. The need for an organizational focal point to ensure a reasonable balance among these competing demands has become increasingly apparent. In lieu of the current Athletic Board, a representative athletic committee, advisory in nature and responsible for looking at the total athletic program, to include facilities, should be considered.

In the final analysis, regardless of how such a committee is structured, it is imperative that it be advisory to the Superintendent so as not to infringe on the management prerogatives and responsibilities of the DIA. In this regard, the charter of the athletic committee should be as precise and definitive as possible.

D. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics (DIA).

In today's competitive world of intercollegiate athletics, one of the greatest challenges to athletic directors is business management. All athletic directors interviewed advocated the increasing need for business experience and ability to manage a successful athletic program. In addition to business experience, the DIA should also be a West Point graduate knowledgeable of intercollegiate athletics. In short, precise

selection criteria for the DIA should be determined, promulgated and applied when the occasion for his selection requires. Further, the performance of the DIA should be evaluated not only on the won and lost column and the financial posture of the AAA but additionally on his relationship with the community and the institution. Lastly, the position of DIA should be accorded additional prominence by including him as a member of select Academy committees or boards so that better communications and understanding are established.

E. Army Athletic Association (AAA).

In the last 20 years the AAA management structure has expanded with the proliferation of assistant athletic directors and coaches reporting to the DIA. This wide span of control, short tenure of the DIA, and the dominant role of the Athletic Board may have been responsible for deficiencies in long-range financial and facilities plans, promotional accomplishments, and overall organizational effectiveness. Expedited functional realignment and revitalization of the AAA is necessary to provide for a dynamic organization which is competitive within the Academy and NCAA environments.

The AAA has proliferated the title of "Assistant Athletic Director" without attendant increases in responsibility accorded such positions. At present, the DIA has five assistant athletic directors, four additional activity managers and more than twenty varsity coaches reporting to him. Fewer assistant athletic directors with broadened roles would reduce the current span of control of the DIA.

Appropriated fund support for intercollegiate athletics derives from multiple sources. The current level of funding has been reached incrementally over many years and appears to have been determined primarily by availability of appropriated funds at West Point and not through consideration of entitlements or requirements of the Office of the DIA. In comparable civilian institutions up to two-thirds of athletic operation budgets are supported by the school or the alumni from funds other than the athletic departments.

The AAA has not placed sufficient emphasis on improvement of financial posture through increased promotional activities and programs. Ticket sales, local AAA chapters, and fund raising campaigns in coordination with activities sponsored by the Association of Graduates could be further exploited to reduce the financial burden. Additionally, the absence of a long-range financial plan provides the opportunity for inadvertent, inconsistent and uneconomical decision making by AAA elements responsible for financial management and planning. Organizationally, the ticket manager has been an assistant director equal to the business

manager. The recent decision to place ticket management under the Assistant DIA for business was sound. Consideration should also be given to combining other AAA functions that impact directly on financial management. Such reorganization would establish clear responsibility and authority for financial management and business functions under one organizational element and enhance coordination for those activities whose roles impact on the AAA financial posture.

Most major institutions give considerable emphasis to athletic promotion because of its major impact on revenue and recruiting. The promotional challenge at the Academy exceeds that of most institutions because of the magnitude of the athletic program, the corresponding resources required to sustain it, and the expectations generated from West Point's past reputation for excellence in athletics. As part of the overall promotion effort, media coverage of Army athletics in the locality of West Point and vicinity is excellent but the Academy is a national institution and aggressive efforts should be made for extensive national media coverage. The AAA contributes to the total promotional program of the institution by scheduling intercollegiate contests geographically dispersed on a national basis. Because the Academy strives to attract outstanding scholar athletes from all parts of the country, comprehensive media coverage nationwide is essential to capitalize on its geographically representative scheduling.

Press relations provide the means to generate good media coverage. Coaches, professors, officer representatives, key institutional executives, cadets, and staff and faculty should support the DIA in this important program. It is the perception of many personnel affiliated with intercollegiate athletics that top military officials at the Academy are reluctant to endorse the promotional effort in an outward aggressive manner. To further enhance this program, press relationships and facilities for major athletic events require improvement.

The established office for promotion of intercollegiate athletics at West Point is the Sports Information Office (SIO) which is a branch of the Public Affairs Office (PAO). Although supportive of many of the informational needs of the AAA, the office is not staffed with sufficient personnel or with the requisite expertise to maintain an aggressive, well rounded promotional program. Consequently, some essential promotional functions are delegated to assistant athletic directors and coaches. The AAA should consider the establishment of a promotional office, headed by a qualified individual on a personal service contract basis, under which the present Sports Information Office would function as one part.

The responsibility of the Director of Athletics to encourage outstanding scholar athletes to attend the Academy cannot be overemphasized.

Considering contemporary attitudes concerning a career as an Army officer, the demanding academic curriculum, and the five-year obligation, it is another of the most challenging responsibilities of the DIA. Because of its importance, visibility and controversy, the process employed by the DIA to encourage scholar athletes to seek admission to West Point warrants constant evaluation and emphasis.

An athlete selection program requires significant assistance from outside sources in order to be successful. The key to success is communication through efficient and effective dialogue with the field. The current athletic recruiting program is only marginally effective. Significant improvement must be made in this important area. Regardless of the ability of the coach, the quality of the athlete determines eventual success in attaining a winning program. Our research indicates that many athletes recruited by the Army Athletic Association have failed to earn a letter in the sport for which they were recruited. Certainly this area needs immediate attention. Statistics should be carefully compiled in order to determine the effectiveness of the recruiting program. Academy graduates, especially former lettermen, have indicated to the study group their dissatisfaction with the current recruiting program in that they have little opportunity to participate in the system. This important source of assistance should be exploited by revising current recruiting programs.

Because of the significant influence a coach has on the cadet development process, a large part of the criteria used by the AAA to select a suitable coach is already predetermined--similar to the criteria for a tactical officer, instructor or staff member. The key variables in the selection process for a coach are professionalism and competence in his sport. In recent years the level of coaching expertise considered or even the decision to hire or fire a coach or assistant coach was based primarily on the AAA financial posture without sufficient consideration of the needs or priorities accorded each sport as part of the overall program. The required degree of professionalism and competence desired of a coach of a particular sport should be predicated on the goals and objectives of the institution for the particular sport. Since more than 20 varsity teams engage in NCAA competition, and sports for women cadets will soon be added, decisions concerning priorities among sports and levels of competition by sport must be made. Such ordering of priorities by competitive level will place each sport in proper perspective and contribute to the establishment of reasonable coach selection criteria.

The number of civilian assistant coaches authorized in order of priority, by sport, should be clearly stipulated on a timely basis. Institutional goals for each sport and the experience of other successful institutions in that sport should be considered. Criteria for civilian assistant coaches should include utility as assistant or head coaches in other sports. Contractual arrangements for civilian assistant coaches, to include those with dual capacity, should be relatively consistent and comparable.

In addition to the ability of the coach to win, to recruit, to assume a leadership role with cadets, and to represent the institution, his performance also should be measured on administrative ability to include participation in the budget process. All coaches should be required to participate in the complete budget process, to accept the responsibility of operating within mutually agreed upon budget limits, and to make a positive contribution to more effective financial management. The maintenance and annual update of a three-to five-year budget projection should in itself serve as the needed catalyst to ensure greater coach participation and accountability.

Because of the unique environment of West Point, intercollegiate athletics have problems and challenges not found at civilian institutions. Innovation, dedication, and institutional commitment are required to ensure excellence in intercollegiate athletics. Athletics play an important role in the cadet development process and all concerned should measurably contribute to this process.

CHAPTER VIII

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

Extracurricular activities can play a vital role in developing the cadet into a well-rounded Regular Army officer. When they are broadening, educational, and voluntary, they contribute to cadet welfare and morale and enhance cadet intellectual, physical, and moral development. Cadets may participate in intercollegiate athletic competition, other than varsity sports, through such club sports such as rugby, volleyball, and water polo. Although free to join any activities that interest them, they are cautioned against becoming unwisely overcommitted.

The Cadet Activities Office (CAO) is responsible for the supervision of all clubs or activities. Activities are started or ended according to cadet interest; final approving authority rests with the Commandant. The CAO monitors this interest level very closely, in part by reviewing annually the minutes of all clubs. Of course, budgetary restraints also check unwarranted growth in the types and numbers of activities offered.

The clubs or activities are categorized into six groups (see Figure 1): academic group (17), competitive athletic group (15), military skills group (8), recreational group (3), religious participation group (10), and support group (26). Each group is monitored by a specific office having a direct interest in that group. For example, the Director of the Office of Physical Education monitors the competitive athletic group; the Director of the Office of Military Instruction has responsibility for the military skills group; and the Chaplain looks after the religious participation group. Group monitors provide guidance and assistance to the various officers-in-charge, recommend changes in activity policies and regulations, and submit nominations for officers-in-charge. The officers-in-charge (OIC) are volunteers from the staff and faculty, who are endorsed by the Commandant and approved by the Superintendent. The OIC supervises the cadet-in-charge (CIC) of the activity, enforces pertinent regulations, and attends club meetings and trips.

The Study Group found that the Cadet Activities Office, functioning under the Commandant, was generally innovative and enthusiastic in serving cadets and their guests. There have been several recent changes that reflect more efficient management. Budgetary and fund disbursing activities are consolidated under a single manager. Presently, new contracts are being negotiated for cadet use of hotels during football trips in order to provide better but less expensive facilities. The cadet hostess has been given more autonomy in order to improve her effectiveness.

The Study Group concludes that extracurricular activities at West Point are well managed and serve the needs of the cadets. Numerous and varied, they broaden cadets intellectually, physically and professionally and expand their interests.

CADET EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
Academic Year 1976-1977

<u>ACADEMIC GROUP (17)</u>
Aeronautics & Astronautics Club
Astronomy Club
Behavioral Science Club
Chinese Language Club
Debate Council and Forum
Electronics Club
Engineering Forum
Fine Arts Forum
French Language Club
Geology Club
German Language Club
Mathematics Forum
Military Affairs Club
Portuguese Language Club
Russian Language Club
Spanish Language Club
Arabic Language Club

<u>COMPETITIVE ATHLETIC GROUP (15)</u>
Basketball Club
Bowling Club
Cycling Club
Gymnastics Club
Handball Club
Judo Club
Karate Club
Marathon Club
Rugby Football Club
Sailing Club
Scuba Diving Club
Team Handball Club
Volleyball Club
Water Polo Club
Softball Club

<u>MILITARY SKILLS GROUP (8)</u>
Mountaineering Club
Orienteering Club
Pistol Club
Riding Club
Rifle Club
Skeet and Trap Club
Sport Parachute Club
Triathlon Club

<u>RECREATIONAL GROUP (3)</u>
Chess Club
Outdoor Sportsmen's Club
Ski Club

<u>SUPPORT GROUP (26)</u>
Single Notes
Cadet Band
Cadet Glee Club
Class Committees (4)
Dialectic Society
Hop Bands
Hop Committees (4)
Howitzer
Pipes and Drums, USCC
Pointer
Babble Bouncers
Ring and Crest Committee (4)
Scoutmasters' Council
Slim and Gravy
Theater Support Group
WAFB Broadcasting Staff
Public Affairs Detail

Figure 1

CHAPTER IX

THE HONOR CODE AND SYSTEM

"A cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do."

A. Introduction

The Study Group has considered carefully the Honor Code and Honor System--those which are so central to every aspect of West Point life.

While the Borman Commission examined the Honor Code and System in some detail, that examination was in the specific context of the Electrical Engineering 304 incident. The Study Group has endeavored to look at the Code and System somewhat more broadly, building upon the work of the Borman Commission.

What we have done is review the causes believed by the Borman Commission to underlie the Electrical Engineering 304 incident. While institutional failure may well have been a contributing or even a major factor, we observe that those involved were mature and intelligent young men--part of a select group--and that they could not have been unaware of the implications of their actions. Indeed, one must examine the relationships between institutional and individual responsibility with some caution. Neither responsibility is absolute and it is just as unreasonable to excuse all individual responsibility simply because the institution falls short of perfection as it is to place total responsibility on individual behavior without regard to the institution. Furthermore, overdrawing the cause-effect relationship could lead to the erroneous view that institutional modification would preclude "another Electrical Engineering 304"; the unpredictability of human systems ensures that the potential for failure is always present.

Nevertheless, whether dealing with the Academic Program, Military Training or the Honor System, it must be accepted that institutional failures which entice lying or cheating, or which encourage (or even only accommodate) attitudes of disdain for excellence and disillusionment with the institution, inevitably erode the honor and integrity of the Corps.

B. An Initial Appraisal

Clearly, the West Point Honor Code is unsurpassed among American colleges in its exacting nature and in the rigorous demands of the supporting Honor System. One of the initial and important conclusions of

the Study Group was that the Honor Code and Honor System were laboring under an unreasonable burden.

- Unreasonable in that an exacting code was supported by an inflexible system of enforcement which carried a single sanction--permanent separation.

- Unreasonable in that perceptions and expectations are such that some view the code as a comprehensive guide to ethical and moral behavior.

In the first instance, disillusionment and lack of faith have been engendered by bizarre cases where the Honor System was not sufficiently flexible to accommodate trivial or totally unintentional offenses. In the latter, there is imparted both an unwarranted sanctity to the code and a distorted and fatally truncated view of ethical obligation.

Compounding the burden are the "non-toleration" feature, which requires a cadet, as a matter of honor, to report all transgressions of the Code, and the universal jurisdiction which applies the Code and System everywhere and at all times.

C. In the Aftermath

In response to both the Borman Commission and the Study Group, West Point has already taken steps designed to improve the Honor System and to improve perceptions of the Honor Code.

- West Point has established a committee to review the formal ethics instruction and has begun formulation of a comprehensive four-year program. The Study Group recommends a thorough but a cautious approach in this area which allows the Academy to acquire the properly educated instructors needed for formal ethics instruction.

- The Superintendent has the option (at the direction of the Secretary of the Army) of not separating a cadet found guilty of an Honor violation, if the circumstances warrant.

- The Commandant is the convening authority for the Full Honor Board, thus ensuring that a senior official will review a case before it comes to a hearing.

- The Special Assistant to the Commandant for Honor Matters is the "supervisor and advisor" to the Honor Committee.

- The Full Honor Board is a due process board.

- On a trial basis the role of lawyers has been expanded to include involvement at the investigatory, hearing, and review levels.

- Both the Full Honor Board and the Subcommittee hearing involve cadets selected from the Corps at large.

- Honor instruction for cadets has been given a thorough review and overhaul to eliminate the deadening litany of detail and to emphasize the spirit of honor.

- Honor instruction is being extended to ensure that all personnel at the Academy fully understand the Honor Code and Honor System.

- Instructional materials and honor publications make clear that no one exclusively "owns the Code."

The initial reactions to these changes appear favorable and the changes themselves appear to promise a salutary effect. Nonetheless, the Study Group conducted a searching inquiry into the Code and System.

D. The Significance of Change

Two of the changes to the Code and System have broad impact:

- The authority granted by the Secretary of the Army to the Superintendent to retain in the Corps cadets who have been found guilty of an honor violation. This provision is frequently referred to as "discretion."

- The introduction of officer advice throughout the operation of the Honor System.

The introduction of "discretion" allows the mature judgment of the Superintendent to be brought to bear to ensure that due consideration is given to matters of mitigation. Knowing that the Superintendent can and will use discretion should make it much easier for cadets to live with the "non-toleration" provision of the Code.

The early and continuing involvement of officers, from the Special Assistant for Honor Matters through the Commandant, helps ensure against cases which should never be brought to the Full Honor Board.

In both instances, much of the unreasonable burden is removed from the Code and System by the introduction of mature judgment. This is not to say that we think officers ought to "run" the System. Quite to the contrary, we strongly urge the Corps of Cadets to permit and direct the Full Honor Board to recommend the exercise of "discretion" in appropriate cases.

E. Towards Understanding Non-Toleration

Clearly the most vexing aspect of the West Point Honor Code is the honor obligation imposed upon cadets to enforce the code by reporting all suspected transgressions to the Honor Committee. And, yet, it is the strict interpretation and adherence to this provision that has made the West Point Honor Code (along with the Air Force Academy's) distinctive among American institutions. The proscriptions against lying, cheating, and stealing are easily understood, essentially passive measures which accord with the normative standards of American life. The "non-toleration" provision, however, introduces a far more complex concept and demands behavior seemingly contradictory to normal experience. In essence, cadets perceive that they are being asked to destroy friendships and violate confidences by reporting the possible transgressions of a fellow cadet with full knowledge that, if found guilty, he would be separated.

The Borman Commission recommended that the Code be reaffirmed, as stated, but that compliance with the "non-tolerance" provision be satisfied with other, less final measures such as warnings, etc. The Study Group was understanding of such recommendations--it is clear that "non-tolerance" is most difficult to comprehend and is the beginning of a "slippery slope" for many violators. And, yet, we were reluctant to abandon what has been so long a fundamental tenet of the Code and System. We were particularly reluctant in view of the granting of the discretionary authority to the Superintendent. Accordingly, the Study Group supports a strict interpretation of "non-tolerance", i.e., if, after determining that a violation has occurred and the cadet in violation fails to report himself (say, after 24 hours), an observer is honor bound to report the violation.

We must emphasize that our conclusion relies heavily upon the Superintendent's discretion to exercise superior judgment where the situation indicates it appropriate. We are deeply aware of the burden this places upon the Superintendent and, should the Corps elect to adopt discretion, the burden will fall heavily upon the Honor Board. But we believe this is where the burden belongs. To ask a young cadet who is just learning to live with the Code to make the judgment as to the appropriate action with respect to a suspected violation by a fellow cadet is also an unreasonable burden. And the alternative of trying to prescribe appropriate action for each case raises the old spectre of endless and confusing codification. It may be that the non-tolerance clause cannot survive since it unquestionably bears the seed of scandal. But it is our sincere judgment that the elimination of the provision would ultimately sap the vigor of the Code.

Equally important, in the view of the Study Group, is the development of an "Honor Ethic" which subsumes the Honor Code in a broader concept making clear the relevance and importance of an obligation which transcends individuals and individual loyalties without appearing to subvert

the bond between cadets. This more general statement should place the Honor Code in perspective, clearly identifying it as the central experience for a cadet in the process of developing a personal standard of ethical behavior.

F. The Honor Code as a Goal

The Superintendent's Special Study on Honor (The Buckley-Reid Report, 1975) suggested, and the Borman Commission endorsed, the idea that the Honor Code "although...a worthy goal...is not a usable criterion of behavior." We believe that the Code is a reasonable standard against which to measure behavior as long as the slightest transgression does not result in permanent separation. Certainly the proscriptions against lying, cheating, and stealing are reasonably well understood under most conditions. But there are troublesome examples of unreasonable interpretation which suggest that perfect compliance, with even these straightforward rules, is not as simple as we might think. And, as stated earlier, the emotional and intellectual stresses introduced by "non-toleration" place special demands upon cadets. The introduction of "discretion," however, recognizes both the existence of human frailty (that perfection is beyond human reach) and the demands of "non-toleration."

Thus, it is our conclusion that, on balance, "discretion" renders moot most discussions of whether the Code is a goal or a minimum standard.

G. Honor and Regulations

A perennial problem, the enforcement of regulations through the Honor Code has been for years a matter of concern and no little confusion. Many aspects of the Honor System, which are viewed nostalgically by graduates as involving mutual trust and confidence, are, in fact, clear instances of "honor being used to enforce regulation." And, in the context of developing a personal and professional ethic, it is to be expected that there eventually will be little or no practical distinction between the compelling demands of Duty and Honor.

The problem arises when there is lack of mutual agreement as to what regulations, what aspects of duty, are appropriately related to the Honor System. The absence card is the clearest example of using honor to monitor compliance with regulations. But in the past cadets have essentially agreed to pledge themselves in a "gentleman's agreement" to comply with regulations concerning their whereabouts and the proscription of certain acts (e.g., drinking, hazing) to avoid the inconvenience that might attend official policing of the regulations. The meaning of the absence card, however, has changed until now it applies only to a cadet's location and only during limited time. Moreover, the design of the card is needlessly complex for its limited purpose. Consequently, the absence

card seems to have become a device of rather trivial meaning, which leads to demerits when mismarked, and which carries the ever-present threat (because it is essentially trivial) of an unintentional honor violation. Accordingly, we would eliminate the absence card completely or, if the Corps were willing to enter into the agreement, return it to a more meaningful instrument.

Another aspect of the relationship between honor and regulations has been the problem of differentiating between a college prank or infraction of regulations and a serious intent to deceive which compromises honor. A classic example of this dilemma over the years is whether placing unauthorized articles in a laundry bag is an honor violation. Clearly there is some intent to deceive, but characterizing such act as "lying," within the meaning of the code, is tantamount to enforcing regulations with honor and treating trivial issues with unwarranted seriousness. And there are many such so-called "acts of deception," such as putting liquor in a hair tonic bottle, covering the window with a blanket while studying after lights out, and so on.

The Study Group believes that these continuing sources of friction, confusion, and fear should be eliminated. Accordingly, lying should be defined, in relation to the Honor Code, in a way to omit these trivial acts. We would define lying as the making of an oral or written statement or gesture of communication made in the presence of and to another, intended by the maker to deceive or mislead. In our examination we have found no serious acts of deception that are not covered by other provisions.

Finally, we feel that West Point should establish a formal procedure for redress to improper questioning using honor to enforce regulations. While there is a system of appeal of punishments, cadets need a clear invitation to seek redress of the misuses of the Honor Code.

H. The Importance of Simplicity

The Study Group was repeatedly impressed with the need for the Code and System to be elegant in their simplicity. It is difficult for those who have not been associated with contemporary West Point to conceive of the potential problems relating to the Honor Code and Honor System. The intense dedication and desire of most cadets are remarkable, carrying the promise that West Point graduates will continue to make extraordinary sacrifices and contributions to the Nation. But such intensity also carries the potential for tragic and unnecessary stress. For example, a cadet recently reported himself for a possible honor violation because he had hidden the key to the locker containing his personal valuables thereby possibly deceiving someone. His anxiety stems, in part, from the difficulty in understanding the true nature of the Honor Code and Honor System and dramatizes the Academy's special responsibility to make them clear, simple, and unequivocal.

I. Other Issues

The Study Group addressed a wide range of issues relating to the Code and System and considered a number of alternative approaches. Some of our more important conclusions are:

- The Superintendent's Honor Review Committee should have an expanded role with wider representation. We do not, however, believe this committee should be the final interpreter of the Honor Code. This responsibility is solely the responsibility of the Superintendent acting for the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army.
- We examined several plans for a phased entry of new cadets into the structures of the Code. In the final analysis we concluded that it was important for new cadets to be fully under the Code at the outset and that the Superintendent's discretionary powers were adequate to deal with extraordinary circumstances.
- The jurisdiction of the Code should be universal. The Study Group questioned whether and how the Honor Code should apply away from West Point, e.g., at home and on leave. We concluded that the Code should apply at all places and at all times. Nevertheless, there is some question as to whether the institutional responsibility of the System for enforcement should be coterminous or whether there are situations where there is only personal responsibility. We urge continuing review of this matter.

J. Summary

The West Point Honor Code and Honor System are fundamentally sound. However, our recommendations will, we believe, serve to strengthen and invigorate them. Nonetheless, total involvement and awareness on the part of cadets and the staff and faculty alike are crucial to sustaining a dedication within the Corps and within the Academy in general.

The Study Group cannot, unhappily, guarantee that changes to the Honor Code and Honor System, or the other changes recommended elsewhere in this report, will prevent a future honor scandal. An institution as intense and challenging as West Point with a demanding and exacting Honor Code continually runs the risk of asking more than some can give. We hope, however, our recommendations will reduce the likelihood that there would be a scandal of such magnitude or a systemic failure of such seriousness. And, perhaps of equal importance, we believe that the changes will improve the quality of the academic and military experience which shape the future of our Army.

APPENDIX A

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BORMAN COMMISSION RELEVANT TO THE WEST POINT STUDY GROUP

In detailing the responses to the Borman Commission recommendations and initial Department of Army responses, the Study Group does not address those made specifically with respect to the cadets involved in EE 304. Since all actions have been taken on that issue, the Study Group regards it as closed.

1. Borman Recommendation: The Honor Code should be retained in its present form: "A cadet will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate those who do."

Army Response: Army concurs. The Honor Code will be retained in its present form.

Study Group Response: The Study Group strongly supports this conclusion.

2. Borman Recommendation: The nontoleration clause should be retained. However, a cadet should have options in addition to reporting an honor violation.

Army Response: The recommendation is being analyzed by the Department of the Army and is being referred to the Academy for evaluation and resolution during the upcoming academic semester.

Study Group Response: The Study Group supports the conclusion that the nontoleration clause be retained. However, on balance, the Study Group rejects the proposal that the individual cadet should have alternative options to ensuring that the suspected violator is reported or convinced to report himself.

3. Borman Recommendation: Sanctions other than dismissal should be authorized for violations of the Honor Code. The Cadet Honor Committee and reviewing authorities should be authorized to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine an appropriate penalty. Any recommendation less than separation should be fully justified. Cadets who are separated should not be required to serve on active duty as a result of their separation.

Army Response: Army concurs. The Regulations for the United States Military Academy and procedures will be amended to provide greater latitude in the application of separation for honor violations upon recommendation of the Honor Committee. A change in the requirement that separated cadets be required to serve on active duty has been recommended to the Secretary of Defense who reserves authority in that area.

Study Group Response: The Study Group concludes that the regulation change permitting the Superintendent to exercise a degree of "discretion"

in separating cadets will serve as an adequate, interim measure to protect against the possible "excesses" that might result from absolute adherence to the strictures of the Honor Code and System. However, the Study Group also concludes that the option would be most effective as a part of the Cadet Honor Committee Procedures.

4. Borman Recommendation: All officers and cadets at the Academy must understand the fundamentals which underlie the importance of the Honor Code and the health of the Honor System:

a. The Honor Code must be viewed as a goal toward which every honorable person aspires, and not as a minimum standard of behavior for cadets alone. Furthermore, its proscriptions do not encompass all forms of dishonorable conduct; the test of whether conduct is honorable or dishonorable does not depend solely upon whether it is proscribed by the Honor Code..

Army Response: Army concurs. A number of actions have been underway since summer 1976 and the Army is intensifying efforts to ensure implementation of these recommendations and as well that the total environment at West Point is fully supportive of the spirit and the provisions of the Honor Code and Honor System. Changes will be instituted seeking to preclude honor being used as a means of enforcing regulations.

Study Group Response: The Study Group concludes that the Honor Code is a reasonable standard against which to measure behavior. However, the Study Group further emphasizes that the Honor Code is not an all-inclusive prescription for moral conduct and recommends that USMA carefully expand the concept of honorable behavior in the perception of cadets.

b. The Honor Code must not be extended beyond its intended purpose of ensuring that only honorable individuals become Academy graduates. Nor should it be exploited as a means of enforcing regulations.

Army Response: Army concurs.

Study Group Response: The Study Group concludes that four areas could be more clearly defined and/or limited in support of this goal. The areas are the redefinition of lying, the redefinition of stealing, the elimination or simplification of the Absence Card, and the introduction of a formal redress to improper questioning.

c. The Honor Code and Honor System must be considered the joint responsibility of all cadets and all officers at the Academy. It must be understood that the Superintendent has the responsibility of reviewing and, if necessary, reversing cadet honor determinations. No

one "owns" the Honor Code. Everyone must work to ensure the effectiveness of the Honor System.

Army Response: Army concurs.

Study Group Response: The Study Group conclusions support the recommendation and contend that a full education on the history of the Honor Code and System have been the exclusive property of the Corps. Such education should reflect a shared interest and responsibility on the part of all components of the USMA community in the efficacy of the Honor Code and System.

5. Borman Recommendation: The Academy should seek ways to ensure that the fundamentals which underlie the importance of the Honor Code work on a continuing basis. As a minimum, the following should be accomplished:

a. There must be academic instruction which provides an intellectual base for character development. All cadets should be required, early in their careers at West Point, to begin formal ethics study. This study, which must be part of the core curriculum, should include those ethical problems likely to be faced by a military officer. Ethics should be stressed throughout the entire curriculum and by all constituencies at West Point: Academic, Tactical, Athletic, and Administrative.

Army Response: Army concurs. Action has been taken to develop a four-year program on ethics/professionalism as part of the core curriculum. Elements of this comprehensive program will be in effect for AY 1977-78.

Study Group Response: The Study Group notes that USMA does not now have on hand nor in the graduate school cycle sufficient instructors qualified in the requisite disciplines to prepare and to teach meaningful, challenging, convincing courses in some of the areas named (e.g., philosophy, psychology). The acquisition of these critical assets must be first priority. Until they are on hand, progress toward full implementation will necessarily be slow; care must be taken to ensure that interim measures are not counterproductive.

b. The content of honor instruction must emphasize the spirit of the Honor Code. A "cook book" approach makes the Code equivalent to another regulation.

Army Response: Army concurs. Action is being taken, for the spring semester 1977, to internalize the spirit of honor and to increase significantly greater participation by all cadets and officers in the operation of the Honor System.

Study Group Response: The Study Group concludes that USMA should expand the Honor education program with emphasis on the necessity, advantages, and ideals of an Honor Code and System. Additionally, USMA should firmly establish the role and function of the Honor Code in the creating and fostering of a complete Honor concept in governing conduct.

c. The method of honor instruction and the environment in which it is conducted must be improved.

Army Response: Army concurs.

Study Group Response: The Study Group concludes that formal and informal education is the key. The education must be thorough, consistent, and frequent.

d. There must be greater participation by all cadets and officers in the operation of the Honor System. Cadet rank should not be awarded for Honor Committee service.

Army Response: Army concurs. Cadet rank for Honor Committee service is being reviewed and evaluated.

Study Group Response: On balance the Study Group rejects the Borman Commission recommendation on cadet rank. It was concluded that the three cadets involved deserve the recognition. Their duties on the Honor Committee preclude their occupying other positions in the Corps.

e. The Superintendent's Honor Review Committee should be continued, but its membership should include cadets and alumni. The Committee should meet at least annually with the mission of guarding the Honor Code against misuse, misinterpretation, and inconsistent interpretation. The Committee should have the ultimate power to interpret the Honor Code.

Army Response: Army concurs. Action is being taken to determine the appropriate composition and functions of the Superintendent's Review Committee.

Study Group Response: The Study Group concludes that the Honor Review Committee should have an expanded charter, composition, tenure, and distribution of report but rejects the Borman Commission recommendation that the Honor Review Committee "should have the ultimate power to interpret the Code." This is the responsibility of the Superintendent, USMA, acting for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

f. An officer should be appointed to advise the Cadet Honor Committee and the Superintendent's Honor Review Committee. This officer should report to the Academic Board (and not the Commandant alone) concerning all honor matters. Continuity is required in this position.

Army Response: Army concurs.

Study Group Response: The Study Group concludes that the Special Assistant for Honor Matters fulfills this task, and that the responsiveness is not, in fact, limited to only the Commandant.

6. Borman Recommendation: A permanent and independent advisory board should be established to provide the continuing assistance that most institutions of higher education receive from their boards of trustees.

Army Response: Army concurs. Such a permanent advisory board will be formed to evaluate all aspects of the USMA operations and to report findings and recommendations to the Chief of Staff on continuing basis.

Study Group Response: Establish the Superintendent's Advisory Committee. All parameters of the Borman Commission recommendation were met except that the Committee would report directly to the Superintendent not the Secretary of the Army. Recommendation does provide that committee reports will be forwarded to SA. Secretary of the Army appoints committee members.

7. Borman Recommendation: The West Point mission statement should be revised to ensure that everyone understands the importance of education in the mission of the Academy. Everyone must understand that this is the primary mission of the Academy from September to June. Military training should be concentrated in the summer months.

Army Response: Army concurs. USMA mission statement is being revised. Primacy of academics will be maintained from September to June. In addition, curriculum changes have been proposed and an in-depth evaluation will be made under the supervision of the Chief of Staff.

Study Group Response: Mission statement has been revised by USMA. Study Group has proposed a comprehensive concept for USMA which enlarges upon the academic orientation encompassed in the revised mission statement.

8. Borman Recommendation: The Superintendent should have responsibility for all aspects of the internal administration of the Academy, including resolving the competing demands made by subordinate authorities upon individual cadets.

Army Response: Army concurs. The Superintendent's authority has been significantly increased, while the Academic Board's effort has been redirected to emphasize academic excellence. A new general officer position, the Provost, is being created to supervise many of the functions which now fall directly under the Superintendent, such as admissions, athletics, post support activities, and others. This will assist the

Superintendent in better focusing internal administration to rationalize competing demands placed upon individual cadets.

Study Group Response: Governance and command/control proposals of the Study Group were drafted with firm control at the top as a guiding principle. The Study Group does not recommend a Provost, but subsumes the functions intended for that position in the recommended position of Deputy Superintendent.

9. Borman Recommendation: Superintendent selection should be based upon his interest in education and a demonstrated ability to provide educational and military leadership.

Army Response: Army concurs.

Study Group Response: Study Group concurs.

10. Borman Recommendation: Superintendent should be assigned to the Academy for a minimum of 5 years and should be consulted as to the selection and length of service of the Commandant of Cadets and Dean of the Academic Board.

Army Response: Army concurs. The tour should be normally 4 to 8 years. The Superintendent will be consulted on the selection and length of service of his key aides.

Study Group Response: The Study Group endorses the recommendation.

11. Borman Recommendation: Permanent professors should not serve on active duty for more than 30 years, unless requested to continue on a term basis by the Superintendent with the approval of the Secretary of the Army.

Army Response: Army concurs. Current law provides permanent professors may be retired by the SA when they have more than 30 years of service as a commissioned officer. Possible revisions to present procedures are being addressed by the Army staff and the Academy.

Study Group Response: The Study Group noted that statute currently provides for service of Professors, USMA beyond 30 years at the pleasure of the Secretary of the Army. A mechanism is, therefore, available for the termination of the service of those professors no longer functioning in a fully effective manner. The Study Group believes that no change of statute is necessary in this respect.

12. Borman Recommendation: The Professor of Physical Education should be a member of the Academic Board.

Army Response: Army concurs. Instructions have been given to change USMA regulations accordingly.

Study Group Response: Endorsed by the Study Group.

13. Borman Recommendation: The Office of Military Leadership, a department concerned in large part with providing academic instruction in behavioral sciences, should be transferred to the Academic Department. The Director of that department should be a member of the Academic Board.

Army Response: Army concurs. The Office of Military Leadership will be retitled the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. Changes are being taken to make the Director a permanent professor and member of the Academic Board.

Study Group Response: Study Group concurs. Already implemented by USMA.

14. Borman Recommendation: There should be an expansion of programs which bring outside viewpoints to the Academy, e.g., visiting professors to and from the Academy.

Army Response: Action has already been taken to expand the visiting professor program from 2 to 5 and to bring additional outside viewpoints to the Academy. Furthermore, the program will be broadened to permit selected professors to participate as visiting professors at civilian institutions and to provide for service on active duty tours with military units.

Study Group Response: The Study Group recommends establishment of a five percent of faculty goal for the civilian visiting professor program, adding that visitors should be recruited on an as-required basis rather than on a departmental quota. The Group also recommended and initiated steps toward establishing a routine input of Material Development and Readiness Command scientists as visiting faculty.

15. Borman Recommendation: The Academy must reaffirm the role of the Tactical Officer as a company commander and ensure that this role is uniformly adhered to throughout the Tactical Department.

Army Response: Army concurs. Superintendent has been directed to reaffirm the role of the Tactical Officer which will be promulgated throughout the staff, faculty, and Corps of Cadets.

Study Group Response: The Study Group concurs fully with both aspects. The Study Group recommendations include affirmation of the Tactical Officer as the company commander and methods for improving and standardizing both tactical officer selection and operation. Specifically, the tactical officer should possess both academic and military credentials of note, and he should be personally interviewed by the Commandant, USMA. USMA should adopt and implement the commander model for the Tactical Officer in AY 1977-78, and the dual chain of command should be eliminated in favor of a direct officer-cadet chain of command.

16. Borman Recommendation: Tactical Officers should be selected from officers who have completed Command and General Staff College or equivalent education.

Army Response: Army concurs. Tactical Officers selected will be mature officers normally with C&GSC level and graduate level schooling.

Study Group Response: The Study Group agrees that Command and General Staff College experience can be an asset, but it should not be a requirement for selection as a Tactical Officer. The Staff College standard does serve as an indicator of maturity and professional competence, but there are ideally qualified officers who have not yet satisfied the eligibility for Staff College selection. The selection process for Tactical Officers is being revised considerably with Staff College experience being a factor, not a determinant.

17. Borman Recommendation: The Leadership Evaluation System should be reviewed to determine whether it is a constructive force in the cadets' leadership development.

Army Response: Army concurs. A study group will intensively review the Leadership Evaluation System on a priority basis.

Study Group Response: The Study Group recommends the elimination of the Leadership Evaluation System as it now exists. Some form of this evaluation may remain, but, as a minimum, the peer ratings should cease.

18. Borman Recommendation: Judge Advocates who defend cadets should have no teaching duties.

Army Response: Army concurs for the near term. There will be continuing review to ensure the spirit of the recommendation is being pursued. In addition, a USMA post Staff Judge Advocate office has been approved and will be established.

Study Group Response: The Academy has already removed the SJA function from the Law Department and placed the former on the Superintendent's personal staff.

19. Borman Recommendation: Military leadership courses should include examination of the role of the lawyer as an advisor to the commander, and the role of defense counsel in the justice system.

Army Response: Army concurs. Course in ethics and professionalism will include the role of the lawyer as an advisor to the commander, and the role of defense counsel in the justice system.

Study Group Response: The Study Group's legal advisor reviewed all course syllabi in law and related areas to ensure adequate coverage. Requisite material is well covered. The Academy also plans to send each Regimental Tactical Officer to the Senior Officers' Legal Orientation at the USA JAG School commencing in the upcoming academic year.

APPENDIX B
COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND
CONSULTANTS

1. Academic Committee

1. Members at Department of the Army

MG Hillman Dickinson - Chairman

- BS - USMA
- MA (Physics) - Columbia University
- PhD (Physics) - Stevens Institute of Technology
- Instructor USMA 1956 (Chemistry)
- Assistant Professor USMA 1957-60 (Physics)
- Research and Development
- Command in Armor Units

COL William S. Fulton - Legal Advisor

- BA - University of Iowa
- JD - University of New Mexico
- Commandant, Judge Advocate General's School
- Infantry and Judge Advocate General

COL Theron W. Knapp - ROTC Advisor

- BS - USMA
- MS (Electrical Engineering) - Georgia Institute of Technology
- Command in Armor Units

LTC(P) Woolf P. Gross - Deputy

- BA cum laude (Anthropology) - Harvard University
- MA (Asian Regional Studies) - University of Pennsylvania
- Instructor Geo Wash Univ 1967-68 (International Relations)
- Command in Field Artillery Units

LTC Joseph E. Brown - Member

- BS (Chemistry) - Georgia Institute of Technology
- MS (Physics) - Iowa State University
- MS (Ops Research) - New York University
- Assistant Professor USMA 1967-70 (Math)
- Command in Infantry Training Units

LTC Frederick J. McConville - Member

- BS - USMA
- MBA (Gov't and Econ) - Harvard University
- Ass't to Dean, USMA 1966-68
- Command in Field Artillery Units

LTC Jerry W. Witherspoon - Member
- BS - USMA
- MBA (Management) - Long Island University
- MA (Psychology) - University of North Carolina
- Assistant Professor USMA 1973-76 (Psychology)
- Research and Development

MAJ Dean E. Dowling - Member
- BS - USMA
- MA (English) - Columbia University
- PhD (English) - Columbia University
- Assistant Professor USMA 1970-73 (English)
- Personnel Management

MAJ Jerry M. Sollinger - Member
- BA - University of Pittsburgh
- MA (English) - University of Pittsburgh
- PhD (English) - University of Pittsburgh
- Assistant Professor USMA 1970-74 (English)

Also Assisting the Academic Committee were:

COL Walter M. Cousland
- BS - USMA
- MA (English) University of Pennsylvania
- Assistant Professor USMA 1962-66 (English)
- Regimental Commander, 1972-73
- Command in Armor Units

LTC John R. Nevins
- BS - USMA
- MPA - Syracuse University
- Assistant Professor USMA 1972-75 (Social Sciences)
- Command in Field Artillery Units

DR. John J. Burke - Associate Director, Army Materials and Mechanics Research Center
- BS (Physics) Boston College
- MS (Geophysics) Boston College
- MS (Metallurgy) MIT
- Metallurgical Engineer - MIT
- ScD (Metallurgy and Material Sciences) MIT

2. West Point Corresponding Members

COL Thomas E. Griess - Senior Member
- BS - USMA
- MS (Civil Engr) - University of Illinois
- PhD (History) - Duke University
- Professor and Head of Department of History

COL Allen F. Grum - Member
- BS - USMA
- MS (Civil Engr) - MIT
- PhD (Systems Analysis) - Stanford University
- Permanent Associate Professor of Engineering

COL Edward A. Saunders - Member
- BS - USMA
- MS (Electrical Engr) - Purdue University
- PhD (Nuclear Science) - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
- Professor and Head of Department of Physics

COL Arvid West - Member
- BS - USMA
- MS (Public Affairs) - Shippensburg
- Commander 2d Regiment United States Corps of Cadets

COL Robert M. Wilson - Member
- BS - USMA
- MS (Civil Engr) - MIT
- PhD (Electrical Engineering) - Lehigh University
- Professor and Head of Department of Mechanics

LTC James Abrahamson - Member
- BS - USMA
- MA (History) - Stanford University
- MA (Int'l Studies) - University of Geneva
- Permanent Associate Professor of History

LTC Paul M. Bons - Member
- BS - USMA
- MA (Psychology) - Wayne State University
- PhD (Psychology) - University of Washington
- Permanent Associate Professor, Office of Military Leadership

LTC Peter Stromberg - Member
- BS - USMA
- MA (English) - Cornell University
- PhD (English) - Cornell University
- Professor of English

MAJ James R. Golden - Coordinator
- BS - USMA
- MPA (Public Admin) - Harvard University
- PhD (Economics) - Harvard University
- Permanent Associate Professor of Social Sciences

3. Civilian Consultants

Dr. Ruth Adams - Vice President, Dartmouth College
- Former President, Wellesley College

Mr. Junius J. Bleiman - Director, Mid-Career Program, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
- Former Instructor USMA

Dr. Davis B. Bobrow - Chairman, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland
- Member, Defense Science Board
- Panel Member, National Science Foundation

Dr. Marvin Bressler - Chairman, Department of Sociology, Princeton University

Dr. Richard G. Folsom - President Emeritus, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
- Member, National Academy of Science
- Member, Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Board on Education
- Chairman, US Naval Academy Curriculum Review Board, 1959
- Member, US Air Force Academy Board of Review

Mr. Dennis Gray - Dean of Students, Claremont Men's College
- Staff, Borman Commission
- Former Instructor, US Air Force Academy and Princeton

Dr. Inge D. Halpert - Professor, Dept of German, Columbia University

Dr. David A. Hills - Associate Professor of Psychology, Wake Forest University
- Coordinator of Student Services, Wake Forest

Dr. Stephen J. Lukasik - Senior Vice President, Rand Corporation
- Former Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Member, Defense Science Board
- Vice Chairman, Science Advisory Committee, DIA

Dr. Steven Marcus - Professor, Dept of English, Columbia University

Mr. Lawrence H. O'Neill, President, Riverside Research Institute
- Former Professor of Electrical Engineering, Columbia Univ
- Former Dean of Engineering, Columbia University
- Member, Defense Science Board
- Former Chairman, Army Scientific Advisory Panel

Dr. John W. Shy - Professor, Dept of History, Univ of Michigan
- Visiting Professor, Army War College

Dr. John Deutch - Chairman, Department of Chemistry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Vice Chairman, Defense Science Board

Mr. James P. Riley - Executive Director Federal Library System
- Former member Georgetown University Library Faculty
- Former Deputy Director, University of Chicago Library
- Former Director, Marquette University Library

B. Military Professional Development Committee

1. Members

BG(P) Jack N. Merritt - Chairman

- BGE (History) - University of Nebraska at Omaha
- MBA (Business Administration) - George Washington University
- Systems Analyst
- Staff Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1970-73
- Command in Combat Units

COL Jarold L. Hutchison - Deputy

- BS - USMA
- MS (Physical Education) - Indiana University
- MS (Counseling) Shippensburg State College
- Assistant Professor USMA 1963-66 (Physical Education)
- Command in Infantry Units

COL Francis J. Waldman, Jr. - Member

- BS - USMA
- MPA (Public Administration) - Harvard University
- Assistant Professor USMA 1956-59 (Social Sciences)
- Command in Infantry Units

Dr. Donald D. Penner - Member

- BS (Industrial Management)
- MA (Industrial Relations)
- PhD (Social Psychology)
- Professor, US Army War College

LTC Doris L. Caldwell - Member

- BA (Personnel Administration) - Sacramento State College
- MPA (Public Administration) - Golden Gate College
- Command in Training Units

LTC Dale E. Hruby - Member

- BS - USMA
- MA (History) - Columbia University
- Assistant Professor USMA 1966-68 (Social Sciences)
- Command in Armor Units

LTC William P. McKay - Member

- BA (Political Science) - University of Georgia
- JD (LAW) - University of Georgia
- Staff Judge Advocate

LTC Gerald D. Pike - Member

- BA (Sociology) - Washington State University
- MA (Sociology) - Washington State University
- Assistant Professor USMA 1969-72 (Sociology)
- Organizational Effectiveness

LTC George W. Sibert -- Member

- BS - USMA
- MSE (Aeronautical Engineering) - Princeton University
- Command in Infantry Units

LTC Gerald E. Webb - Member

- BA (Business Administration) - Rutgers University
- MPA (Public Administration) - George Washington University
- Tactical Officer USMA 1970-73
- Command in Infantry Units

MAJ David A. Bramlett - Member

- BS - USMA
- MA - English
- Assistant Professor USMA 1972-75 (English)
- Command in Infantry Units

MAJ Robert J. Davis - Member

- BS - USMA
- Operations Officer USCC, USMA 1975 to present
- Command in Infantry Units

MAJ John M. Keane - Executive Officer

- BS (Accounting) - Fordham University
- MA (Philosophy) - Western Kentucky University
- Command in Infantry Units

MAJ John T. Wells - Member

- BS (Mathematics) - Eastern Kentucky University
- Command in Armor Units

2. Consultants

MAJ Stephen D. Clement
US Army Administration Center, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN
PhD, Organizational Communications

Dr. Robert F. Holz
US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences
PhD, Social Psychology

Dr. T. O. Jacobs
US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences
PhD, Psychology

LTC William K. Schrage
US Army Center of Military History
MA, History

3. Points of Contact Provided by West Point

COL Thomas F. Cole
Director of Military Instruction

COL James R. Hall, Jr.
Commander, Fourth Regiment, USCC

COL Lloyd J. Matthews
Permanent Associate Professor, Department of English

COL Hal B. Rhyne
Special Assistant to Commandant for Honor Matters

LTC Kermit M. Henninger
Deputy Director of Physical Education

MAJ George A. Crocker
Tactical Officer, A-1

MAJ Robert A. Brace II
Tactical Officer, I-3

MAJ Mary C. Willis
Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

CPT Dennis Fogarty
Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

C. Environment Committee

1. Members

MG Jack V. Mackmull - Chairman

- BS - USMA
- Infantry troop and staff assignments
- Aviation commands, battalion through brigade
- Commanding General, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance

COL Veloy J. Varner - Deputy

- BS - USMA
- MA - Columbia University
- Command and Staff in Infantry Units
- Assistant Professor, USMA 1968-71 (History)
- Commander, US Army Readiness Group, Los Angeles

COL John H. Oakes

- BS - USMA
- Command and Staff in Field Artillery Units
- Senior Field Artillery Instructor, USMA 1967-70
- Chief, Ground/Air Group, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency

LTC David G. Cotts

- BS - USMA
- MS - Iowa State University
- Command and Staff in Engineer Units
- Tactical Officer, USMA 1969-72
- Staff Officer, Office of the Chief of Engineers

LTC Walter S. Dillard

- BS - USMA
- MA - University of Washington
- PhD - University of Washington
- Command and Staff in Armored Cavalry and Infantry Units
- Assistant Professor, USMA, 1969-72 (Social Sciences and History)
- Staff Officer, Office of Chief of Staff, US Army

LTC Edward I. Hickey

- BS - USMA
- MS - University of Pennsylvania
- Command and Staff in Infantry and Transportation Units
- Staff and Faculty, USMA 1972-75
- Staff Officer, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army

LTC Hans O. Wagner

- BS - USMA
- MS - Purdue University
- Command and Staff in Armor and Special Forces Units
- Tactical Officer, USMA 1970-73
- Staff Officer, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army

LTC Willie F. Wright

- BS - Virginia State College
- MS - George Washington University
- Command and Staff in Infantry Units
- Staff Officer, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army

MAJ Thomas E. Faley

- BS - USMA
- MS - University of Miami
- Command and Staff in Infantry Units
- Instructor, USMA, 1969-72 (Psychology and Leadership)
- Staff Officer, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army

MAJ Robert F. Scheidig

- BS - USMA
- MS - US Naval Post Graduate School
- Command and Staff in Infantry Units
- Instructor (ROTC) and Tactical Officer, the Citadel, 1967-68
- Staff Officer, Office of Chief of Staff, US Army

MAJ Ted K. Yamashita

- BS - USMA
- MS - University of Illinois
- Command and Staff with Infantry Units
- Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of Illinois, 1970-72
- Staff Officer, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army

CPT Peggy A. Stubbs

- BA - West Georgia College
- MA - Central Michigan University
- Command and Staff in Women's Army Corps Units
- Instructor, US Army Institute of Administration (Management and Leadership)
- Section Chief, US Army Military Personnel Center

2. Principal Contacts at USMA

COL James H. Tormey
Chief of Staff, USMA

COL Clarence D. Gilkey
Director, Facilities and Engineering, USMA

COL Joseph T. Griffin, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Security, USMA

COL William F. Luebbert
Director, Instruction Support and Information Systems Division,
USMA

COL Edward Mennona
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, USMA

COL Alexander P. Polak
Comptroller, USMA

COL Manley E. Rogers
Director of Admissions and Registrar

COL Graham M. Sibbles
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, USMA

COL Michael S. Sirkis
Cadet Activities Officer

COL William J. Taylor
Permanent Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences

LTC Donald J. Barlow
Treasurer, USMA

LTC Robert F. Danner
Office of the Director of Admissions and Registrar

LTC Berwyn L. Place
Management Information Systems Division, USMA

LTC George D. Waters
Director of Institutional Research

MAJ Mary C. Willis
Operations Officer, HQ, USMA

Mr. Jack P. Riley
Office of Director of Intercollegiate Athletics

Mr. Homer Smith
Office of Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, USMA

Mr. John J. Smith
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, USMA

APPENDIX C
RESEARCH LOG

The West Point Study Group obtained its information from:

A. Consultations with:

1. The Army Staff
2. The Superintendent, Commandant, and Dean, USMA
3. 125 USMA Faculty members
4. 206 USMA Tactical Officers and staff
5. 580 USMA Cadets
6. 20 Active Army General Officers
7. 21 Retired Army General Officers
8. 16 Leaders of the Academic Community
9. Superintendent, Commandants, and Deans of all US Service Academies and Canadian, British, German, and French Academies
10. 99 Staff and Faculty at other service academies
11. 38 other service academy cadets and midshipmen
12. Others including ex-cadets and ROTC students

B. Visits to:

1. All US Service Academies
2. British, Canadian, French, and German Military Colleges
3. Six private or state military colleges
4. 10 civilian colleges and universities
5. US Army War College
6. US Army Command and General Staff College
7. Seven Training and Doctrine Command Schools
8. Nine Active Army Divisions

C. Questionnaires administered to:

1. 824 recently commissioned Lieutenants serving as platoon leaders (both USMA and ROTC graduates)
2. 750 of their commanders and subordinate non-commissioned officers
3. 1,165 cadets
4. 385 West Point staff and faculty

D. Letter replies from current Corps Commanders, Division Commanders, Major Command Chiefs of Staff, Commandants of Combat Arm and Combat Support Arm Schools, and separate Brigade and Regimental Commanders

E. Analysis of literature available to include:

1. Accreditation reports of USMA and USNA

2. Previous studies of the Academies, such as:
 - (a) The White Committee Report
 - (b) The Folsom Committee Report
 - (c) The Kappel Board Report
 - (d) The Borman Commission Report
 - (e) GAO Report on Student Attrition
 - (f) Report of Special Study Group on Honor
3. Annual Class Questionnaires
4. Surveys of Graduates
5. Commercially published works concerning the history and operation of the Academy.

APPENDIX D
BOARD AND COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

A. Policy Board Committees

1. Committee on Committees.

Responsibilities: To advise the Policy Board on the need to establish, change, or terminate Policy Board Committees; to recommend the membership and chairmanship of standing and ad hoc committees, the terms of appointment for members, and the charters of those committees.

Composition: Dean (Chairman), Commandant, Chief of Staff, three tenured faculty members who are not members of the Policy Board elected by the Academic Board for 3-year terms, and Director of Plans and Analysis (Secretary without vote).

2. Tenured Personnel Selection Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Policy Board concerning policies and procedures for selection of tenured staff and faculty.

Composition: Associate Dean, Deputy Commandant, Chief of Staff, a tenured representative from each academic department, one non-tenured representative from each Academic Division, and the Assistant to the Dean (Secretary without vote).

3. Scheduling Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Policy Board on the scheduling of activities, the development of the yearly events calendar (with special attention to demands on cadets), policies relating to scheduling; and to resolve exceptions to policy, and conflicts in scheduling.

Composition: One representative of the Dean, Commandant, and Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, one representative appointed by each chairman of Academic Division Committees and each Director of the Office of the Commandant, one representative of the Deputy Post Commander, one representative of the Director of Plans and Analysis, and the Assistant to the Dean (Secretary without vote).

4. Cadet Extracurricular Activities Committee.

Responsibilities: To monitor the policies, regulations, and procedures of cadet extracurricular activities and to recommend appropriate changes.

Composition: Brigade Tactical Officer; Director of Cadet Activities (Secretary); a representative of the Dean; the officers in charge of SCUSA, the Debate Council and Forum, and the Fine Arts Forum; two representatives from other academic departments to be appointed by the Dean; and a representative of the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics.

5. Athletic Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Policy Board on policy matters concerning the total USMA athletic program, to include facilities, in order to provide for an integrated, coordinated, and balanced athletic program.

Composition: Director of Intercollegiate Athletics (Secretary); Director, Office of Physical Education; Director of Cadet Activities, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration; one representative each, colonel or below on rotating basis, of the Dean and Commandant; one non-tenured faculty member; a company tactical officer; one representative each appointed from the Post Staff and from the Alumni Association; a tenured colonel from an Academic Department (chairman), not an Admissions Committee member, selected by the Superintendent for a 2-year term renewable up to 6 years; and appropriate cadet representation as determined by the Commandant.

6. Professional Development Committee.

Responsibilities: To monitor the professional development of cadets; to ensure that the academic and military components of the program of instruction reflect the changing needs of the graduate, the Army, and the Academy.

Composition: Dean and Commandant (to alternate chairmanship for 1-year terms), a representative of each Academic Divisional area, a representative of the Brigade Tactical Officer and of the Director of Cadet Activities, and two non-tenured faculty members and two company tactical officers to be appointed by the Superintendent for 2-year terms; the Dean will designate a Secretary without vote.

7. Cadet Life Committee.

Responsibilities: To monitor the quality of cadet life.

Composition: Representative of the Dean; a representative of each Academic Divisional area, a representative of the Director of Cadet Activities, two non-tenured faculty members and two company

members and two company tactical officers appointed by the Superintendent for 2-year terms, a cadet from each of the three upper classes appointed by the Commandant. The Commandant will designate a Secretary without vote.

8. Computer Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Policy Board on automation-related matters (computers, microform, etc.); to review and support Academy automation requirements; to establish automation policies and resolve problems regarding automation support.

Composition: Heads or designated representatives of the Academy agencies which are primary users of computer support (Office of the Dean, Commandant, Director of Plans and Analysis, Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, Director of Administration, and Comptroller). Non-voting members will be the Automation Management Office (AMO) and other personnel involved in computer support or instruction.

9. Institutional Research Advisory Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Policy Board on current institutional research and to recommend programs of institutional research.

Composition: Director of Plans and Analysis, one tenured and one non-tenured faculty member appointed by the Dean for 2-year terms, two representatives appointed by the Commandant, the Director of Admissions and Registrar, Assistant to the Dean for Academic Research. The Director of Plans and Analysis will appoint the Secretary without vote.

10. Chaplain Coordinating Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Policy Board on the religious and ethical activities of the Corps of Cadets and the West Point staff and faculty.

Composition: Deputy Commandant; Special Assistant for Honor; two tenured faculty members appointed by the Dean; Chaplain, United States Military Academy, Post Chaplain; Catholic Chaplain; and Jewish Chaplain.

B. Academic Board Committees

1. Cullum Committee.

Responsibilities: To carry out the provisions of the will of General Cullum for the planning, procurement, installation, custody, care, and preservation of all statues, busts, mural tablets, portraits, and other works of art in the Cullum Memorial Hall.

Composition: Superintendent (Chairman), Heads of four Academic Departments, Alumni Secretary (Secretary without vote).

2. Admissions Committee.

Responsibilities: To recommend annually to the Academic Board criteria for admission and readmission to the Military Academy and, based thereon, to present to the Academic Board the names of candidates found qualified and recommended for admission and readmission.

Composition: Director of Admissions and Registrar (Chairman), tenured representatives of the Departments of English and Mathematics, representatives of the Commandant, director of Physical Education, and Professor of Military Hygiene (when appropriate), two other members appointed by the Superintendent to serve for a period of 2 years, and Deputy Director of Admissions and Registrar (Secretary without vote).

3. Faculty Research Advisory Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Academic Board on instructional and faculty research.

Composition: Associate Dean (Chairman), one tenured and one non-tenured faculty member appointed by the Dean for 2-year terms, two representatives appointed by the Commandant of Cadets, the Director of Plans and Analysis, Assistant to the Dean for Academic Research (Secretary without vote).

C. Dean's Committees.

1. Curriculum Committee.

Responsibilities: To conduct a continuing review of the curriculum and to develop proposals for change that may be deemed necessary.

Composition: Associate Dean (Chairman), a tenured representative from each Academic Division, two non-tenured faculty members appointed by the Dean for 2-year terms, a representative each from the Offices of Physical Education and Military Instruction appointed by the Commandant for 2-year terms, and the Assistant to the Dean (Secretary without vote).

2. Class Committees. (First, Second, Third, Fourth)

Responsibilities: To report to the Dean on academic matters pertaining particularly to the cadet class concerned, including the determination of proficiency of cadets, cadets to be advanced from class to class, the disposition of cadets who are deficient, and cadets who are to be granted diplomas.

Composition: Two non-tenured faculty members from departments which teach required courses to the class concerned, a representative from the Office of Physical Education, a representative from the Department of Tactics, and the Chairman (appointed by the Dean) who will be the Head of an Academic Department which teaches a required course to the class concerned; the Assistant to the Dean will be Secretary without vote.

3. Scholarship Committee.

Responsibilities: To recommend to the Dean cadet candidates for scholarships authorized by current Army regulations; to monitor administrative arrangements for scholarship candidates; to report on cadet participation in scholarship programs.

Composition: Representatives of Department Heads of Social Sciences, Engineering, Physics, and Foreign Languages; a representative appointed by the Commandant and representatives from two other academic departments appointed by the Dean for 2-year terms. The senior member will be Chairman; the Assistant to the Dean will be Secretary without vote.

4. Academic Division.

Responsibilities: To recommend to the Dean course content, elective courses, concentration, and field requirements, and other matters relating to the several disciplines in the academic division.

Composition: Chairman to be elected by the tenured faculty members in each department within the divisional area, a tenured and non-tenured faculty member appointed by each Head of Department in the divisional area for a 2-year term, and a representative appointed by the Commandant for a 2-year term.

5. Instructional Support Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Dean on matters concerning the use of Academic Computer Center and instructional technology to support cadet instruction.

Composition: Associate Dean (Chairman), one representative from the Departments of Earth, Space, and Graphics Sciences, Mathematics, Physics, and Engineering; two representatives from other Academic departments to be appointed for 1-year terms on a rotating basis; and a representative each from the Office of the Commandant, the Deputy Post Commander, and Instructional Support; and Assistant to the Dean (Secretary without vote).

6. Library Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Dean on matters concerning the operations of the USMA Library and to recommend to the Dean changes in policy, regulations, or procedures applicable to the Library.

Composition: Librarian; Director of Plans and Analysis; tenured representatives of the Heads of Departments of English, History, and Social Sciences; and a non-tenured representative of each of the remaining academic departments who shall serve for a period of 2 years. The Chairman will be the senior tenured faculty member; the Assistant to the Dean will be Secretary without vote.

7. Cadet Academic Council.

Responsibilities: To advise the Dean on academic matters of concern to the Corps of Cadets.

Composition: Sixteen cadets (one from each class in each regiment) appointed by the Commandant; the Chairman and Secretary will be elected from the members.

8. Mathematics Instruction.

Responsibilities: To coordinate the content and timing of mathematics instruction with the requirements of other courses; to eliminate duplicatory teaching requirements; to develop applications and requirements which exploit the use of computers as mathematical problem-solving devices.

Composition: One representative each from the Department of Behavioral and Leadership Sciences, Chemistry, Earth, Space, and Graphic Sciences; Electrical Engineering, Mathematics, Mechanics, Physics, Social Sciences; Office of the Commandant; and Instructional Support and Information Systems Division, Office of the Dean. Secretary without vote, Assistant to the Dean.

9. Writing.

Responsibilities: To develop and coordinate a logical and balanced program of written requirements spanning the four-year curriculum; to establish standards for the length and scope of requirements within each year; to review and establish grading standards for grammar and manner of expression.

Composition: One representative each from the Departments of Behavioral and Leadership Sciences, English, History, Law, Social

Sciences; Office of the Commandant; Basic Sciences and Mathematics Division; and Applied Science and Engineering Division. Secretary: Assistant to the Dean.

D. Commandant's Committees

1. Professional and Military Training.

Responsibilities: To advise the Commandant of Cadets on the program of professional and military training of the Corps of Cadets by the Department of Tactics.

Composition: Director of Military Instruction (Chairman), two company tactical officers, one instructor from the Office of Physical Education, two representatives from the Department of Military Instruction, and one tenured faculty representative and one non-tenured faculty representative appointed by the Dean. Secretary to be appointed by the Chairman.

2. Disciplinary Review Committee.

Responsibilities: To advise the Commandant on the state of discipline in the Corps of Cadets; to propose any needed changes in policy or procedures; and to recommend the dismissal of any cadet for deficiency in conduct.

Composition: Brigade Tactical Officer (Chairman); three additional officers appointed by the Commandant; one tenured and one non-tenured faculty member appointed by the Dean for 2-year, overlapping terms; two cadets (without vote or attendance on matters of dismissal) appointed by the Cadet First Captain; a commissioned officer from the Commandant's office (Secretary without vote).

3. Category I and II Leadership Boards.

Responsibilities: To advise the Commandant on leadership instruction, positions, and evaluation, and to recommend for dismissal those cadets deficient in leadership.

Composition: Brigade Tactical Officer (Chairman), regimental/battalion Tactical Officers, two officers appointed by the Commandant, tenured representative of the Department of Behavioral and Leadership Sciences, and three officers appointed by the Dean for 2-year terms.

E. Deputy Post Commander's Committees

1. Installation Planning Board.

Responsibilities: To prepare the proposed Master Plan for the Academy, to ensure appropriate coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies for resolution of unusual physical development problems, to ensure that maximum use is made of existing facilities, and to formulate and justify the construction program for the installation.

Composition: Dean (Chairman), Commandant, three Heads of Academic Departments to be appointed by the Superintendent, Chief of Staff, Deputy Post Commander, Director of Industrial Operations, Comptroller, Director of Plans and Analysis, Director of Facilities Engineering (Secretary), and the Deputy District Engineer of the New York District.

2. Museum Board.

Responsibilities: To recommend policy for museum operations; to advise on museum memorial gift and award activities, and on joint gift funds of the West Point Museum and the USMA Library.

Composition: Tenured representative of the Department of History; three faculty members appointed by the Dean for 2-year terms, Director of Alumni Affairs and Gifts, Museum Director, and USMA Librarian (Secretary). The Superintendent will appoint the Chairman.

3. School Board.

Responsibilities: To review curricular, faculty and staff, and facilities matters of the West Point Elementary School System.

Composition: Three representatives appointed by the Dean, one representative appointed by the Commandant, one representative appointed by the Deputy Post Commander; Secretary (without vote) will be the school superintendent. The Superintendent will appoint the Chairman.

4. Housing Advisory Council.

Responsibilities: To review housing policies and to recommend needed changes.

Composition: Three members appointed by the Dean, one member appointed by the Commandant, one member appointed by the Deputy Post Commander (Chairman); the Chief of the Housing Division will serve as Secretary (without vote).

5. Real Property Construction and Maintenance Review Board.

Responsibilities: To advise on all matters pertaining to minor new construction and all major real property maintenance projects.

Composition: Chief of Staff (Chairman), Deputy Post Commander, Dean's representative, Commandant's representative, Director of Industrial Operations, Director of Facilities Engineering (Secretary), Comptroller, Assistant Deputy Post Commander (Stewart Army Subpost).

APPENDIX F
ADMISSIONS

A. Discussion.

Perhaps no other single factor influences the environment of a university as dramatically as does the quality of its entrants. With regard to the Academy, some interviewees stated during the course of our study that the primary success of West Point could be attributed to the consistent quality of its entering classes. This perception indicated the importance of the Admissions Office and its programs to the environment. In turn, it is this importance which has focused attention upon the Admissions Office from sources both internal and external to the Academy. Much is expected from the Admissions Office, and it is readily criticized for real or imagined faults. Inseparable from our study of admissions were the topics of pregraduation attrition and post-graduation resignation. The Study Group found no unanimity concerning the relationship of cadet attrition and graduate resignations to the cadet environment nor could any definite relationships be established concerning the effect of the cadet environment on these losses. However, no topics involving the Military Academy have been the subject of as much internal and external study and conjecture as the attrition of cadets over the four-year program and of graduates prior to the completion of a full career. This attention is understandable, given the outstanding quality of each entering class, the considerable cost of the educational and training programs, and the public nature of the institution. Since West Point is a national institution, its cadets and graduates are viewed by the public as more than just college students and Army officers. This fact alone demanded the inclusion of these brief comments on both attrition and post-graduation resignation.

The mission of the Admissions Office is to establish and execute admissions procedures and maintain candidate records. Perhaps no other major office at the Academy has changed so radically in recent history. The expansion of the Corps of Cadets during a period of vocal anti-militarism was the catalyst which caused significant change in the administration of the admissions program. This required the Admissions Office to depart from its traditional role of processing candidate records and Congressional education and liaison to that of an active seeker of qualified, motivated candidates. While the traditional missions of the Admissions Office remain, all available indicators of the target population dictate an aggressive program of recruiting, admissions information distribution, high school counselor education, and personal contacts with interested groups and individuals. The Admissions Office generally has moved aggressively in these areas with the excellent, innovative Cadet Public Relations program, the Reserve Officer Liaison program, use of the West Point Societies, and the educator visits. The computer program, designed to support admissions programs, was found to be one of the most innovative management systems at USNA.

Through the years West Point has continued to attract an outstanding class; and, judged by any standards, candidates are competitive with the other academies. It is significant to note that, while SAT scores nationwide have declined and the size of the entering classes have expanded, the quality of candidate attracted to the Academy, as measured by SAT scores, has remained basically constant. A different type comparison, that of attitudes, educational background, and career aspirations of entrants, compared with other groupings of college and universities, again indicates the high quality of Academy entrants.

Figures analyzed indicate that the admissions program must continue to improve if scholastic achievement is to be the primary indicator of quality for the incoming class and if USMA is to compare favorably with the other Federal academies. One method of improvement which should be consistently pursued is to question candidates declining appointments and other top quality prospects to determine what the Academy and the Army could do to improve the competitive position of West Point. Studies of prospects who decline have been conducted in the past but need institutionalization until negative factors can be identified and corrected.

The admission procedures for the admittance of women appear to have been well planned, managed, and coordinated. The entry figure of about 100 women per class appears to be an appropriate number, not only to provide a proper environment at West Point, but to meet projected needs of _____ well.

The admissions procedures are cumbersome, complicated, difficult to understand, and time-consuming in comparison with civilian schools. Steps should be taken to reduce the amount of pre-entrance paperwork required of candidates. Some procedures are mandated by Congress and are beyond the ability of the Academy to change substantively. This difficulty reinforces the importance of providing information to prospective candidates and counselors and explains the shift of emphasis of the Academy's educational efforts from high school juniors and seniors to sophomores and freshmen. Admissions procedures, other than those required by Congress, should be streamlined. Some procedural changes are currently under study by West Point authorities. In addition, West Point should take full advantage of an aggressive early acceptance program for outstanding candidates.

The pool of qualified, motivated candidates for USMA does not appear to be as great as commonly believed. In an effort to maintain the strength of the Corps of Cadets at the level required to meet input quotes for Regular Army officers, candidates may have been admitted whose motivation made them poor risks. Additionally, there appears to be no substantial pool of qualified, motivated women who desire admittance to West Point as long as the curriculum maintains an engineering orientation. Considering these factors, cadet strength should be allowed to fluctuate, within manageable bounds, as agreed upon by the Academy and DA, OSD and the Congress so that the quality of entrants will provide for a high probability of success as cadets and as Regular Army officers.

The composition and functions of the USMA Admissions Committee were similar to all other institutions investigated. The committee deliberations observed were thoughtful, efficient, and mindful of the whole person concept. The Admissions Committee is empowered to act on those candidates obviously qualified and those obviously not. They send to the full Academic Board only those cases upon which they cannot agree or which represent some degree of risk. Nevertheless, over 500 files per year are considered by the Academic Board. It is apparent that current procedures require the forwarding of excessive numbers of files from the Admissions Committee to the Academic Board. The majority of these cases appear to represent excessive attention to detail by the Academic Board. The limits of authority of the Admissions Committee should be broadened so that only those admissions cases which represent major deviations from admissions policies for the entering class are brought before the Academic Board. An expansion of the authority of the Admissions Committee is currently being contemplated by USMA and the Study Group agrees that this is appropriate. It also appears advantageous for the Admissions Office to be authorized to decide on certain obviously qualified or dis-qualified candidates within established policies.

B. Findings.

In summary, the Study Group found that:

- The USMA Admissions Office appears to be well managed, mission-oriented, and anxious to improve its operation. Particularly, commendable is its application of automation to admissions procedures. It is apparent that Admissions Directors at the other service academies respect West Point's admissions operations and techniques.
- The quality of incoming classes has remained high in both absolute and relative terms. However, continuous studies of prospects who decline and independent research of outstanding prospects may allow USMA and/or the Army to identify factors which, if eliminated, would improve USMA's recruiting position.
- The admission program for women appears well-planned, coordinated, and apparently meets the needs of the Academy and the Army.
- While the quality of incoming classes remains high, a more aggressive early admissions program may be necessary in the future to recruit and retain gifted candidates. Recruitment will be necessary to ensure the admission of classes of continued high quality.
- The pool of qualified, motivated candidates desiring to attend USMA does not appear to be as great as is commonly believed.

- The Academic Board consistently reviews approximately 500 candidate files per year. This number appears excessive and easily correctable by broadening the authority of the Admissions Office and the Admissions Committee.

APPENDIX F
THE INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONING INVENTORY (IFI)

The IFI, a product of the Educational Testing Service, was administered at USMA in April 1977. Those completing the survey included 100 faculty members, 38 administrators, 48 members of the Tactical Department, 112 senior cadets (Class of 1977), and 89 junior cadets (Class of 1978). The IFI uses the responses to 132 questions to develop scores on 11 scales. Students answer only the first 72 questions which result in scores for six scales. According to the ETS technical manual:

The IFI provides a means by which a college or university can describe itself in terms of a number of characteristics judged to be of importance in American higher education. The instrument assumes that different individuals and constituent groups will perceive the institution differently; the IFI thus affords the opportunity for study of sources of disparate beliefs about work of the college as a device for self-study, a college's scores on the IFI would have meaning only in relation to the institution's presumed roles and objectives, about which, to be sure, there may or may not be agreement.

The scores of the three staff and faculty groups on the IFI agree on virtually all scales except Institutional Esprit (IE). Scores and definitions appear at the end of this Appendix. The IE scale refers to a sense of shared purposes and high morale among the staff and faculty and low scores suggest antagonism among and between groups as well as poor morale in general within the group. The members of the Department of Tactics are approximately 20 percentile points below the faculty and administrators on the IE scale. Although the IE scores for the faculty and administrators are higher than the average of other institutions, they are lower than one should expect for West Point. When the IFI was taken by 79 faculty members in 1968, the IE score ranked at approximately the 90th percentile, while the current scores for faculty and administrators are at about the 60th percentile. As was mentioned, the Department of Tactics ranks even lower, near the 40th percentile. One explanation for low scores of both the staff, faculty, and Tacs, of course, may be the Electrical Engineering 304 situation and its aftermath, but it should be a matter of concern for the future.

The ETS technical manual suggests that "low scores on the Freedom, Democratic Governance, Improvement of Society, and Meeting Local Needs scales and relatively high scores on the Institutional Esprit and Self-Study and Planning dimensions are consistent with one's expectations, given the special mission of the military academies." The manual does not predict the relatively high score on Concern for Advancing Knowledge (Ak) or the significantly low scores on Concern for Innovation. The

high AK score may have resulted from a misinterpretation of some questions. However, given the mission of USMA, one would expect that the AK score would be lower, particularly in comparison with Concern for Undergraduate Learning (UL). AK measures the degree of emphasis on research and scholarship while UL reflects the degree of emphasis on undergraduate teaching and learning. If the scores on AK and UL are accurate descriptors of the perceptions at USMA, one might conclude that some shift in emphasis is desirable.

The lower score on Concern for Innovation (CI) may be the most significant indicator of this survey. The technical manual says:

Concern for Innovation refers, in its highest form, to an institutionalized commitment to experimentation with new ideas for educational practice. A high score reflects the view that senior administrators are receptive to new ideas, that people are encouraged to innovate and experiment at all levels, and that significant changes, in the curriculum, for example, have, in fact, been made in recent years. Low scores could imply traditionalism, complacency, or opposition to change in the college community.

Examination of responses to the questions which contribute to the CI scale shows a low rating in "general willingness here to try innovations that have shown promise elsewhere," extremely high rating in "tradition so strong it is hard to modify established procedures or try new ones," very low rating in "senior administrators and department chairmen encourage professors to try new courses and methods," and unusually strong agreement with the statement that "ideas for innovations must be approved by top level administrators before being tried out." The answers support a perception that decisions are controlled at too high a level and that innovations suggested at low levels receive little support. The CI score for this survey is much lower than on the 1968 survey. In 1968, the CI score was only slightly below the national mean while in 1977 it is more than a standard deviation below the mean.

The scores for the two groups of cadets agree with the staff and faculty on Intellectual-Aesthetic Extracurriculum (IAE), Freedom (F), and Democratic Governance (DG). Minor variations occur on Human Diversity (HD), Concern for Improvement of Society (IS), and Concern for Undergraduate Learning (UL).

Cadets perceive the West Point community as less heterogeneous (HD) in terms of faculty and student background and beliefs than do the staff and faculty.

Both cadet groups scored higher on IS than the staff and faculty. The difference is explained when one examines the questions feeding this scale. For example, while 63 percent of the cadets perceive that a number of professors are involved in economic planning at the national or state level, only 26 percent of the staff and faculty believe this is true.

The junior cadets (Class of 1978) scored higher on the UL scale than did the staff and faculty or the Class of 1977. This difference indicates a perception of a slightly greater emphasis on undergraduate learning and teaching than that seen by the other groups.

From the above examination several conclusions emerge:

- a. Although the perceptions of the various groups of the functioning of USMA are in basic agreement, not all of the ratings are at desirable levels.
- b. Esprit and morale among the staff and faculty, especially in the Tactical Department, are unusually low.
- c. The relative emphasis on research and scholarship (AK) and an undergraduate teaching and learning (UL) are inappropriate.
- d. The traditionalism, complacency, opposition to change, and lack of encouragement to innovate and experiment (CI) have become too strong and are stifling initiative.
- e. Too many decisions have to be made at too high a level at the Academy.

The following chart depicts scoring by category of the various groups. Cadets were not surveyed on the last five items.

National Average							
Raw Score	8.49	9.05	7.11	6.75	8.18	6.99	6.86
** Percentile	49	45	49	46	39	45	45
Faculty							
Raw Score	7.3	3.1	6.6	3.5	7.7	2.8	3.8
Percentile	24	1	40	12	32	1	8
Administrators							
Raw Score	7.8	2.5	6.4	3.9	7.7	3.3	3.8
Percentile	30	0	38	15	32	4	8
Tactical Officers							
Raw Score	7.4	2.5	6.3	3.6	7.4	2.7	3.7
Percentile	24	0	35	14	24	0	7
Class of 1977							
Raw Score	7.7	2.5	5.6	4.8	7.4	2.3	*
Percentile	30	0	16	22	24	0	*
Class of 1978							
Raw Score	7.7	2.1	6.0	5.0	8.1	2.1	*
Percentile	30	0	27	24	38	0	*

* No Response

** All percentiles are approximate

BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ELEVEN SCALES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONING INVENTORY

1. **Intellectual-Aesthetic Extracurriculum (IAE):** the extent to which activities and opportunities for intellectual and aesthetic stimulation are available outside the classroom.
2. **Freedom (F):** the extent of academic freedom for faculty and students as well as freedom in their personal lives for all individuals in the campus community.
3. **Human Diversity (HD):** the degree to which the faculty and student body are heterogeneous in their backgrounds and present attitudes.
4. **Concern for Improvement of Society (IS):** the desire among people at the institution to apply their knowledge and skills in solving social problems and prompting social change in America.
5. **Concern for Undergraduate Learning (UL):** the degree to which the college—in its structure, function, and professional commitment of faculty—emphasizes undergraduate teaching and learning.
6. **Democratic Governance (DG):** the extent to which individuals in the campus community who are directly affected by a decision have the opportunity to participate in making the decision.
7. **Meeting Local Needs (MLN):** institutional emphasis on providing educational and cultural opportunities for all adults in the surrounding communities.
8. **Self-Study and Planning (SP):** the importance college leaders attach to continuous long-range planning for the total institution, and to institutional research needed in formulating and revising plans.
9. **Concern for Advancing Knowledge (AK):** the degree to which the institution—in its structure, function, and professional commitment of faculty—emphasizes research and scholarship aimed at extending the scope of human knowledge.
10. **Concern for Innovation (CI):** the strength of institutional commitment to experimentation with new ideas for educational practice.
11. **Institutional Esprit (IE):** the level of morale and sense of shared purposes among faculty and administrators.